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Effects of loss aversion on the evaluation of decision outcomes 
Aikaterini Kokmotou 
 
Abstract 
 
Loss aversion is the tendency to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of 
the same amount. This thesis aimed to explore the neural correlates of loss aversion 
and its effects on the evaluation of monetary decision outcomes. Decision making in 
different contexts was investigated in order to identify specific conditions that could 
modulate the loss aversion effects. 
Individual differences in loss aversion were estimated by employing a 
gambling task and parametric modelling of participants’ choice behaviour. 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings and event-related potential (ERP) analysis 
were utilised in order to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying loss aversion 
during the processing of decision outcomes. 
Results from across four experimental studies showed that loss aversion was 
consistently associated with feedback ERPs. Specifically, the first study demonstrated 
that loss aversion was associated with feedback-related negativity (FRN) component 
after learning the decision outcome. Individual differences in orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) activity during the FRN time window were further associated with individual 
differences in loss aversion. In the second study, loss aversion was associated with 
FRN as well as with P300 component following obtained gains and losses. However, 
no such associations were found for counterfactual gains and losses (i.e., outcomes 
that could have been obtained if a different decision has been made). The third study 
showed that outcomes from choices made by participants themselves and outcomes 
resulting from choices that were arbitrarily inflicted upon participants were processed 
differently. This effect was specific for losses in that losses resulting from unchosen 
decisions produced stronger ERP amplitudes compared to losses resulting from 
decisions chosen by participants. Furthermore, this result was only found for 
participants who displayed increased P300 amplitudes following an obstruction of 
their choice and loss aversion was associated with FRN only in the condition of 
outcomes freely chosen by those participants. The fourth study investigated loss 
aversion within a social context and revealed that participants experienced similar 
levels of loss aversion for themselves and others. For decisions regarding the self, the 
classic FRN was found, however, for decisions regarding others, the FRN was of 
opposite polarity. Furthermore, loss aversion was associated only with FRN following 
decisions that participants made for themselves but not with FRN following decisions 
that participants made for others. 
 This thesis concludes that individual differences in loss aversion exert robust 
effects on the neural evaluation of decision outcomes. These effects were represented 
in feedback ERP components, under the condition that decision outcomes had real 
monetary consequences for the decision makers. Moreover, specific conditions that 
could modify the association between loss aversion and feedback ERPs were 
identified. The motivational significance of the decision outcomes for the decision 
makers appears to be the main factor shaping such effects. 
xvi 
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Decision making, loss aversion and outcome processing 
 
Decision making affects nearly all aspects of daily life. Understanding how 
individuals make choices and how the brain evaluates alternative prospects has 
implications for improving everyday decision making (Camerer et al., 2005; 
Rustichini, 2009). Both environmental and idiosyncratic factors can interfere with the 
decision maker’s ability to make optimal choices (Camerer and Hare, 2013; Glimcher, 
2004), and this is even more problematic in cases where such factors are subliminal 
(Pessiglione et al., 2008). Importantly, many decisions involve risk, which is often 
associated with potential negative consequences (Platt and Huettel, 2008). 
In this thesis, decision making was investigated within the framework of 
prospect theory (PT; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
one of the most influential models of choice behaviour (Fox and Poldrack, 2013; 
Trepel et al., 2005). Specifically, the research that will be described in the following 
sections investigated the neural mechanisms of loss aversion, which is a core 
component of PT. Loss aversion refers to the notion that decision makers tend to prefer 
avoiding losses over acquiring gains of equivalent size (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Although extensive behavioural research has highlighted the influence of loss 
aversion on economic choice (Camerer, 2005; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005), its 
neural underpinnings are still poorly understood (Fox and Poldrack, 2013). 
After a decision has been made, its outcomes need to be evaluated by the 
decision maker in order to determine whether the decision led to a desirable 
consequence or whether the course of the decision making process needs to be changed 
in order to produce better future results (Rangel et al., 2008). Neuroimaging research 
has demonstrated where and when this outcome processing occurs in the brain (for 
reviews see Bartra et al., 2013; Glimcher, 2013), although several questions still 
remain unanswered, especially regarding risky and uncertain choices (Tobler and 
2 
 
Weber, 2013). Understanding the neural mechanisms that underlie decision making 
and the factors that can influence choice is important both from a theoretical point of 
view and for improving actual decision making (Camerer et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
knowledge of the brain’s function, and therefore dysfunction, has implications for 
understanding maladaptive decision making. For example, several psychiatric 
disorders are characterised by impairments in decision making and altered hedonic 
evaluation of choice outcomes, such as heightened sensitivity to negative emotions 
and events (Endrass et al., 2013; Horan et al., 2012; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b; 
Trémeau et al., 2008). Therefore, detailed knowledge about the neural processing 
behind decision making and its associated impact on behaviour might provide helpful 
insights into particular decision making deficits, which could be targeted by specific 
interventions. 
 
1.2 Prospect theory 
 
Early economic theory (reviewed in Trepel et al. (2005)), was based on the 
assumption that decision makers choose the option that is associated with the highest 
expected value (EV). A simple example is a prospect that offers a specified amount of 
money x with probability p and nothing otherwise. In such a case, the EV of the 
prospect is calculated by multiplying the amount of money with its associated 
probability, so that EV = p·x. Therefore, a decision maker should always prefer a risky 
prospect that offers a 50% chance of a £100 gain over a sure gain of £49, because the 
EV of the gamble is higher than the value of the sure option. However, EV 
maximisation does not account for risk aversion, as, for example, in the case that the 
decision maker preferred the sure gain over the risky prospect. 
To account for this, Bernoulli (1954/1738), cited in Trepel et al. (2005), 
proposed that decision makers do not evaluate prospects by their objective EV but 
rather by their subjective utility, and that the utility of a given amount of money 
decreases as wealth increases. This diminishing sensitivity gives rise to a utility 
function that is concave over levels of wealth. A concave utility function means that 
the utility of £50 is more than half the utility of £100, so that a decision maker should 
prefer receiving £50 for sure over a 50% chance of receiving £100. 
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A set of axioms have been proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), 
cited in Fox and Poldrack (2013), in order to formally represent a decision maker’s 
choices by the maximisation of expected utility. One of the central axioms of expected 
utility theory (EUT) is the ‘substitution’ or ‘independence’ axiom, according to which 
if a decision maker prefers prospect A over prospect B then this preference should not 
be influenced if prospects A and B are combined in a third prospect. Another central 
EUT axiom is the ‘sure-thing’ principle (Savage, 1954), according to which if two 
options yield the same consequence when a particular event occurs, then a decision 
maker’s preference between these options should not depend on the particular 
consequence that they have in common. 
However, Allais (1953), cited in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), questioned 
both of the above axioms by designing a range of decision questions that are referred 
to as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953, 1979). The following version was adapted from 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979): 
Decision A: 80% chance of £4000 gain (1) or 100% of £3000 gain (2). 
Decision B: 20% chance of £4000 gain (3) or 25% of £3000 gain (4). 
Most respondents choose (2) over (1), but (3) over (4). However, choices (3) and (4) 
are ¼ of choices (1) and (2), respectively. As such, the above responses violate the 
substitution axiom, according to which (3) should be preferred over (4) if and only if 
(1) is preferred over (2). 
Decision C: 33% chance of £2500 gain, 66% chance of £2400, 1% chance of 
£0 (5) or 100% chance of £2400 gain (6).  
Decision D: 33% chance of £2500 gain (7) or 34% chance of £2400 gain (8). 
In this case, most respondents prefer (6) over (5), but (7) over (8). However, choices 
(5) and (6) can be transformed into choices (7) and (8), respectively, by eliminating 
their common consequence (i.e., 66% chance of £2400 gain). As such, the above 
responses violate the independence axiom, according to which (7) should be preferred 
over (8) if and only if (5) is preferred over (6). 
PT is a decision making model that explains choice behaviour under risk 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). It was developed as 
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an effort to explain the inconsistencies with EUT described in the previous paragraphs 
and to account for the observation that decision makers do not always behave as 
completely rational agents (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
According to PT, the value V of a simple prospect that offers x with probability 
p and nothing otherwise is given by: 
V(x, p) = w(p)·v(x), 
where w measures the impact of probability p on the attractiveness of the prospect, 
and v measures the subjective value of outcome x. 
Specifically, PT describes decision making under risk between prospects with 
known probabilities, and can be described by two functions, the value function and 
the probability weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
1.2.1 Value function 
 
PT assumes an S-shaped value function, which is depicted in Figure 1.1. The 
value function has three properties. Firstly, the value function measures the subjective 
value of gains and losses relative to a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
This reference-dependence property of the value function means that decision makers 
evaluate outcomes as positive or negative (e.g., amount of money won or lost) relative 
to a given reference point rather than from absolute levels of wealth. For monetary 
outcomes, a zero reference point or the status quo (wealth level at the time of the 
decision) generally serve as the reference point distinguishing losses from gains. In 
this framework, a decision maker perceives any negative departure from zero or from 
the status quo as a loss, while perceives any positive departure as a gain. 
Secondly, the value function has a shape that is concave for gains and convex 
for losses (Abdellaoui, 2000; 2007; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). The curvature of the 
value function implies risk aversion in the gain domain (concavity) and risk seeking 
in the loss domain (convexity). Risk aversion for gains means that decision makers 
tend to prefer a sure gain of £100 over a gamble offering 50% chance of winning £200 
or nothing. Within PT, risk aversion is defined as the preference for a sure outcome 
over a gamble with higher or equal expected value. Conversely, risk seeking is defined 
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as the rejection of a sure thing in favour of a gamble of lower or equal expected value 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1984). On the contrary, risk seeking for losses means 
that people tend to prefer a gamble offering 50% chance of losing £200 or nothing 
over losing £100 for sure. Moreover, the curvature of the value function is consistent 
with diminishing sensitivity, the notion that people are more sensitive to changes near 
the reference point than to changes further away from the reference point. For instance, 
the difference between a gain/loss of £100 and a gain/loss of £200 has substantially 
more impact than the difference between a gain/loss of £1100 and a gain/loss of £1200. 
Thirdly, the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, which gives rise 
to loss aversion; the tendency to overestimate losses compared to gains of the same 
amount as ‘losses loom larger than gains’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the 
context of decision under risk, loss aversion gives rise to risk aversion for mixed (gain-
loss) gambles, so that people typically reject a gamble that offers 50% chance to gain 
£10 or lose £10. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The PT value function. Adapted from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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1.2.2 Probability weighting function 
 
PT assumes probability weighting, the notion that the values of outcomes are 
not weighted by their objective probabilities but, rather, by decision weights, which 
represent the impact of the relevant probability of an event on the evaluation and 
corresponding desirability of a prospect. The decision weight is not necessarily a 
measure of subjective belief as a person may report that they believe that the objective 
probability of a fair coin landing heads is ½ but nevertheless give this event a weight 
of less than ½ in the evaluation of a prospect. The decision weights are computed with 
a probability weighting function, which is depicted in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The PT probability weighting function. Adapted from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
The probability weighting function is an inverse S-shaped function that is 
concave near zero and convex near one. Similar to the value function capturing 
diminishing sensitivity to changes in the amount of money gained or lost, the 
weighting function captures diminishing sensitivity to changes in probability, ranging 
from impossibility to certainty. This shape leads to the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes, so that low probabilities are overweighted, leading to risk seeking for gains 
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and risk aversion for losses, and moderate to high probabilities are underweighted, 
leading to risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses (Abdellaoui, 2000; 
Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Table 1.1 shows an example of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, adapted from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The certainty equivalent (i.e., the sure payment that 
the decision maker deems as equally attractive to the risky prospect) of a prospect (x, 
p) that offers x with probability p is given by c(x, p). Choices consistent with this 
fourfold pattern have been observed in several studies (Fishburn and Kochenberger, 
1979; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Payne et al., 
1981). Risk seeking for low probability gains may contribute to the attraction of 
gambling, whereas risk aversion for low probability losses may contribute to the 
attraction of insurance. Risk aversion for high probability gains may contribute to the 
preference for certainty, as in the Allais (1953) paradox, whereas risk seeking for high 
probability losses is consistent with the tendency to undertake risk to avoid facing a 
sure loss. 
 
              Table 1.1. A fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Adapted from Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 Gains Losses 
Low probability c(£100, 5%) = £14 
Risk seeking 
c(-£100, 5%) = -£8 
Risk aversion 
High probability c(£100, 95%) = £78 
Risk aversion 
c(-£100, 95%) = -£84 
Risk seeking 
 
 
It has been suggested that the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes for (gain-only 
or loss-only) gambles that offer a gain or a loss with low or high probability is driven 
primarily by the curvature of the weighting function, because the value function is not 
particularly curved (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Risk aversion for mixed (gain-
loss) gambles that offer an equal probability of a gain or loss is driven almost entirely 
by loss aversion because the curvature of the value function is typically similar for 
losses versus gains and decision weights are similar for gain versus loss components 
(Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). Table 1.2 summarises the main components of PT. 
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Table 1.2. Summary of the major components of PT. Adapted from Trepel et al. (2005). 
Component Phenomenon Description Manifestation 
Value      
function 
Sensitivity to gains 
and losses 
Concave for 
gains / convex 
for losses 
Risk aversion in the 
gain domain / risk 
seeking in the loss 
domain 
Loss aversion Steeper for losses 
than for gains 
Risk aversion for 
mixed gambles 
Weighting 
function 
Diminishing 
sensitivity 
Convex near 0 
Concave near 1 
Fourfold pattern of 
risk attitudes 
 
 
1.3 Loss aversion 
 
Losses tend to be overvalued compared to gains of the same amount, a 
phenomenon known as loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This tendency 
suggests that the negative affective state that a decision maker experiences by losing 
a specific amount of money is greater than the pleasure derived by gaining the same 
amount of money (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
In the context of decision making under risk, loss aversion gives rise to risk 
aversion for mixed (gain-loss) gambles. Within PT, risk aversion refers to a preference 
for a sure option over a risky prospect as indicated by the curvature of the value 
function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Decision makers tend to reject fair bets that 
offer equal chances of winning or losing the same amount of money. For instance, 
individuals typically reject a 50% chance to gain £100 or lose £100. It is important to 
note that loss aversion, which relates to the steepness of the value function (for lower 
values), should be distinguished from risk aversion, which relates to the curvature of 
the value function, specifically the concavity of value function in the gain domain 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As such, risk aversion can occur even without the 
prospect of a loss. For example, decision makers tend to prefer a sure gain of £5 over 
a gain-only prospect that offers 50% chance of a £10 gain or £0 otherwise (e.g., Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009). In contrast, loss aversion by definition requires the evaluation of 
potential negative consequences. 
Several studies have demonstrated that loss aversion can be extended from 
decisions about risky gambles to objects (Kahneman et al., 1990) and ‘mock’ 
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investments (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997). Additionally, analyses of 
field data have observed loss aversion for the pricing and purchasing of consumables 
(Hardie et al., 1993; Putler, 1992), for house investments (Genesove and Mayer, 
2001), and even for the choice of work hours by cabdrivers (Camerer et al., 1997). 
Moreover, it has been proposed that loss aversion might have an evolutionary basis as 
experiments with primates have demonstrated that they also exhibit loss aversion 
(Chen et al., 2006). Furthermore, loss aversion is even observed in the trading 
behaviour of children (Harbaugh et al., 2001), which suggests that it may reflect a 
fundamental feature of how potential decision outcomes are assessed by the brain. 
Thus, loss aversion appears to exist across different domains and species. Loss 
aversion has been used to explain many effects obtained in decision making research, 
such as the sunk-cost effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), the status-quo bias (Knetsch, 
1989; Schweitzer, 1994), the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990; Van Dijk & 
Van Knippenberg, 1998), and the framing effect in negotiations and coalition 
formation (De Dreu et al., 1994; Van Beest et al., 2005). 
Loss aversion is also evident in riskless choice contexts when consumers 
compare one product attribute against another. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1991) asked participants to choose between two hypothetical jobs. The first job was 
characterised as ‘limited contact with others’ and a 20-minute daily commute, whereas 
the second job was characterised as ‘moderately sociable’ with a 60-minute daily 
commute. Participants were more likely to choose the first job if they had been told 
that their present job was socially isolated with a 10-minute commute than if they had 
been told it was very social but had an 80-minute commute, consistent with the notion 
that individuals are loss averse for attributes that present relative advantages and 
disadvantages in comparison to a reference point. 
Different theories have been proposed regarding the psychological 
mechanisms that lead to loss aversion. Some theories describe loss aversion as a 
‘hedonic property’, suggesting that it represents a hedonic preference relative to losses 
because losses hurt more than gains feel good, such that avoiding a negative affective 
state is preferred over gaining a positive affective state (Novemsky and Kahneman, 
2005). Other theories suggest that loss aversion represents a ‘judgmental error’ due to 
an exaggerated fear of losses relative to their actual impact (Camerer, 2005; Kermer 
et al., 2006), or due to an underestimation of emotional adaptation to negative events 
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(Wilson and Gilbert, 2005). From this perspective, when an individual is asked to 
predict how they will feel after experiencing negative outcomes, they tend to anticipate 
that losses will have a greater impact than they actually do because individuals 
underestimate their own tendency to rationalise and discount actual losses (Kermer et 
al., 2006), whereas, in reality, the experience of loss is not as bad as originally 
anticipated. One fundamental question for the study of decision making is whether 
loss aversion reflects the engagement of distinct emotional processes when potential 
losses are considered. It has been suggested that enhanced sensitivity to losses is 
driven by negative emotions, such as fear or anxiety (Camerer, 2005). In line with this 
notion, it can be hypothesised that exposure to increasing potential losses should be 
associated with increased activity in brain structures that are thought to mediate 
negative emotions in decision making such as the amygdala or anterior insula (Kahn 
et al., 2002; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). Furthermore, loss aversion could reflect an 
asymmetric response to losses versus gains within a single system that encodes the 
subjective value of the potential prospect, such as within ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) or ventral striatum (VS) (Breiter et al., 
2001; Knutson et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2004). 
 
1.3.1 Neurophysiological research on loss aversion 
 
1.3.1.1 Psychophysiological studies 
 
The first study that investigated the neural correlates of loss aversion required 
participants to make decisions regarding whether they would accept or reject a series 
of gambles that offered 50% chance of gaining or losing different amounts of money 
(Tom et al., 2007). Importantly, this study focused on neural responses during the 
evaluation of potential outcomes, therefore, the gambles were not resolved and 
participants did not receive any outcomes until the end of the experiment. The study 
showed that a set of brain areas displayed increasing activity as potential gains 
increased, including VS, VMPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), and OFC. There were no brain regions showing decreasing 
activation as gains increased and no brain regions showing increasing activation as the 
size of the potential loss increased. Instead, a group of brain regions showed 
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decreasing activity as the size of potential losses increased. This loss-responsive set of 
regions included the striatum, VMPFC, ventral ACC and medial OFC. Importantly, 
the VS and VMPFC exhibited a pattern of neural loss aversion, meaning that they 
showed joint sensitivity to both gains and losses whereby the slope of the decrease in 
activity for increasing losses was greater than the slope of the increase in activity for 
increasing gains. Notably, individual differences in behavioural loss aversion were 
associated with neural loss aversion in the VS and VMPFC. These results appear to 
be consistent with the suggestion of PT for a value function that is steeper for losses 
compared to gains. 
Along those lines, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2013) asked participants to accept or 
reject a series of gambles offering 50% chance of gaining or losing different amounts 
of money. Participants completed these sets of choices under two cognitive strategies: 
‘attend’ and ‘regulate’ strategy. In the attend strategy, participants were instructed to 
consider each choice in isolation, as if it were the only choice in the experiment. In the 
regulate strategy, participants were asked to consider each choice in a greater context, 
considering each choice as if it were one of many. The behavioural results showed that 
the regulate strategy decreased loss aversion compared to the attend strategy. The 
authors explain this by arguing that, in the regulate strategy, participants evaluated 
choices and outcomes as part of a broader portfolio, thus, reducing the expected cost 
of each individual loss. In terms of the fMRI results, at the time of outcome 
presentation, stronger activity in the amygdala for losses compared to gains was 
associated with behavioural loss aversion. Furthermore, the reduction of loss aversion 
by the regulate strategy also correlated with individual differences in the reduction of 
amygdala activation following losses but not gains. 
The above results regarding the effects of the regulate strategy in decreasing 
loss aversion were supported by another study, in which behavioural loss aversion was 
associated with stronger skin conductance responses (SCR) to loss outcomes relative 
to gain outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Likewise, another study demonstrated 
increased behavioural loss aversion and SCR to losses during the outcome period 
while perceiving an unpleasant odour (Stancak et al., 2015). 
Amygdala activation has been found to increase as the gain/loss ratio deviates 
from the individual certainty equivalents (i.e., the point at which participants accepted 
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and rejected gambles with equal probability). This response pattern has been shown to 
be more strongly expressed in loss averse individuals, so that amygdala activation was 
associated with individual differences in loss aversion at the time of choice (Gelskov 
et al., 2015). Further support for the role of the amygdala in loss aversion comes from 
a study with individuals with bilateral amygdala lesions (De Martino et al., 2010). The 
participants completed a set of gambling tasks and showed decreased loss aversion 
compared to matched controls. 
Canessa et al. (2013) observed both bidirectional and gain/loss-specific 
responses while evaluating gambles, with brain regions such as the amygdala and 
posterior insula specifically tracking the magnitude of potential losses. Moreover, 
individual differences in loss aversion were reflected both in limbic fMRI responses 
and in grey matter volume in a structural amygdala–thalamus–striatum network. 
Similarly, Canessa et al. (2017) demonstrated that neural responses in the VS and the 
right posterior insula/supramarginal gyrus during resting state activity were associated 
with individual differences in behavioural loss aversion evaluated using the gambling 
task from the study by Tom et al. (2007). Notably, the brain regions which were found 
to be associated with loss aversion in these two studies were very similar, and cross-
study analyses confirmed that this correlation holds when voxels identified were used 
as regions of interest in task-related activity and vice versa. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the individual degree of (neural) loss aversion represents a stable 
individual difference which reflects in specific brain activity at rest and might also 
modulate cortical excitability at the time of choice. 
Furthermore, an association was found between grey matter volume in bilateral 
posterior insula as well as left medial frontal gyrus with individual loss aversion, so 
that higher loss aversion was associated with lower grey matter volume in these brain 
regions (Markett et al., 2016). Another study utilised positron emission tomography 
(PET) scans and demonstrated a negative correlation between loss aversion and 
norepinephrine transporters (NET) binding in the thalamus (Takahashi et al., 2012), 
so that individuals with low thalamic NET showed pronounced loss aversion. 
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1.3.1.2 EEG studies 
 
EEG studies investigating loss aversion are extremely scarce. Specifically, at 
the time we started the experiments presented in the current thesis no EEG studies 
existed on loss aversion. Since then, and to the best of our knowledge, only two EEG 
studies have been published, one investigating loss aversion during the decision 
making phase (Heeren et al., 2016) and the other in association with resting state brain 
activity (Duke et al., 2018). 
In the Heeren et al. (2016) study, the authors investigated loss aversion during 
the decision making phase by comparing ERP responses to easy versus difficult 
decisions. The gain/loss ratio of gambles was used as a measurement of conflict and 
difficulty of the decision. Large quotients (i.e., large gains and small losses) mean low 
decision conflict and attractive gambles. Low quotients (i.e., similar amounts of gains 
and losses) also mean low conflict because the gamble is clearly unattractive and 
participants can easily decide to reject it. Decisions with an intermediate difference 
between offered gains and losses are considered difficult. Results showed that both 
easy and difficult decisions induced a P300 potential during the evaluation of the 
available options. However, high conflict decisions were associated with smaller P300 
amplitudes compared to low conflict decisions. Importantly, P300 amplitudes were 
modulated by individual differences in loss aversion such that P300 amplitudes were 
further reduced for high loss averse participants even in low conflict trials and 
irrespective of the attractiveness of the gamble. Loss aversion was measured using the 
task used in the study by Tom et al. (2007). Specifically, participants were asked to 
accept or reject a series of mixed gambles offering a 50% chance of gaining one 
amount of money or losing another amount. Loss aversion was calculated for each 
participant by entering gains and losses into a binary logistic regression analysis as 
independent variables and predicting the individual decision (accept or reject). 
Importantly, there were no differences in P300 amplitudes between high and low loss 
averse participants during high conflict decisions. Hence, the reduced P300 was 
observed in high loss averse participants even in easy decisions associated with low 
conflict. Thus, this study demonstrated differences in ERPs between high and low loss 
averse participants and provided an approximation of the timing at which loss aversion 
14 
 
influences decision making while participants were contemplating potential gains and 
losses. 
 In the study by Duke et al. (2018), participants played a gambling task and 
later their resting state EEG activity was recorded. The authors found that individual 
differences in loss aversion were associated with increased cortical activity in the right 
compared to the left hemisphere at central and posterior electrode sites. These findings 
support the idea that lateralisation of the right hemisphere may underlie individual 
variation in behavioural loss aversion. 
 The studies described above have two important shortcomings. Firstly, neither 
study controlled for the potentially confounding risk aversion effects. As already 
mentioned, loss and risk aversion can co-occur but they represent distinct properties 
of PT and affect decision making in different ways. Secondly, both studies utilised an 
EEG system with only nine electrodes. Although this would not represent an issue for 
experiments investigating well studied ERP components, in exploratory studies such 
as these, the use of only nine electrodes is extremely limited and, additionally, it can 
obstruct any opportunities for source localisation. 
Table 1.3 summarises the main findings from the psychophysiological and 
EEG studies discussed in this section. 
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Table 1.3. Main findings from psychophysiological and EEG studies of loss aversion. 
Study Method Participants Task Outcome Results 
Tom et al. 
(2007) 
fMRI 16 256 mixed 
gambles 
No VS, VMPFC 
De 
Martino et 
al. (2010) 
fMRI 8 256 mixed 
gambles 
No amygdala 
Sokol-
Hessner et 
al. (2013) 
fMRI 39 240 mixed 
gambles, 60 
gain-only 
gambles 
Yes amygdala 
Canessa et 
al. (2013) 
fMRI 56 104 mixed 
gambles 
No amygdala, 
thalamus, 
striatum 
Canessa et 
al. (2017) 
fMRI 57 104 mixed 
gambles 
No VS, insula 
Gelskov et 
al. (2015) 
fMRI 16 128 mixed 
gambles 
No striatum, 
amygdala 
Markett et 
al. (2016) 
fMRI 41 256 mixed 
gambles 
No insula 
Heeren et 
al. (2016) 
EEG 36 256 mixed 
gambles 
No P300 attenuation 
for high loss 
averse 
participants 
Duke et al. 
(2018) 
EEG 40 256 mixed 
gambles 
No alpha band 
asymmetry at 
central and 
posterior sites 
Sokol-
Hessner et 
al. (2009) 
SCR 29 240 mixed 
gambles, 60 
gain-only 
gambles 
Yes SCR differences 
in arousal to 
losses versus 
gains 
Stancak et 
al. (2015) 
SCR 30 240 mixed 
gambles, 60 
gain-only 
gambles 
Yes unpleasant odour 
increased loss 
aversion 
Takahashi 
et al. 
(2012) 
PET 19 40 mixed 
gambles 
No higher loss 
aversion in 
individuals with 
lower NET in 
the thalamus 
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1.3.2 Phenomena related to loss aversion 
 
It has been suggested that loss aversion leads to a range of behavioural 
phenomena (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991). One such phenomenon is the endowment 
effect, which refers to the notion that people often demand much more money in order 
to part with a possession compared to the amount of money that they would be willing 
to pay in order to acquire it (Thaler, 1980). The endowment effect has been 
demonstrated in several experiments using a variety of objects. In a classic experiment 
by Kahneman et al. (1990), half of the participants were given coffee mugs and the 
other half were given pens of equal monetary value. Participants who were given mugs 
were reluctant to trade their mug for pens, and similarly, participants who were given 
pens were reluctant to trade them for coffee mugs. The endowment effect has generally 
been interpreted as a manifestation of loss aversion on the assumption that once an 
object has been acquired, the pain associated with parting with that object is larger 
than the pleasure associated with exchanging it for another equally priced object 
(Kahneman et al., 1990; Thaler, 1980; Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg, 1996). 
Variations of the above experiments included investigating the discrepancies 
between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) prices. In these 
experiments, half of the participants were endowed with an item (e.g., coffee mugs, 
chocolate bars) while the remaining half were not endowed with anything (Kahneman 
et al., 1990). Participants that were endowed with the item (‘sellers’) were informed 
that they could sell the object in their possession to one of the participants who were 
not endowed with an item (‘buyers’). It was found that sellers demanded much higher 
prices to part with the object compared to the amount of money that buyers were 
offering to acquire the same object. The authors concluded that the endowment effect 
does not reflect the appeal of the good one owns but, rather, reflects the pain of parting 
with the good, so that the disutility of giving up an object is greater that the utility 
associated with acquiring it. Of course, it must be noted that loss aversion does not 
affect transactions with goods that were initially intended for sale (Novemsky and 
Kahneman, 2005). 
A study investigating the neural basis of the endowment effect found that WTP 
prices were associated with VMPFC activation, whereas WTA prices were associated 
with OFC activation (De Martino et al., 2009). Overall, the ventral striatum showed a 
17 
 
pattern indicative of the endowment effect being more activated during selling 
compared to buying trials. Importantly, individual differences in the endowment effect 
(i.e., WTA/WTP differences) were associated with bilateral ventral striatal activity. 
Additionally, Plassmann et al. (2007) utilised an auction paradigm which compared 
free-bid trials, in which participants decided how much to bid on a food item, with 
forced-bid trials, in which participants were told how much to bid. Results showed 
that activity in VMPFC and DLPFC was associated with WTP in the free-bid trials 
but not the forced-bid trials, suggesting that these regions are particularly involved in 
coding for decision utility. Subsequent work using WTP paradigms has confirmed that 
the VMPFC activation is associated with decision utility across a broad range of goods 
(Chib et al., 2009), suggesting that the VMPFC serves as a common pathway for value 
representation. 
Similarly, De Martino et al. (2006) manipulated framing during a decision 
making task in which participants chose between a sure outcome and a gamble after 
receiving an initial endowment on each trial. Framing was manipulated by offering 
participants the choice between a sure loss and a gamble (loss frame; e.g., lose £30 
versus gamble) or the choice between a sure gain and a gamble (gain frame; e.g., keep 
£20 versus gamble). Participants showed risk seeking in the loss frame and risk 
aversion in the gain frame. Amygdala activation was associated with the dominant 
choices, with increased activity for sure choices in the gain frame and risky choices in 
the loss frame. The dorsal ACC displayed the opposite pattern across conditions. 
Individual differences in behavioural framing-related bias were correlated with 
framing-related activation in right OFC and VMPFC, so that participants who showed 
less framing bias showed more activity for sure choices in the gain frame and risky 
choices in the loss frame compared to the other two conditions. Thus, whereas 
amygdala showed the framing-related pattern across all participants, in the OFC this 
pattern was stronger for participants who showed less of a behavioural framing effect. 
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1.4 Evaluation of decision outcomes in the brain 
 
It is evident from the previous sections that loss aversion manifests in response 
to anticipated and experienced negative outcomes (e.g., Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 
Tom et al., 2007). Accordingly, it has been hypothesised that the striatum represents 
loss aversion at the time of a binary choice between a gamble or a sure outcome by 
encoding the values assigned to prospective outcomes (Tom et al., 2007) and that these 
values are then processed by the amygdala so that the amygdala represents loss 
aversion at the time of outcome receipt (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). The implication 
of the striatum and the amygdala in reward evaluation is supported by several fMRI 
studies which have aimed to identify the brain regions that encode value, both during 
the decision making phase and during the receipt of the decision outcome phase. Meta-
analyses of those studies (Bartra et al., 2013; Kringelbach, 2005; Lebreton et al., 2009; 
Padoa-Schioppa and Conen, 2017) suggest that the VS, the amygdala, the VMPFC, 
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the OFC are the main brain regions that 
collectively form the brain’s valuation system. Activation in these regions tends to 
increase when considering the subjective value of the available options during choice, 
as well as with the value of the reward received, thus, implicating a common set of 
brain regions in the evaluation of both prospects and outcomes (Bartra et al., 2013). 
Importantly, these brain regions have been found to respond to outcomes in multiple 
domains, including both primary rewards (e.g., food) and secondary rewards (e.g., 
monetary or social rewards), suggesting that the valuation system is domain-general 
(Delgado, 2007; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Knutson 
and Cooper, 2005; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Montague and Berns, 2002; O'Doherty 
et al., 2004; Peters and Büchel, 2010). 
 
1.5 ERP correlates of decision outcomes 
 
This section describes the spatiotemporal aspects of the neural evaluation of 
decision outcomes by focusing on EEG research. Although there is undoubtedly a 
range of ERP components that might be associated with outcome evaluation, the two 
components prevailing in the literature are feedback-related negativity (FRN) and 
P300. 
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1.5.1 FRN 
 
FRN is one of the most extensively studied ERPs in the reward processing 
literature (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). It is commonly elicited by experimental 
paradigms that employ forced-choices between two gambles which are subsequently 
followed by presentation of gain or loss feedback (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004). FRN is typically evaluated as the difference waveform between 
averaged potentials time-locked to the presentation of gain and loss outcomes 
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). The resulting potential difference has a fronto-
central scalp distribution and its maximum amplitude occurs between 200-350 ms 
after feedback presentation (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). The brain region that has 
most often been suggested to contribute to the generation of the FRN is the ACC 
(Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Gehring and Willoughby, 
2002; Hewig et al., 2007; Miltner et al., 1997; Potts et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2002; 
Tucker et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2010). Other sources that have also been suggested as 
the potential neural generators of the FRN include the PCC (Badgaiyan and Posner, 
1998; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Donamayor et al., 2011; Luu et al., 2003; Müller 
et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c) and the striatum (Carlson et al., 2011; Foti et 
al., 2011; Martin et al., 2009). 
The two experiments that first identified the FRN component were conducted 
by Miltner et al. (1997) and Gehring and Willoughby (2002). Miltner et al. (1997) 
utilised a time estimation task in which participants had to estimate the duration of 1 
s. At the beginning of the task a tolerance window of ± 100 ms was used during which 
a response was considered a correct response. This window was adjusted for each trial 
based on participants’ responses so that when they guessed correctly, the window 
decreased by 10 ms, whereas when they were incorrect, the window was increased by 
10 ms. Following their responses, participants received feedback as to whether their 
guess was correct in the form of visual, auditory or tactile stimulus. By comparing the 
average correct and incorrect waveforms, the authors observed an ERP component 
evoked by performance feedback peaking approximately 250 ms after stimulus onset. 
This component was elicited irrespective of the modality in which feedback was 
provided. 
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In the experiments conducted by Gehring and Willoughby (2002), a monetary 
gambling task was employed whereby participants made choices between two cards 
associated with 50% chance of winning or losing money. Following their choice, 
participants received feedback about whether the gamble resulted in gain or loss. By 
comparing grand average ERPs to gain and loss trials, the authors observed a negative-
polarity ERP component, peaking approximately 265 ms after feedback onset, which 
was stronger for loss compared to gain trials. The Gehring and Willoughby (2002) 
gambling task is the most commonly used task for FRN elicitation and studies using 
comparable experimental paradigms have consistently found FRN following monetary 
losses (Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yeung et 
al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). 
A range of theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain the generation 
of FRN (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). The most influential theory has 
been the FRN reinforcement learning theory, which postulates that the FRN reflects a 
reinforcement learning reward prediction error (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). According 
to the theory, the ACC, the midbrain dopamine system and the basal ganglia form a 
reinforcement learning system within the medial-frontal cortex (Schultz, 2002). 
Discrepancies between expected and received outcomes (i.e., reward prediction errors) 
are computed by the basal ganglia and then conveyed to the ACC through the midbrain 
dopamine system. In this way, the dopamine system monitors outcomes to determine 
whether things have gone better or worse than expected. Outcomes that are better than 
expected (i.e., positive prediction errors) induce phasic increases in the dopamine 
firing rates of a mesencephalic dopamine system, producing smaller FRN amplitudes. 
Outcomes that are worse than expected (i.e., negative prediction errors) induce phasic 
decreases, producing stronger FRN amplitudes. These signals are thought to guide 
action selection mediated by the ACC, through the reinforcement of the action 
associated with positive outcomes and the punishment of the action associated with 
negative outcomes. 
 
1.5.1.1 Outcome valence 
 
The most robust finding in the FRN literature is that the FRN component is 
primarily modulated by outcome valence. For instance, several studies have 
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consistently reported the presence of the FRN component when participants receive 
negative compared to positive performance feedback (Hajcak et al., 2005; Hajcak et 
al., 2006; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004; Luu et al., 2003; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Ruchsow et al., 2002; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004). The FRN also occurs following the presentation of stimuli indicating 
monetary loss or non-reward compared to reward (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2005, 2006; Holroyd et al., 2006; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 
2004). Therefore, FRN can be elicited following both performance and monetary 
feedback (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu et al., 2003; 
Miltner et al., 1997; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Nieuwenhuis et al. 
(2004b) compared these two feedback types within a single study and demonstrated 
that FRN could be elicited by either utilitarian (monetary loss) or performance 
(incorrect response) information, even within the same decision context. Specifically, 
when feedback included information about both dimensions simultaneously, the 
aspect of the feedback that elicited the FRN was the one that had been emphasised to 
participants. These findings suggest that monetary losses and negative performance 
feedback can be considered functionally equivalent because both reflect outcomes 
along a good-bad dimension. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the FRN is context-dependent 
(Holroyd et al., 2004). For example, feedback indicating that participants received no 
reward elicited FRN when the alternative outcomes were rewards. However, the same 
feedback did not generate FRN when the alternative outcomes were monetary losses. 
Thus, FRN was elicited by unfavourable outcomes, however, what constituted an 
unfavourable outcome was determined by the alternative feedback within the given 
task context. Taken together, the above findings suggest that FRN categorises 
outcomes in a binary manner by distinguishing between good and bad or better and 
worse than expected outcomes (Hajcak et al., 2006). 
 
1.5.1.2 Outcome probability 
 
Another factor that has been shown to modulate FRN amplitude is outcome 
probability. Some researchers have suggested that FRN amplitude is stronger for 
improbable (unexpected) compared to probable (expected) negative outcomes. For 
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instance, in a study by Hajcak et al. (2007), participants were presented with four doors 
and were instructed to guess which door hid a prize, with the goal of winning as many 
prizes as possible. Prior to each trial, a cue was presented indicating how many doors 
hid a prize (1, 2 or 3). Thus, the probability of positive feedback could be inferred 
from this cue (25%, 50%, or 75%, respectively). Following their choice, participants 
received feedback about whether they had guessed correctly. FRN was the most 
negative following improbable events (i.e., associated with small probabilities), in that 
it was the most negative in trials associated with 75% probability to receive rewards. 
Other studies utilising variations of the Hajcak et al. (2007) task have also provided 
support for a modulation of FRN by outcome probability (Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; 
Bellebaum et al., 2010b; Cohen et al., 2007; Hewig et al., 2007; Holroyd and 
Krigolson, 2007; Holroyd et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 2003; Kreussel et al., 2012; Liao 
et al., 2011; Martin and Potts, 2011; Martin et al., 2009; Potts et al., 2006; Walsh and 
Anderson, 2011). Nevertheless, other experiments have not found support for such a 
reward probability modulation (Hajcak et al., 2005). 
 
1.5.1.3 Outcome magnitude 
 
When considering the modulation of FRN by reward magnitude, it has been 
suggested that the evaluative system could determine the favourableness of events 
according to the value of the feedback, so that large losses should elicit an enhanced 
FRN relative to small losses, and small gains should elicit a larger FRN compared to 
large gains (Holroyd et al., 2004). Alternatively, FRN might reflect the binary 
categorisation of good versus bad outcomes, so that an event is simply categorised as 
either good or bad (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Although it appears to be intuitive that 
an outcome evaluation system would be influenced by outcome magnitude, many 
studies fail to find such a modulation regarding FRN (Goyer et al., 2008; Hajcak et 
al., 2006; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008; Masaki et al., 2006). Furthermore, in the studies 
that manipulated reward magnitude and found support for such a modulation 
(Bellebaum et al., 2010b; Holroyd et al., 2004; Kreussel et al., 2012), outcome values 
were known in advance (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). Therefore, it is possible that the 
monitoring system might scale its response to negative feedback based on the potential 
outcomes on each trial, so that losing 5 when 5 could have been won may be similar 
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to losing 10 when 10 could have been won. Several fMRI studies have demonstrated 
that, in such circumstances, the brain displays adaptive scaling. Neural firing rates and 
BOLD responses adapt to the range of outcomes so that maximum deviations from 
baseline remain constant regardless of absolute reward values (Bunzeck et al., 2010; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a; Tobler et al., 2005). Failure to find an effect of reward 
magnitude on FRN strength might indicate that the FRN also scales with the range of 
reward values (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). 
To further investigate the possibility of FRN modulation by reward magnitude, 
Hajcak et al. (2006) employed a paradigm in which participants did not know in 
advance whether the potential reward would be small or large. Specifically, 
participants performed a gambling task in which four outcomes that varied in 
magnitude and valence were equally likely to be presented as feedback. For each trial, 
participants could gain 25, gain 5, lose 5, or lose 25. FRN was consistently observed 
following monetary loss, but FRN magnitude was insensitive to the magnitude of the 
loss. In a second experiment, the authors included a condition in which participants 
could break even (i.e., receive nothing). Results showed that feedback indicating that 
participants had broken even did not elicit FRN with a magnitude intermediate to gains 
and losses. Rather, the FRN observed following zero feedback was similar in 
magnitude to the FRN following losses. In addition, large and small losses both 
elicited equally large FRN. These results support the idea that the FRN reflects a 
coarse differentiation of favourable versus unfavourable outcomes (Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004). 
 
1.5.1.4 Counterfactual outcomes 
 
The research described up to here has focused on the evaluation of obtained 
decision outcomes. However, in order to determine whether the decision made led to 
the best possible outcome, decision makers often need to compare the obtained 
outcome with other possible outcomes that could have been obtained, if they had 
chosen differently. This comparison process is generally referred to as ‘counterfactual 
thinking’ (Roese and Olson, 1993). When counterfactual comparisons indicate that the 
obtained outcome could have been better if another decision had been made, this can 
lead to negative feelings, including regret or disappointment. When counterfactual 
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comparisons show that the obtained outcome could have been worse, this can lead to 
positive feelings, including elation or satisfaction (Roese and Epstude, 2017). In 
gambling tasks, a counterfactual comparison can generally be evoked by feedback 
informing participants about both the received outcome and the alternative possible 
outcome (Osinsky et al., 2014). Along those lines, it has been hypothesised that FRN 
might categorise counterfactual outcomes in a way that corresponds to the encoding 
of actually obtained outcomes, so that missed desirable outcomes are counterfactually 
evaluated as losses and missed undesirable outcomes are counterfactually evaluated 
as gains (Roese and Epstude, 2017). However, FRN literature on this topic does not 
provide comprehensive results. Although some studies suggest that missed gains are 
indeed experienced as losses, whereas escaped losses are experienced as gains (Gu et 
al., 2011; Yu and Zhou, 2009), others fail to find such a differentiation between 
counterfactual outcomes (Marciano et al., 2018; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and 
Zhou, 2009). Finally, others propose that both chosen and unchosen outcomes are 
processed similarly, such that FRN encodes only positive or negative valence (Osinsky 
et al., 2014). Therefore, it is clear that more research is needed on this topic in order 
to fully understand the spatiotemporal characteristics of counterfactual thinking, and 
this could be achieved by using the EEG technique. The role of FRN in the processing 
of missed outcomes was further investigated in the second study (detailed in Chapter 
4). 
 
1.5.1.5 Free versus obstructed choices 
 
Another open question concerning the role of FRN in decision making is how 
this component encodes outcomes that were not freely chosen by individuals. The 
research described in previous paragraphs investigated decision making under 
unobstructed choice conditions, thus, allowing participants to freely select among 
available prospects (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Goyer et al., 2008; Hajcak et al., 
2006, 2007; Holroyd et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b). Even though it is 
undeniably important to understand the neural mechanisms of free choice, perhaps it 
is even more crucial for real world decision making to also understand choice under 
conditions of unexpected circumstances that force us to change the path of our decision 
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making. The role of FRN in the processing of unpredictable and unchosen outcomes 
formed the topic of the third study (detailed in Chapter 5). 
 
1.5.1.6 Social context 
 
Social context during decision making is an important factor that could 
influence FRN. Social comparison, which is intuitively at the core of feelings 
associated with upward counterfactuals, might play a role in outcome evaluation even 
in situations where the good fortune of another individual does not affect the fortune 
of the participant (Dvash et al., 2010). The effects of making decisions for others and 
processing of vicarious rewards on FRN have been shown to be modulated by empathy 
(Liu et al., 2018) or by social distance (Leng and Zhou, 2014). The role of FRN in a 
social context whereby participants made decisions either for themselves or for others 
formed the topic of the fourth study (detailed in Chapter 6). 
 
1.5.1.7 Methodological issue 
 
An important methodological issue that needs to be considered when 
investigating FRN is that this component is typically evaluated as the difference 
potential waveform between the canonical ERP waveforms following gains and losses 
(Luck, 2014). Therefore, whether the resulting difference waveform has a positive or 
negative valence will depend on the subtraction performed: it will have a negative 
polarity if losses are subtracted from gains and a positive polarity if the inverse 
subtraction is performed, meaning that FRN represents a relative rather than an 
absolute negativity. This often produces confusion in the literature, mainly because of 
the component nomenclature (Krigolson, 2017). In the initial FRN experiments 
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997), the component was named as 
such because of the negative shift that could be observed only on the loss but not on 
the gain canonical feedback ERP waveforms. Furthermore, initial investigations 
considered FRN to represent a variation of the error-related negativity (ERN); a 
component that indexes internal error representations when external feedback is not 
necessary in order to evaluate whether an action has been successful or unsuccessful 
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(Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). The similarities in the elicitation and 
topography of FRN with ERN have led several researchers to consider that the two 
components are part of the same error detection mechanism (Krigolson, 2017). 
Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that it is positive, rather than negative, 
feedback that modulates the FRN, and suggested that the component should instead 
be referred to as reward positivity (Proudfit, 2015). Therefore, one needs to keep in 
mind that the subtraction performed will not influence the conclusions drawn 
regarding the experimental findings, rather, it will only influence whether the final 
component is graphically represented as a negativity or a positivity. 
 
1.5.2 P300 
 
In addition to FRN, another ERP component that has been suggested to play 
an important role in outcome evaluation and reward processing is the P300; a positive 
shift in the electrocortical potential occurring approximately 300-500 ms after 
stimulus onset and acquiring its maximum amplitude at parietal scalp locations 
(Polich, 2007, 2012). The P300 has been one of the most studied ERPs since it was 
first reported (Sutton et al., 1965), and is thought to be associated with several 
cognitive and affective processes, including information processing and attention 
allocation (Donchin et al., 1978; Duncan‐Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Polich, 2007). 
Early P300 studies investigated the role of stimulus probability and task 
relevance by utilising oddball paradigms (Donchin et al., 1978; Pritchard, 1981). The 
oddball task presents two different stimuli in a random sequence, with one occurring 
less frequently (target) than the other (standard), and participants are instructed to 
respond only to the target stimulus. Discriminating the target stimulus from the 
standard stimulus produces a P300 component that increases in amplitude as the 
probability of occurrence of the target stimulus decreases (Duncan-Johnson and 
Donchin, 1982; 1977). Subsequent studies investigated the role of attentional resource 
allocation, by employing dual-task performance paradigms in which a primary task is 
performed while the participant is also engaged in a secondary task of mentally 
counting target oddball stimuli. P300 amplitude from the oddball task decreases as the 
difficulty of the primary task increases (Kramer et al., 1985; Wickens et al., 1983). 
For tasks that require large compared to small amounts of attentional resources, the 
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P300 amplitude is relatively small and the peak latency is later because processing 
resources are being used for task performance (Polich, 2003). 
The generation of the P300 has been explained within the context-updating 
theory (Donchin, 1981; Polich, 2003). This theory proposes that the P300 component 
is associated with the revision of the mental representations induced by stimuli. After 
initial sensory processing, a comparison process evaluates the representation of the 
previous event in working memory in order to ascertain whether the current stimulus 
is either the same as the previous stimulus or not. For instance, in the oddball task, the 
comparison process is employed to determine whether a standard or a target stimulus 
was presented. If no differences in the stimulus are detected, the current mental model 
of the stimulus context is maintained, and only sensory evoked potentials are generated 
(N100, P200, N200). If a new stimulus is detected, the subject allocates attentional 
resources to the target, and the neural representation of the stimulus environment is 
changed or updated, so that a P300 potential is generated in addition to the sensory 
evoked potentials. 
Importantly, P300 has also been observed in tasks involving decision making 
and outcome evaluation and is thought to reflect the evaluation of the functional 
significance of feedback stimuli (Hajcak et al., 2005; 2007; Sato et al., 2005; 
Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). 
Specifically, in the context of value-based decision making, P300 has been 
consistently shown to be sensitive to the magnitude of the reward, being more positive 
for larger compared to smaller rewards (Bellebaum et al., 2010b; Gu et al., 2011; Sato 
et al., 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In addition to reward 
magnitude, studies have demonstrated that the P300 is also sensitive to reward 
valence, being more positive for gain compared to loss feedback (Bellebaum et al., 
2010b; Hajcak et al., 2005; 2007; Holroyd et al., 2004; Leng and Zhou, 2010; Li et al., 
2010; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Yeung et al., 2005). Nevertheless, other studies found no 
support for P300 amplitude modulation by outcome valence (Sato et al., 2005; Yeung 
and Sanfey, 2004). Finally, similarly to studies that utilised the oddball paradigm 
(Courchesne et al., 1977; Duncan‐Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Johnson and Donchin, 
1980), studies employing gambling tasks have also found that P300 is modulated by 
outcome probability, so that unexpected rewards elicited stronger P300 amplitudes 
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compared to expected rewards (Cohen et al., 2007; Hajcak et al., 2005; 2007; Holroyd 
and Krigolson, 2007; Holroyd et al., 2003). 
Motivated by research demonstrating that FRN is typically sensitive to reward 
valence whereas the P300 is sensitive to reward magnitude, it has been proposed that 
the FRN and the P300 components might encode different aspects of outcome 
evaluation (Kamarajan et al., 2009; Sato et al., 2005; Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; 
Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2006). In particular, it is possible that the FRN 
serves as an early automatic evaluation process that coarsely differentiates between 
good and bad outcomes, whereas the P300 is a later cognitive/affective appraisal 
process for which factors related to the allocation of attentional resources, including 
reward valence and magnitude, are of importance (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). 
 
1.6 Interim summary 
 
 In light of the research discussed in the previous sections, it is evident that loss 
aversion plays a profound role in decision making. Brain regions that are important 
for value computation and reward processing have also been suggested to encode loss 
aversion. Given the definition of loss aversion as a cognitive bias towards potential 
losses and the sensitivity of FRN in differentiating between gain and loss outcomes, 
FRN provides a suitable candidate to investigate the neural underpinnings of loss 
aversion during the outcome receipt phase of the decision making process. 
 
1.7 Research problems 
 
Although loss aversion has been proven to be a robust behavioural 
phenomenon, the neural mechanisms underlying its influence on decision making and 
evaluation of decision outcomes are still poorly understood due to the limited amount 
of neuroimaging studies, especially those employing EEG. Most importantly, the 
temporal aspects of loss aversion effects on decision making and outcome evaluation 
are an important, yet still not investigated, topic. Moreover, little is known about 
whether loss aversion measured at the time of the decision influences subsequent 
evaluation of decision outcomes during the learning of the outcome phase. It is not 
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clear if (and which) ERP components are associated with loss aversion, and 
specifically the timing of such modulation. Furthermore, the majority of existing 
neuroimaging research did not control for potential risk aversion effects, which is a 
possible source of confound in both the behavioural and the neuroimaging data. Such 
questions have wider relevance for the general literature on risky decision making and 
reward evaluation, and can only be investigated using a neuroimaging technique with 
high temporal resolution, such as EEG. The first experimental study of the current 
thesis, which is described in detail in Chapter 3, served as a starting point towards 
answering these questions. 
Additionally, it is not known whether potential loss aversion effects exert 
similar modulation on outcome evaluation during simple decisions and during more 
complex decision situations. The second experiment (detailed in Chapter 4) aimed to 
compare two different types of undesirable outcomes; experienced losses and missed 
gains. To this end, participants were prompted to engage in comparisons relating to 
counterfactual thinking and processing of missed opportunities. Given that loss 
aversion is a bias towards avoiding negative outcomes, it might correspondingly affect 
the processing of missed opportunities, if these are perceived as negative prospects. 
This topic has great importance for decision making research as not only are we 
frequently required to make decisions by simultaneously considering alternative 
options, but also we are often confronted with regret associated with wrong decisions. 
Furthermore, there is also the potential of anticipated regret about making the wrong 
decision such that regret can occur both before and after making a decision. 
Furthermore, decision making is often limited by the amount of freedom (or 
lack thereof) that the decision maker has. The role of loss aversion is of evident 
relevance in such a context as decision makers can be inflicted by losses irrespective 
of whether these losses were the consequence of their own freely-made choices or not. 
This topic of obstructed, relative to free, decision making was investigated in the third 
experimental study (detailed in Chapter 5). 
Finally, in order to understand how decisions might differ depending on the 
recipient of the decision outcome, the fourth study (detailed in Chapter 6) investigated 
loss aversion within a social context. Loss aversion and corresponding outcome 
evaluation patterns were directly compared in two decision making situations; in one, 
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participants made a series of gambling decisions for themselves and kept the rewards 
earned, whereas in the other they gambled for another participant and gave their 
earnings to that participant. 
 
1.8 Aims 
 
The main aims of the current thesis were: 1) to investigate the neural correlates 
of loss aversion at the time of receiving a decision outcome, 2) to identify the timing 
of potential loss aversion effects by taking advantage of the temporal resolution of the 
EEG technique, 3) to ensure that the observed results pertained only to loss aversion 
by utilising an incentivised gambling paradigm that allowed a simultaneous separation 
of loss and risk aversion, and 4) to explore specific conditions under which such 
influences do and do not occur. 
 
1.9 Hypotheses 
 
 Individuals with large loss aversion will show stronger FRN amplitude 
compared to individuals with small loss aversion (study 1). 
 Individual differences in loss aversion will be correlated with FRN amplitude 
strength following actual outcomes but not with FRN following counterfactual 
outcomes (study 2). 
 Individual differences in loss aversion will be correlated with FRN amplitude 
following outcomes resulting from free choices but not with FRN amplitude 
following outcomes resulting from choices that were arbitrarily imposed on 
participants (study 3). 
 Individual differences in loss aversion will be correlated with FRN amplitude 
following outcomes obtained for participants themselves but not with FRN 
amplitude following outcomes obtained for others (study 4). 
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Chapter 2 
 
General Methods 
 
2.1 Loss aversion estimation 
 
Several methods have been used in behavioural and neuroimaging experiments 
in order to evaluate loss aversion. The main methods fall broadly into the following 
categories: 
 
2.1.1 Questionnaires 
 
 The first efforts to obtain loss aversion estimates utilised short questionnaires 
in which participants selected their preferred option between a set of choice problems 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The problems presented symmetric bets offering 
equal probability to win or lose the same amount of money, based on the idea that if 
these bets are considered unattractive this would be evidence for loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Subsequent experiments asked participants to rate the 
acceptability of pairs of mixed prospects (e.g., 50% chance to lose £100 and 50% 
chance to win an alternative amount) in which the alternative amount varied over trials 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Variations of these problems consisted of comparing 
a fixed prospect (e.g., 50% chance to lose £20 and 50% chance to win £50) to a 
different set of prospects (e.g., 50% chance to lose £50 and 50% chance to win x) in 
which x varied from trial to trial. 
 
2.1.2 Endowment paradigms 
 
Another set of experiments focused on loss aversion in riskless contexts based 
on the idea that people tend to value objects more after they come to feel that they own 
them, a phenomenon known as the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991). This has the implication that the minimum amount of money that 
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a person is willing to accept to part with an object generally exceeds the minimum 
amount of money that the person is willing to pay to obtain the same object, and these 
differences between WTA-WTP values are interpreted as evidence for loss aversion 
(Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). For instance, Kahneman 
et al. (1990) presented a coffee mug to one group of participants (‘sellers’), told them 
that the mug was theirs to keep, and then asked them to state the minimum WTA 
amount to give up the mug. A second group of participants (‘buyers’) were told that 
they had the option of receiving an identical mug or an amount of money and asked 
which they preferred at various prices. The sellers quoted higher prices compared to 
the buyers, presumably because the former framed the choice as a loss of a mug against 
a gain of money, whereas the latter framed the choice as a gain of a mug against a gain 
of money (Kahneman et al., 1990). These findings have been replicated in similar 
endowment paradigms using a variety of products, including lottery tickets (Knetsch 
and Sinden, 1984), basketball tickets (Carmon and Ariely, 2000), gift vouchers (Sen 
and Johnson, 1997), snack choices (Levin et al., 2002), chocolate (Kahneman et al., 
1991), and wine (Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg, 1998). 
 
2.1.3 Gambling/choice tasks 
 
 This category differs from questionnaires in that the tasks did not rely solely 
on a small (typically less than ten) number of gambling choices but rather 
systematically employed a range of carefully selected amounts of money in order to 
achieve more robust individual decision making parameters that were not influenced 
by the specific selection of gambling stakes. Tasks within this category can be further 
divided into non-parametric and parametric methods. 
 
2.1.3.1 Non-parametric 
 
Non-parametric methods do not make any assumptions regarding the form of 
the value and probability weighting functions. These methods rely on a two-stage 
process whereby the value function is estimated first and then it is used to estimate the 
probability weighting function. One of the most commonly used non-parametric 
methods for loss aversion estimation entails asking participants to choose between a 
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number of two-outcome gambles associated with different probabilities with the goal 
to assess certainty equivalents for each choice (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). Each gamble 
offers a 50% chance to win a specified amount of money or nothing versus a sure 
smaller amount. For instance, assuming a gamble prospect of £100 or £0, if a 
participant preferred a sure prospect of £40 over the gamble, but preferred the gamble 
over a sure prospect of £20, then the following round of choices would be designed 
such that it reduces the range to be between £40 to £20. This process is repeated until 
exact certainty equivalents can be estimated. That is, if a participant preferred a sure 
£36 over a gamble, but preferred the gamble over £35, then a certainty equivalent for 
this participant is £35.5. Each possible outcome amount and probability weight are 
parameters that are estimated using a least squares procedure whereby each step either 
held weight constant and estimated value or held the value constant and estimated 
weight. 
Another commonly used non-parametric example is the trade-off method 
(Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). This method requires participants to choose between a 
pair of two-outcome prospects. The prospects offer a specified probability to win an 
amount of money or an alternative amount for sure (e.g., win x with probability p or 
receive y for sure), with one of the outcomes being adjusted following each choice. 
For instance, a participant might be offered a choice between a fixed 50% probability 
to win £100 or £20 for sure versus 50% to win £70 or £40 for sure. If the participant 
prefers the latter gamble, then the variable prospect of the first gamble (e.g., the £100 
amount) will increase or decrease (e.g., £110). This amount will vary until both 
prospects are equally attractive for the participant. Once indifference is established for 
a first pair of prospects, the procedure continues with a second pair of prospects with 
the same probability and reference outcomes but with a different variable outcome. 
By combining the two indifference values, equal value intervals can be estimated such 
that a standard set of equally spaced outcomes can be produced, creating a parameter-
free value function for gains. The disadvantage of non-parametric methods is that they 
are generally quite cognitively demanding for participants, requiring choices between 
multiple two-outcome prospects (or even more complicated choices). 
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2.1.3.2 Parametric 
 
In parametric approaches, specific functional forms for the value and 
probability weighting functions are fitted directly to the obtained choice data. One 
such method entails asking participants to choose whether they want to accept or reject 
a series of mixed-gambles offering 50% chance of winning or losing different amounts 
of money (Tom et al., 2007). In order to estimate individual differences in sensitivity 
to gains and losses, a logistic regression is performed on each participant’s choice data 
with the potential gain and loss amounts as independent variables and participant’s 
decision (accept vs reject gamble) as the dependent variable, thus leading to separate 
measurement of sensitivity to gains and losses (the regression coefficients). A measure 
of loss aversion can then be computed as the ratio of the loss response to the gain 
response, such that loss aversion equals -βloss / βgain, where βloss and βgain are the 
unstandardised regression coefficients for the loss and gain variables, respectively. 
This method does not take into account the PT value and weight functions. This 
method assumes a piecewise linear value function, and identical decision weights for 
a 50% probability to gain or lose money. This method has been used almost 
exclusively in neuroimaging research for the estimation of loss aversion (Canessa et 
al., 2017; 2013; De Martino et al., 2010; Duke et al., 2018; Heeren et al., 2016) as it 
is easy to implement within a neuroimaging experiment. However, this method has 
the disadvantage that it does not allow for separate estimation of risk aversion. It has 
been proposed that loss aversion and risk aversion are often confounded (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009) and this might lead to mistaken assumptions regarding the source 
of the obtained choices and corresponding brain activation. 
A modification of this method has been proposed in order to accommodate an 
estimation of risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). This method requires 
participants to make two different types of choices that each allow the estimation of 
either loss or risk aversion. Specifically, for the loss aversion estimation, participants 
are required to choose between mixed-gambles offering 50% chance of winning or 
losing different amounts of money and a sure zero outcome. For the risk aversion 
estimation, participants are required to choose between gain-only gambles versus a 
sure non-zero outcome, which is smaller than the gain from the corresponding gamble 
in each trial. The rationale for this is that risk aversion can be present even without the 
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prospect of potential loss, whereas loss aversion by default requires the measurement 
of loss outcomes. Importantly, this method allows for a behavioural separation of loss 
and risk aversion, and researchers can separately investigate the brain processes 
underlying specifically each of these variables by including only the neuroimaging 
data from each type of trials. This is the method that was chosen for the experiments 
presented in the current thesis, and a detailed description of the task and the estimation 
procedure used are given in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Electroencephalography (EEG) 
 
2.2.1 Physiological basis of the EEG signal 
 
Neurons in the brain communicate with each other through discrete voltage 
spikes, known as action potentials. These action potentials travel from the cell body 
along the axons towards excitatory or inhibitory terminals called dendrites 
(Speckmann and Elger, 2005). When action potentials reach the dendrites, 
neurotransmitters are released which bind with the receptors of the postsynaptic cell 
membrane causing ion channels to open. A postsynaptic potential is then created 
between intracellular and extracellular space. These potentials are called field 
potentials (Speckmann and Caspers, 1979), and they constitute the basic mechanism 
underlying the potentials recorded by EEG. While action potentials last approximately 
one millisecond, field potentials can last tens or even hundreds of milliseconds (Luck, 
2014). The activity recorded through EEG is thought to be generated mainly by 
pyramidal cells, which have a perpendicular orientation relative to the cortical surface 
(Fisch, 1999). When thousands of field potentials occur simultaneously at a similar 
location and orientation, it is possible for their summated activity to be detected as a 
voltage difference on the scalp, and it can be recorded using EEG (Lopes da Silva and 
Van Rotterdam, 2005; Nunez and Silberstein, 2000). 
 
2.2.2 EEG signal acquisition and processing 
 
The EEG technique utilises the measurement and recording of fluctuating field 
potentials in the brain over time (Kamp et al., 2005). To this end, electrodes are 
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positioned on the scalp at locations based on the Standardised International 10-20 
system, which employs relative distance measurements using internationally 
recognised anatomical landmarks on the skull (Jasper, 1958; Klem et al., 1999). This 
standardised electrode placement ensures that the names and positions of electrodes 
are consistent across different laboratories so that the corresponding EEG recordings 
can be comparable allowing for meaningful interpretation of findings. For the 
placement of electrodes, a suitable gel or liquid must be applied in order to facilitate 
the conduction of signal (Rowan & Tolunsky, 2003). 
For all the EEG recordings described in the current thesis, a 129-channel net 
with sponge electrodes (Electrical Geodesics, Inc.) was used. Figure 2.1 shows a 
flattened representation of the net and the positions of its electrodes. This high density 
net allows for full head coverage, including much of the face. A saline solution was 
used as the conductor medium. The Cz vertex electrode was used as the reference 
(denoted by ‘REF’ in Figure 2.1). Recordings were taken at a sampling rate of 1000 
Hz. A high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz was used online. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic of the 129-channel Geodesics net. 
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Typically, the adult EEG recording signal ranges between 10 and 100 μV in 
amplitude (Aurlien et al., 2004). This signal needs to be amplified before it can be 
measured (Luck, 2014). The resulting amplified signal is subsequently digitised, and 
the digital recording enables the display and analysis of data. The signal at each 
specific electrode at a specific time point represents the voltage difference between 
this electrode and a reference electrode (Luck, 2014). There are different methods that 
can be used to acquire the reference signal. These include mean recordings from 
bilateral mastoid electrodes, Laplacian comparison between each electrode and the 
weighted average of its surrounding electrodes or the common average method which 
refers to the mean signal of all EEG channels (Nunez et al., 1997). During the EEG 
recording, low-pass filters can be used to attenuate high frequency signals and high-
pass filters to attenuate low frequency potentials (Luck, 2014). 
 
2.2.3 Advantages and limitations of EEG 
 
The most important advantage of using the EEG technique is that it offers 
excellent temporal resolution which is in the range of milliseconds (Schneider and 
Strüder, 2012). This allows for an understanding of stimulus processing in real time 
which can be particularly useful during investigation of cognitive processes that occur 
quickly in the brain, such as during decision making. Additionally, EEG offers a more 
direct measure of neuronal activity compared to indirect responses measured through 
fMRI or positron emission tomography (PET) (Hari et al., 2010). Furthermore, there 
are practical advantages for the use of EEG in that it is a non-invasive technique, it 
can be recorded wirelessly allowing for recordings in a wide range of environments, 
and is relatively inexpensive compared to fMRI, magnetoencephalography (MEG) or 
PET (Schneider and Strüder, 2012). 
The main disadvantage of the EEG technique is that it has a limited spatial 
resolution compared to fMRI. Because the EEG activity is recorded from scalp 
electrodes, the original signal needs to pass through several brain layers such as 
cerebrospinal fluid and the skull (Nunez et al., 1997). Therefore, exact identification 
of the source of activity is impossible. Even though advanced source localisation 
methods can be used to approximately identify intracranial sources, these are by 
default limited and depend on the accuracy of conductivity models and brain templates 
38 
 
used (Schneider and Strüder, 2012). Despite the accuracy of source localisation 
methods improving with increasing number of electrodes used during recordings 
(Babiloni et al., 2001; Lantz et al., 2003; Michel et al., 2004), these techniques can be 
used as source estimates, but with caution as they are not definitive (Luck, 2014). 
 
2.2.4 Artifact rejection 
 
EEG recordings are sensitive to artifacts, which are electrical signals that do 
not originate from within brain, but, nevertheless, can obscure the brain signals. Given 
that an amplification of signal is required during EEG recordings, this also leads to 
amplification of the artifacts which are not relevant for the analysis of the cognitive 
activity being investigated. These artifacts can include eye blinks (electrooculographic 
activity, EOG), parallel eye movements (or saccades), electrocardiographic activity 
(ECG), muscle movements, or accidental electrode sway. Furthermore, external noise 
from the environment, such as activity from electrical sources or appliances, can 
induce a 50 Hz wavelength artifact in the EEG signal. The two main problems 
associated with artifacts are that they can be large compared to the EEG signal of 
interest, thus, decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and, sometimes, they can 
occur systematically (e.g., eye blinks) rather than randomly in isolated instances 
(Luck, 2014). Even though some caution can be taken to reduce external noise, 
specific types of artifacts, such as eye blinks, cannot be completely eliminated. 
Therefore, prior to a meaningful interpretation of experimental findings, these artifacts 
must be eliminated from the EEG recording (Luck, 2014). 
The simplest, but also the most time consuming, artifact rejection technique is 
the visual inspection of individual trials and manual disregarding of trials containing 
artifacts (Luck, 2014). Additionally, filter application might help with the rejection of 
artifacts, particularly those that are of a known amplitude. For instance, 50 Hz noise 
can easily be reduced by applying a ‘notch’ filter (Luck, 2014). Sometimes, it might 
be the case that only one channel is showing an artifactual pattern consistently 
throughout the experiment (e.g., because the electrode is broken). Interpolation of this 
electrode, which entails replacing the original waveform with interpolated values from 
the surrounding electrode sites, is usually the most suitable strategy in this case. 
Furthermore, in cases where artifacts have a consistent pattern of activity, such as 
39 
 
those created by eye blinks, principal component analysis (PCA; Berg and Scherg, 
1994) or independent component analysis (ICA; Jung et al., 2000) techniques can be 
used. PCA and ICA do not eliminate entire trials, but rather identify and subsequently 
separate the average pattern associated with a specific type of artifact and finally 
subtract the isolated artifactual component from the data (Luck, 2014). Therefore, 
artifact rejection techniques are a necessary step in the processing of EEG recordings 
in order to ensure clean data pertaining only to the activity of interest and not to 
irrelevant extra-cerebral noise. 
It needs to be noted, however, that artifact rejection reduces the number of 
trials, and, consequently, the SNR. Furthermore, participants for whom a large 
percentage of trials has been rejected (e.g., 25% of trials) usually have to be excluded 
from subsequent analysis (Luck, 2014). The number of trials that were rejected for 
each participant and condition is reported in every experimental study presented in the 
current thesis. 
 
2.2.5 Event-related potentials (ERPs) 
 
ERPs refer to averaged EEG activity that is time-locked to an event or stimulus 
(Lopes da Silva, 2005). Conventionally, ERP responses to different conditions or 
stimuli are compared in order to quantitatively analyse EEG data with the underlying 
assumption that differences in ERP activity are associated with differential processing 
between conditions (Lopes da Silva, 2005). 
Four main steps are typically followed during measurement and quantification 
of ERPs, namely, the extraction of relevant epochs, baseline correction, averaging, 
and latency/amplitude measurement (Luck, 2014). Fixed-length segments of data are 
extracted from the continuous EEG, which are time-locked to the event/stimulus of 
interest. The exact epoch length depends on the ERP component being measured but, 
commonly, epochs range between 500-1500 ms following the onset of the stimulus. A 
pre-stimulus baseline period also needs to be measured for comparison. The baseline 
period is usually set to be one fourth of the total length of the epoch (typically 100-
200 ms), although this can vary depending on the experiment (Luck, 2014). Baseline 
correction is achieved by subtracting the average pre-stimulus voltage from the 
waveform. From trial to trial there is variability due to the fact that the EEG is the sum 
of many different sources of electrical activity in the brain, many of which are not 
40 
 
involved in the processing of the stimulus. However, any brain activity that is 
consistently elicited by the stimulus is assumed to have approximately the same 
latency from trial to trial. Thus, by averaging EEG epochs corresponding to each 
experimental condition from several trials, the component of interest is isolated from 
the remaining EEG activity. This averaging of event-locked EEG activity to different 
trials from specific electrodes produces a mean waveform, which has positive and 
negative voltage deflections that represent different ERP components (Luck, 2014). 
The ERP waveform becomes more stable as more trials are averaged together. Finally, 
the two main characteristics of ERP components that are usually compared between 
conditions are latency and amplitude (Luck, 2014). The two most common ways to 
quantify the magnitude of a given ERP component are the peak and mean amplitude 
and latency. The peak method simply uses the largest positive or negative peak voltage 
observed at a single time point within a given time window. The mean method uses 
the mean voltage over a specified time window. Furthermore, deviations in latency 
and/or amplitude of known ERP components can be used to make inferences about a 
particular function or a specific population (Duncan et al., 2009). 
The main advantage of using the ERP technique is the temporal resolution 
which is given at the range of milliseconds. The main disadvantage is the large number 
of trials that are required for averaging. This can lead to prolonged experiments, 
repetitive tasks, and participant fatigue. Nevertheless, the number of trials that are 
necessary to see robust ERP activity depends on the component of interest, and well 
established components with a known latency and topographic pattern tend to require 
less trials (Luck, 2014). 
 
2.2.6 EEG analysis using statistical parametric mapping (SPM) 
 
The main difference between SPM analysis and standard ERP analysis is that 
SPM employs a whole scalp approach, using data from all electrodes during a selected 
time epoch. Therefore, SPM constitutes a data-driven clustering approach compared 
to the classical a priori ERP component analysis (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). This 
can be particularly useful when investigating exploratory research questions or when 
it is difficult to make hypotheses regarding when or where to look for an effect (Kiebel 
and Friston, 2004; Worsley, 2003). SPM was used to analyse the differences between 
responses to gains and losses over the entire time epoch after feedback onset and in all 
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scalp electrodes in the first experiment described in the current thesis, as it represented 
an initial exploratory investigation. 
SPM constitutes a voxel-based approach that employs classical inference to 
interpret regionally specific responses to experimental factors (Friston et al., 1994; 
Kiebel and Friston, 2004). Every voxel in the brain is analysed using statistical tests 
and the resulting statistical parameters create an image called statistical parametric 
map (Friston et al., 1994). Similarly to three-dimensional space volumes in fMRI 
analysis, SPM during EEG data analysis uses three-dimensional volumes in which 
time represents the third dimension. In SPM maps, the value at each voxel represents 
a statistic that expresses evidence against the null hypothesis (Friston et al., 1994). 
SPM uses principles of Gaussian random field theory to control for multiple 
comparisons (Adler, 1981) and degrees of freedom are adjusted for non-sphericity 
(Kiebel and Friston, 2004). Hence, SPM provides robust control over Type I error 
while, at the same time, maintains sensitivity for the detection of significant results. 
The first stage in SPM analysis includes the modelling and standard estimation of ERP 
effects within subject and trial type, and this can involve observation of multiple ERPs. 
The second stage models the parameters defined at the first stage among trial type and 
participants, allowing classical inference (using t- or F-statistics) about experimental 
effects using contrast vectors (Kiebel and Friston, 2004). SPM analysis offers an 
unbiased analysis which does not assume that an effect needs to cover the full duration 
of an ERP component or its peak. As ERP components are usually generated by 
multiple cortical source dipoles, it is likely that an effect can also occur in areas of the 
scalp other than the site manifesting the dominant part of the component. In particular, 
in FRN, which was the main component of interest in the experiments presented in the 
current thesis, strong components of opposite polarity often co-occur with the 
activation cluster seen on the vertex. Thus, SPM during an exploratory investigation 
can reveal more aspects of data compared to the standard ERP analysis which would 
focus on one selected component. 
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2.2.7 Source analysis 
 
The ultimate goal of cognitive neuroscience is to discover how brain structure 
and function give rise to the cognitive processes under investigation. The EEG 
technique, although limited in spatial resolution compared to imaging techniques such 
as fMRI, provides the temporal resolution that is essential in order to measure 
cognitive processes in real time. As such, the goal of EEG source localisation is to 
provide a measurement of the time course of neural activity in specific brain regions. 
Topographic maps that represent the configuration of the potential field at a single 
moment in time can be constructed from EEG recordings. The analysis and 
interpretation of these topographic maps can provide information about the potential 
brain sources and direct the next source analysis steps. The underlying concept behind 
EEG source analysis is to fit sources at all brain regions contributing to the observed 
topographic maps. Therefore, EEG source localisation entails inferring the active brain 
source from the observed EEG signal. The resulting source waveforms represent the 
modelled brain activities and answer the question of if and when activity takes place 
in a specified brain region. 
In general, the source localisation of EEG activity is associated with the 
‘forward’ and ‘inverse’ problems. The forward problem refers to determining the 
potential scalp distribution given a number of intracerebral sources. In the forward 
solution, source locations and orientations represent independent variables and their 
associated source waveforms constitute the dependent variables. If a single dipole is 
placed in a conductive sphere, it is relatively simple to estimate the precise distribution 
of voltage that will be observed on the surface of the sphere. To solve the forward 
problem, a head model is created that describes the propagation of the volume currents 
to the scalp and represents the voltage at any electrode due to a current dipole with a 
given location and orientation. The head model needs to take into account the different 
electrical conductivity properties of several parts of the head, such as the skull. The 
volume conduction of the brain results in a widespread scalp topography with a 
maximum over the activated cortical sheet. A corresponding activity of opposite 
polarity appears on the other side of the head, so that any negativity has a 
corresponding positivity at another scalp location and vice versa. The inverse problem 
refers to the identification of intracerebral sources based on the observed scalp 
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potential distribution (i.e., what are the sources if the scalp waveforms/topographies 
are known). However, it is difficult to estimate a unique solution for the inverse 
problem because a large number and combination of possible source locations can 
contribute to the observed topographic distribution. In order to find a plausible 
solution, several assumptions and constraints must be considered in order to reduce 
the number of potential alternative solutions. The forward problem is an integral part 
of the inverse problem in that the inverse problem is estimated using the forward 
solution. In the hypothetical condition where there is only one dipole placed in a 
conductive sphere with known conductivity properties and there is no noise, the 
inverse problem can be solved by comparing forward solutions from a model dipole 
with the observed scalp distribution and then adjusting the dipole to reduce the 
discrepancy between the predicted and observed distributions. However, no unique 
solution can be found if the number of sources and their locations are unknown, as in 
the case of real EEG recordings. In other words, for any given scalp distribution, there 
is an infinite number of possible sets of dipoles that could produce that specific scalp 
distribution (Helmholtz, 1853; Plonsey, 1963). Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce 
the number of possible solutions which consequently reduces the error in source 
placement and several techniques have been proposed to address this.  
The techniques that have been proposed for source analysis of EEG data fall 
into two main categories: (1) discrete source models and (2) distributed source models. 
The discrete source approach utilises a small number of equivalent current dipoles 
(ECDs), each of which represents the activity over a small cortical region (up to 3 
cm3), and assumes that these dipoles vary only in strength over time. Each ECD is 
represented by its location, orientation and strength. One of the most commonly used 
discrete source approaches is ECD fitting within Brain Electrical Source Analysis 
(BESA; MEGIS GmbH, Germany) program. BESA is based on the assumption that 
the spatiotemporal distribution of voltage can be adequately modelled by a small set 
of dipoles (less than 20), each of which has a fixed location and orientation but varies 
in magnitude over time (Scherg and Von Cramon, 1985). Each dipole has six major 
parameters, three indicating its location, two indicating its orientation, and a 
magnitude parameter which varies over time. Each dipole is represented by a sphere 
indicating its location and a short line showing its orientation. Each dipole is also 
associated with a source waveform which graphically represents the temporal 
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evolution of the dipole moment, thus, showing how the estimated magnitude for that 
dipole varies over time. 
The first step to create a source model using the BESA ECD fitting approach 
is to define an initial model by fitting one ECD at a single time point or over a specified 
time interval. The BESA algorithm fits the ECD by determining the optimum location 
and orientation in order to explain the data in the specified interval as well as possible. 
The second step is the re-evaluation of the current model of ECD locations and 
orientations. BESA calculates the forward model topography for the fitted ECD(s) by 
computing a magnitude for each dipole at each time point so that the sum of the dipoles 
yields a scalp distribution that matches the observed distribution as closely as possible 
for each time point. Next, the predicted model scalp distribution is compared with the 
observed scalp distribution of voltage resulting from the recorded data. The difference 
between recorded data and modelled data defines the residual waveforms. The 
normalized sum of squares over electrodes of this residual activity is the residual 
variance (RV), that is, the unexplained fraction of the data variance. The goal of the 
BESA algorithm is to find the set of dipole locations and orientations that provide the 
optimal fit between the model and the data (the fit that yields the lowest RV). Finally, 
ECD location and orientation are adjusted until the RV is maximally reduced. That is, 
on each iteration, the forward solution is calculated, producing a particular RV, and 
then the locations and orientations of the ECDs are adjusted to try to reduce the RV. 
Distributed source models divide the brain into voxels creating a cubic grid 
spanning the whole brain volume. Such models compute a pattern of activation 
strengths for these voxels that can explain the observed distribution as well as satisfy 
additional mathematical constraints. The most important advantage of distributed 
approaches is that they do not depend on assumptions about the number and location 
of brain generators. Nevertheless, as distributed source models contain more sources 
than electrodes, there are many different source current distributions that could 
produce the observed scalp distribution. Even a coarse segmentation of the brain 
requires the computation of several different dipole strengths. This non-uniqueness 
problem is intensified as the brain is divided into smaller voxels. Therefore, constraints 
need to be defined in order to enable selection of the optimum solution. For instance, 
it has been proposed to select the one solution that both produces the observed scalp 
distribution and has the minimum overall source magnitudes (minimum norm 
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solution; Hämäläinen and Ilmoniemi, 1994). Derivatives of this method include Low 
Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994), 
standardised LORETA (sLORETA; Pascual-Marqui, 2002), and Local Auto 
Regressive Average (LAURA; de Peralta Menendez et al., 2001). The result of the 
method used is displayed superimposed on the anatomical MR image. Because no 
individual MRI is available, BESA software implementing these procedures 
automatically uses a standardised MRI template for this purpose. The main advantage 
of using distributed source approaches compared with discrete source approaches is 
that the former are relatively quickly generated and the experimenter does not have to 
decide on the number of sources and the respective fit intervals. Despite this, all 
distributed source approaches suffer from smearing and crosstalk causing the 
reconstructed image to appear blurred and non-focal and, consequently, the 
reconstructed activity at one source location represents not only brain activity at the 
modelled location but also from other brain regions. Iterative approaches, such as 
Classical LORETA Analysis Recursively Applied (CLARA; Hoechstetter et al., 2010) 
aim to combine advantages from discrete and distributed source images and can help 
to make distributed images more focal. They iteratively apply distributed source 
images with a successive shrinking of the source space. The result is more focal than 
the general distributed methods, decreasing the spread of activity substantially. 
Therefore, to directly compare discrete and distributed approaches, in discrete 
source analysis, each ECD represents an extended brain region and the number of 
sources is smaller than the number of electrodes. The discrete source model is defined 
by fitting or seeding, and the result is a multiple source model and source waveforms. 
If the source model contains all active brain regions, the source waveforms represent 
their activity, meaning that they separate and mutually contrast their activities with 
minimum crosstalk. However, because the source model needs to be defined, user 
interaction is required (e.g., decision on the number of sources, fit intervals). In 
distributed source analysis, each ECD represents one small brain segment and the 
number of sources is larger than the number of electrodes. The distributed source 
model is predefined (along the brain surface or on a regular volume grid), and the 
result is a 3D volume image, one for each time point. However, the images show 
smeared, non-focal activity, with substantial crosstalk between sources, and it is 
difficult to separate activity of brain regions positioned close to each other. Despite 
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this, because the source model is pre-defined, source images are generated easily and 
quickly, with minimum user input. 
In the current thesis, both a discrete and a distributed source localisation 
method were employed. The first technique involved source modelling using BESA 
(i.e., discrete method) by fitting ECDs sequentially in the order of peak latencies of 
grand average ERPs evaluated using global field power (GFP) waveform. Each ECD 
was fitted in the time window corresponding to a peak in the GFP waveform. As such, 
ECDs were fitted consecutively beginning with short latency components. The fitting 
procedure was stopped if the residual variance was not considerably reduced by adding 
another source dipole. The second technique employed CLARA (i.e., distributed 
method) as an independent source localisation method to verify the presence of each 
ECD fitted using the sequential technique. CLARA is an iterative application of the 
LORETA algorithm that reduces the source space in each iteration. First, a regularised 
LORETA is computed. Then, in iterative steps, CLARA smooths the previous image 
and sets all voxels with amplitudes of less than 10% of the maximum activation to 
zero, effectively eliminating them from the analysis and from the source space in the 
following step. 
However, as already mentioned, EEG source localisation is limited because, 
although a unique solution with parameters can be produced, it cannot be determined 
whether this solution is definitively correct. Nevertheless, approximate reconstruction 
of intracranial sources for a given EEG signal can be useful if the above limitation is 
taken into account when interpreting source analysis findings. Importantly, the 
advantage of the high density EGI system used for the experiments presented in the 
current thesis is that it offers whole head coverage, which includes electrodes 
positioned over lower scalp regions and face. This characteristic allows for superior 
modelling of the head sphere and improved source localisation compared to standard 
EEG systems, which is essential for identification of deep cortical sources, such as 
those located in OFC (Luu et al., 2001; Tucker, 1993). Indeed, it has been proposed 
that the first step for correct source analysis should be the adequate spatial sampling 
of the scalp potential fields, which necessitates a high number of electrodes (Michel 
and He, 2011). 
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2.3 Summary 
 
 The experiments presented in the current thesis employed parametric 
modelling of choices to investigate individual differences in loss aversion. EEG 
recordings were used in order to investigate ERP responses following the receipt of 
positive and negative decision outcomes. Given that loss aversion is a cognitive bias 
occurring only as a small fragment of the decision making process, the temporal 
resolution of the EEG technique offered an excellent measure to investigate its neural 
correlates. 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
  
49 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Study 1: Effects of loss aversion on neural responses to losses: an 
event-related potential study. 
 
 
This experiment investigated the effects of individual differences in loss aversion on 
the evaluation of monetary decision outcomes using EEG. 
 
It is published in Biological Psychology (2017), doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2017.04.005. The format has been altered to match the style of 
the thesis. 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
Loss aversion is the tendency to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of 
the same amount. To shed light on the spatio-temporal processes underlying loss 
aversion, we analysed the associations between individual differences in loss aversion 
and electrophysiological responses to loss and gain outcomes in a monetary gambling 
task. 
Electroencephalographic feedback-related negativity (FRN) was computed in 
29 healthy participants as the difference in electrocortical potentials between losses 
and gains. Loss aversion was evaluated using non-linear parametric fitting of choices 
in a separate gambling task. 
Loss aversion was associated with FRN amplitude (233˗263 ms) at electrodes 
covering the lower face. Feedback-related potentials were modelled by five equivalent 
source dipoles. From these dipoles, stronger activity in a source located in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) was associated with loss aversion. 
The results suggest that loss aversion implemented during risky decision 
making is related to a valuation process in the OFC, which manifests during learning 
choice outcomes. 
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Loss aversion is the tendency to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of 
the same amount (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion affects a large range 
of economic behaviours, such as willingness to part with an object in one’s possession 
(Kahneman et al., 1990), relative sensitivity to price changes (Hardie et al., 1993; 
Putler, 1992), decision making in a monetary gambling task (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2009; Takahashi et al., 2012; Tom et al., 2007), or the style of playing golf (Pope and 
Schweitzer, 2011). 
 In prospect theory of decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
individual decisions are modelled by two functions, the probability weighting function 
and the value function. Loss aversion, typically evaluated in tasks involving decision 
making under risk (Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013; Canessa et al., 2013; Tom et al., 
2007; Wright et al., 2012), is defined as a value function that is steeper for losses than 
for gains of equal size. Similarly, losses are associated with greater autonomic (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et al., 2015) and cerebral (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 
Tom et al., 2007) responses in people with high loss aversion compared to people with 
low loss aversion. Individual levels of loss aversion have been shown to negatively 
correlate with the presence of norepinephrine transporters in the thalamus (Takahashi 
et al., 2012). Further, a recent structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study 
revealed a positive correlation between loss aversion and grey matter volume in 
amygdala, thalamus and striatum (Canessa et al., 2013). 
A loss in a monetary gambling task is a negative feedback. A wealth of 
electrophysiological data suggests that presenting information about losses compared 
to gains is associated with a negative deflection in the electrocortical potential, which 
is superimposed on the subsequent, typically large, positive P300 component 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung et al., 2005). This negative electrocortical 
potential, known as feedback-related negativity (FRN), occurs between 200 and 350 
ms after feedback presentation (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a; Walsh and Anderson, 2012) and shows a characteristic 
scalp potential map with a spatial maximum in the fronto-central midline region of the 
scalp (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; 
Walsh and Anderson, 2012; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). The cortical source of FRN has 
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been located near or in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Bellebaum and Daum, 
2008; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hewig et al., 2007; Miltner et al., 1997; Potts 
et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2002). However, the potential fields during the period of 
FRN appear to have a more complex topography with positive components occupying 
the bilateral temporal regions of the scalp, suggesting the possibility that multiple 
cortical sources might be involved (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). Indeed, several 
studies have identified additional brain regions contributing to the generation of FRN 
(for reviews see Hauser et al., 2014; Walsh and Anderson, 2012), such as the PCC 
(Badgaiyan and Posner, 1998; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Müller et al., 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c) and the striatum (Martin et al., 2009; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2005c). 
 In the context of the present study, punishment sensitivity has been shown to 
be related to the amplitude of FRN (Santesso et al., 2011; Unger et al., 2012). In studies 
exploring effects of framing, stronger FRN amplitudes were found in prospects framed 
negatively compared to those framed positively (Ma et al., 2012; Yu and Zhang, 2014). 
Further, a recent study showed that loss aversion attenuated amplitudes of a posterior 
positive slow wave during decisions involving low conflict between competing 
options (Heeren et al., 2016). These studies suggest the possibility of an association 
between FRN and loss aversion. 
 The purpose of the present study was to identify the cortical regions and time 
period when loss aversion modulates the cortical response to losses during the 
evaluation of choice outcomes. Although loss aversion affects decision making during 
the period of evaluation of expected utilities of individual prospects, previous studies 
also found processing of loss outcomes related to loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et al., 2015). Neural responses to expected 
(Knutson et al., 2001) and actually perceived (Delgado et al., 2000; May et al., 2004) 
losses or gains are processed in an overlapping set of regions. Meta-analyses of fMRI 
studies typically point to ventral striatum, OFC and VMPFC as playing a central role 
in value-based decision making (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014). 
Therefore, we postulated that loss aversion will be associated with the 
electrophysiological responses to choice outcomes in one or more regions belonging 
to the brain valuation system (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Lebreton 
et al., 2009). To identify the brain regions involved in mediating the relationship 
between loss aversion and FRN, we applied source dipole analysis and analysed the 
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associations between source dipole waveforms and loss aversion using correlation 
analysis. To differentiate the effects of sensitivity to losses from sensitivity to risk, a 
non-linear parametric method was employed to model the individual choices using 
three parameters: loss aversion, curvature of the value function (i.e., risk attitudes) and 
choice sensitivity (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et 
al., 2015). Although the primary focus of the present study was on loss aversion, the 
curvature of the value function was evaluated as well to check the potentially 
overlapping effects of these two preference parameters. Finally, choice sensitivity 
served as an estimation of participants’ response consistency throughout the 
experiment. 
 
3.3 Methods 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
 
A total of 31 participants (16 females) completed the study. Two participants 
were removed from subsequent analyses due to technical issues encountered during 
EEG recordings. Thus, the final sample included 29 participants (14 females), aged 
22.5 ± 3.6 years (mean ± SD), 4 left-handed. The experimental procedures were 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Liverpool. All 
participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
 
3.3.2 Procedure 
 
The experiment involved two different tasks. The first one was a monetary 
gambling task comprising 100 trials. Participants had to select between two prospects 
with one of them offering a sure zero outcome or sure non-zero gain and the other an 
uncertain gain or loss of variable amounts. This task was used to assess individual loss 
aversion levels. Next, participants completed an EEG experiment involving only 
uncertain monetary gambles followed by presentation of the outcome. The event-
related potential (ERP) analysis of the outcome period served to evaluate the 
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individual FRN potentials. The purpose of the experiment was explained to 
participants, who were given instructions for the tasks at the beginning of the session. 
 
3.3.2.1 Loss aversion task 
 
The initial monetary gambling task was adapted from previous studies (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Tom et al., 2007), and in particular 
from Stancak et al. (2015). Participants received an initial endowment of £20 and were 
instructed to use it for gambling during the experiment. They were informed that 10% 
of the difference between their total gains and losses would be added to or subtracted 
from this £20 endowment and they would receive the remaining amount as a 
reimbursement for their participation. 
The task consisted of a total of 100 trials. In 80 of those trials, participants 
decided between a gamble and an alternative sure zero outcome. Each gamble 
consisted of 8 possible gain amounts (£1.0, £2.0, £3.0, £3.5, £4.5, £5.0, £5.5, £6.0) in 
combination with 10 possible losses. The losses were computed by multiplying each 
particular gain value with a coefficient from 0.2 to 2.0 in 0.2 steps in all possible 
permutations (8 gains × 10 losses). The gain and loss amounts used for these 80 
gambles are listed in Table 3.1. Potential gains and losses were associated with equal 
probabilities (i.e., 50%). In additional 20 trials, participants decided between a gain-
only gamble and a sure non-zero outcome. Here, the gain-only gambles offered a 50% 
chance to win a certain gain amount or zero otherwise, whereas the sure alternative 
was a smaller gain. These 20 gambles are listed in Table 3.2. Trials were presented in 
random order for each participant. 
Participants were seated in front of a 19-inch CRT monitor, and rested their 
right hand on a computer mouse. The stimuli were presented using Cogent software 
2000 (UCL, London, United Kingdom) for Matlab (Mathworks, Inc., USA). The trial 
structure is shown in Figure 3.1. Each trial began with two possible choices that were 
displayed on the screen for 4 s. Half of the screen presented a gamble option (e.g., 
‘You win £3.0, You lose £3.0’) in yellow text on black background. Participants were 
informed that the outcome was always random (i.e., 50% probability). The other half 
of the screen showed the value of a sure outcome (e.g., £0). Participants were 
instructed to choose between the two prospects by pressing the left or right mouse 
button according to the part of the screen they preferred. If the participant selected the 
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risky gamble option, feedback about the outcome was shown for 1 s (‘You won’ or 
‘You lost’). A fixation cross appeared before the start of the next trial that stayed on 
the screen for 1 s. The duration of this initial gambling task was approximately 15 min. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Gain and loss amounts used for the 80 mixed gambles. 
Gains Losses 
1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6   1.8   2.0 
2.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2   3.6   4.0 
3.0 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.8   5.4   6.0 
3.5 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.6   6.3   7.0 
4.5 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.6 4.5 5.4 6.3 7.2   8.1   9.0 
5.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0   9.0 10.0 
5.5 1.1 2.2 3.3 4.4 5.5 6.6 7.7 8.8   9.9 11.0 
6.0 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6.0 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12.0 
 
 
Table 3.2. List of 20 pairs of gain-only gambles and assured non-zero gains. 
Pair Gamble Sure gain 
1 1.0 0.5 
2 1.5 0.5 
3 2.0 1.0 
4 2.5 1.0 
5 3.5 1.5 
6 4.0 1.5 
7 6.0 3.0 
8 6.0 2.5 
9 6.0 2.0 
10 7.5 2.5 
11 7.5 3.0 
12 9.5 4.0 
13 11.0 5.0 
14 11.5 5.0 
15 12.5 4.5 
16 12.5 5.0 
17 13.0 5.0 
18 13.0 6.0 
19 14.0 7.5 
20 15.0 6.0 
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Figure 3.1. Trial structure of the loss aversion task. Top panel: Declined gambles. Each trial began with 
the presentation of two possible choices, which were displayed on the screen for 4 s. Half of the screen 
presented a gamble option (e.g., ‘You win £3.0, You lose £3.0’) with a 50% chance of winning or losing 
the displayed amount of money. The other half of the screen showed the value of a sure outcome (e.g., 
£0). Participants were instructed to choose between the two prospects by pressing the left or the right 
mouse button according to the part of the screen they preferred. If participants chose a sure zero 
outcome, they would neither lose nor win anything. In the next 2.5 s, the options stayed on the screen 
and two yellow rectangles appeared at the bottom of the screen. After participants chose their preferred 
option, the yellow rectangle corresponding to that option turned into green colour to highlight 
participants’ choice. Subsequently, a fixation cross appeared on the screen and the next trial started 
after 1 s. Bottom panel: Accepted gambles. If participants selected the risky gamble option, a black 
screen was displayed for 1 s after the 2.5 s response period, and feedback about the gamble outcome 
was shown for 1 s (‘You won’ or ‘You lost’). A 1 s black screen served as a resting period before the 
next trial. 
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3.3.2.2 FRN task 
 
After application of the EEG cap, participants were led into a dimly lit, sound 
attenuated room and completed the second gambling task. This task was similar to 
those used in previous studies (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2006; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b). Figure 3.2 shows the flowchart of the trial procedure. Each 
trial began with a resting interval during which participants viewed a white cross on a 
black background. Participants then saw two white rectangles positioned next to each 
other (one on the left and one on the right side of the screen). After 1 s, the numbers 
25 and 5 were presented in either one of the rectangles. These numbers indicated 
amount of money (in pence) that could be won or lost on that trial. Each number 
appeared on either the left or right side of the screen and this was counterbalanced 
across trials. The rectangles never contained the same number on both sides 
simultaneously. Participants had to choose between these two options by pressing the 
left or right mouse button. Their chosen option was highlighted for 1 s with a yellow 
rectangle. Next, the chosen and the alternative outcomes were displayed again with 
the sign ‘+’ or ‘-’ in front of each number, indicating their valence. The outcome on 
any trial was randomly generated by the computer and participants had a 50% chance 
of winning or losing. Thus, the prospects could be either positive or negative numbers 
but participants could not know this in advance. There were four possible 
combinations of outcomes (+25 +5, +25 -5, -25 -5, -25 +5). During the outcome 
period, participants also received feedback about whether their chosen option was 
better or worse than the other option. The better of the prospects was highlighted with 
a green rectangle and the worse prospect with a red rectangle. For example, in the case 
where both numbers were positive (+25 vs. +5), participants won money no matter 
what they chose. However, winning 25 was still better than winning 5 and, therefore, 
25 was highlighted with green. Finally, participants were reminded that the value of 
each chosen outcome would be added to or subtracted from their initial £20 
endowment. 
The task consisted of 480 trials, split into 15 blocks of 32 trials. The duration 
of each block was approximately 5 min. At the end of each block, participants received 
feedback about the amount of money earned in that block as well as the cumulative 
amount gained from the beginning of the task. 
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Figure 3.2. Trial structure of the FRN task. Each trial began with the display of two white rectangles 
positioned next to each other (one on the left and one on the right side of the screen) on a black 
background. After 1 s, the numbers 25 and 5 were presented in either one of the rectangles. These 
numbers indicated amount of money (in pence). Participants had to choose between these two options 
by pressing the left or right mouse button. Their chosen option was highlighted for 1 s with a yellow 
rectangle. After this, the chosen and the alternative outcomes were displayed with the sign + or – in 
front of each number, indicating their valence. In addition, participants received feedback about whether 
their chosen option was better or worse than the unchosen one. The best prospect was highlighted with 
green colour and the worst with red colour. 
 
 
3.3.3 EEG Recordings 
 
After completing the loss aversion task, participants were connected to the 
EEG system. EEG was recorded continuously using a 129-channel Geodesics EGI 
System (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon, USA) with a sponge-based 
HydroCel Sensor Net. This system allows full head electrode coverage as it includes 
electrodes positioned over lower scalp regions and face, which is essential for 
identification of deep cortical sources, such as those located in OFC (Luu et al., 2001; 
Sperli et al., 2006; Tucker, 1993). The sensor net was aligned with respect to three 
anatomical landmarks; two preauricular points and the nasion. Electrode-to-skin 
impedances were kept below 50 kΩ and at equal levels across all electrodes, as 
recommended for the EGI system we used (Ferree et al., 2001; Luu et al., 2003; Picton 
et al., 2000). The recording band-pass filter was 0.001−200 Hz with sampling rate at 
1000 Hz. The electrode Cz served as the reference. 
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3.3.4 Behavioural analysis 
 
A parametric method was employed to estimate the level of loss aversion using 
a piecewise function: 
 
𝑈(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝑣+,                 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝑣−,    𝑥 < 0
 
 
where ν is the curvature of the value function parameter that controls the diminishing 
sensitivity, x represents the actual outcome from each trial, and λ is the loss aversion 
coefficient to overstate disutility from losses. Because the whole utility is reference-
dependent, outcomes are regarded as gains when x ≥ 0 or losses when x < 0 . In line 
with previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wu 
and Gonzalez, 1996), we employed the assumption of equality of curvature parameters 
(i.e., v+ = v-). 
The estimation process was based on the logit-function, which gives the 
probability of acceptance of a risky gamble. Formally, the function can be written as: 
 
𝐹(𝑝, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑙 , 𝑥𝑐) = (1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝜇 (𝑈(𝑝, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑙) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑐))})
−1
 
 
where xg and xl refer to the monetary amount that participants could win or lose and xc 
represents the alternative sure outcome. The probability to win the uncertain gamble is 
represented by p. In the present study, we employed the common simplification of 
linear probability weighting (Canessa et al., 2013; Schulreich et al., 2016; Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2013; 2009; Tom et al., 2007) and probabilities of gains and losses were 
equal throughout the experiment at p = (1 – p) = 0.5. We further assumed that 
participants combined their utility and probability in a linear manner, which implies 
pU(x) = U(px). 
The logit parameter µ denotes the sensitivity to utility deviations. A greater µ 
suggests a greater consistency in applying the respective prospect-theoretic model to 
individual decision making behaviour. On the other hand, smaller µ indicates more 
random choice (approaching a random choice with 50:50 probability of acceptance vs. 
rejection in its extreme. 
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One hundred choices were collected for each participant. Denote Zi as the 
choice related to the gamble i, where Zi equals one if the participant proceeds with the 
uncertain gamble, otherwise Zi will remain zero. The log likelihood function is given 
by: 
∑ 𝑍𝑖 log (𝐹(𝑝, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑙, 𝑥𝑐)) + (1 − 𝑍𝑖) log (1 − 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑙 , 𝑥𝑐))
100
𝑖=1
 
 
The values λ, v and μ were obtained by finding a proper set of estimates to maximise 
the above equation. Since this process involved a non-linear optimisation, a numerical 
approximation method has been applied using the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm 
(Nocedal and Wright, 2006) implemented in Mathematica 9.0 (Wolfram Research, 
Inc., USA). 
 
3.3.5 EEG analysis 
 
EEG data were pre-processed using BESA software v. 6.0 (MEGIS GmbH, 
Germany). EEG signals were spatially transformed to reference-free data using 
common average reference method (Lehmann, 1987). This spatial transformation 
restored the signal at electrode Cz which was also used in further analyses. Eye blinks 
and, when necessary, electrocardiographic artifacts were removed by principal 
component analysis (Berg and Scherg, 1994). Further, data were visually inspected for 
the presence of any movement or muscle artifacts, and epochs contaminated with 
artifacts were excluded. The average number of accepted trials in each condition was: 
loss feedback: 215.97 ± 7.73 (mean ± SD); gain feedback: 217.62 ± 11.10. The average 
number of trials accepted did not differ across conditions (p > 0.05). Data were filtered 
from 0.5−30 Hz. ERPs in response to outcome were computed separately for each 
feedback condition (gain or loss) by averaging respective epochs in the intervals 
ranging from 100 ms before outcome onset to 500 ms after outcome onset. Epochs 
were baseline corrected using a time window of -100 to 0 ms relative to the onset of 
feedback. 
Data were exported to SPM12 software package (Statistical Parametric 
Mapping, UCL, England; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12). Data 
from each subject and each outcome condition during the epoch -100 to 500 ms were 
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converted into three-dimensional scalp-time images. The electrodes were mapped onto 
a standardised scalp grid sized 32 × 32 pixels (pixel size 4.25 × 5.3 mm2) representing 
the field potential planes stacked over the time axis. Images were smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 9 mm × 9 mm × 20 ms (full width at half maximum). 
After calculating the contrast of gain-minus-loss, a multivariate regression 
analysis was computed with the smoothed scalp-time images of 29 participants as the 
dependent variable, and loss aversion λ, curvature of the value function ν and log-
transformed values of choice sensitivity μ as the predictor variables. The T-contrasts 
representing positive or negative correlations with λ and ν were evaluated. An 
uncorrected p value of 0.001 was used to statistically threshold the data, and significant 
clusters were only accepted if they were larger than 20 space-time voxels. 
 
3.3.6 Source reconstruction 
 
Grand average potentials comprising both gains and losses were analysed 
using source dipole analysis in BESA software v. 6.0 (MEGIS GmbH, Germany). 
Equivalent current dipoles (ECDs) were fitted sequentially in the order of peak 
latencies of individual ERPs evaluated using global field power waveform, similar to 
previous studies (Hoechstetter et al., 2001; Stancak et al., 2002; Stancak et al., 2013). 
Classical low-resolution electromagnetic analysis (LORETA; Pascual-Marqui et al., 
1994) recursively applied (CLARA; Hoechstetter et al., 2010) was used as an 
independent source localisation method to verify the presence of each ECD. In 
iterative steps, CLARA smooths the previous image and sets to zero all voxels with 
amplitudes of less than 10% of the maximum activation, effectively eliminating them 
from the analysis. CLARA analysis employed the singular value decomposition 
(SVD) regularisation with a cut-off of 0.01% and four iterations. The source activation 
images covered the whole brain with a voxel size of 7 × 7 × 7 mm3. If a small 
difference, in the range of 10 mm, in the location of an ECD and a corresponding 
CLARA cluster was encountered, the fitted ECD maximum was preferred in order to 
maintain the integrity of the source dipole model over the entire feedback epoch. A 4-
shell ellipsoid head volume conductor model was employed, using the following 
conductivities (S/m = Siemens per meter): brain = 0.33 S/m; scalp = 0.33 S/m; bone 
= 0.0042 S/m; cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) = 1.0 S/m. 
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Approximate Talairach coordinates for each ECD were compared with the 
Talairach atlas (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988), and the source locations were labelled 
according to the nearest cortical location. 
 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Choice parameters 
 
The mean loss aversion λ was 1.05 ± 0.04 (mean ± SEM) and the mean 
curvature of the value function ν was 0.53 ± 0.03. The mean loss aversion value was 
slightly smaller compared to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009); however, 
it fitted well with the mean loss aversion of 1.11 in a recent study involving 
adolescents and adults (Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013). There was no correlation 
between loss aversion and curvature of the value function (p > 0.05). The assumption 
of a Gaussian distribution was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Both loss aversion 
(W(29) = 0.96, p = 0.33) and curvature of the value function had normal distributions 
(W(29) = 0.94, p = 0.12). As choice sensitivity μ was not normally distributed (p < 
0.001), this variable was log-transformed, resulting in a mean value of 2.31 ± 0.26. 
 
3.4.2 FRN 
 
EEG epochs were averaged for each type of outcome (gains and losses), and 
FRN was quantified by subtracting ERPs to loss trials from ERPs to gain trials (gain-
minus-loss difference waveform; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). Figure 3.3A shows 
grand averaged waveforms of an averaged EEG potential at electrode Cz at the vertex, 
and at electrode 38 in the left temporal area for losses and gains. Loss trials (2.73 ± 
2.14 μV) resulted in less positive potential amplitudes compared to gain trials (3.30 ± 
2.29 μV; t(28) = 5.49, p < 0.001) during the maximum FRN. Figure 3.3B shows the 
topographic map of FRN displayed on a volume rendering of a human head. In 
accordance with previous studies (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2004b), FRN had a positive maximum at central and frontal midline electrodes. 
However, we also found negative FRN potential components at electrodes overlying 
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the face, and at lower temporal and parietal electrodes. The presence of multiple 
negative spatial maxima suggests that more than one cortical source contributed to 
FRN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. A. Grand averaged EEG potentials for gain and loss trials shown at electrode Cz at the 
vertex, and at electrode 38 in the left temporal area of the scalp. B. FRN is shown as the amplitude 
difference between gain and loss trials, peaking at 275 ms after feedback presentation (top panel). The 
scalp topographic map of FRN at its peak (275 ms) latency (bottom panel). 
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3.4.3 Correlations with loss aversion 
 
A multivariate regression analysis was computed involving the three decision 
making parameters (λ, ν and μ) and the smoothed scalp-time maps for the gain-minus-
loss contrast in every time sample ranging from -100 to 500 ms relative to the onset 
of feedback. 
Figure 3.4A shows the scalp-time plot, a standardised scalp map and a volume 
rendering of the head representing the statistically significant correlation with loss 
aversion λ. One spatio-temporal cluster operating in the interval 233‒263 ms showed 
a statistically significant negative correlation with λ (uncorrected p < 0.001). The 
temporal maximum of the correlation between FRN and λ had a peak latency of t = 
244 ms (T = 4.64, Z = 3.90, 547 scalp-time voxels). There were no scalp-time voxels 
showing any statistically significant positive correlations with λ (p > 0.05). 
To illustrate the correlation between loss aversion and the negative potential 
during the interval 233‒263 ms, the potential value in the scalp-time cluster shown in 
Figure 3.4A was evaluated in every subject, and correlated with individual loss 
aversion values. Figure 3.4B shows the scatter plot and the linear regression line 
between λ and the cluster representing the negative correlation coefficient of r(28) = -
0.91, p < 0.001. 
 
3.4.4 Source reconstruction 
 
Figure 3.5A shows the grand averaged waveforms and topographic maps of 
brain activity at different ECDs, on data combined from all the sessions. Figure 3.5B 
shows locations of the ECDs, which were fitted using global field power waveform, 
and spatial clusters obtained in the CLARA analysis. The final source dipole model 
accounted for 94.3% of the total variance, and involved five ECDs. 
ECD 1 was located in the PCC (Brodmann area 31; approximate Talairach 
coordinates: x = -4, y = -24, z = 45 mm) and peaked at 185 ms. ECD 1 had a prevailing 
radial orientation, related to the positive maximum in the fronto-central electrodes and 
a negative potential in the lower occipital region of the scalp. ECD 2 was located in 
the left OFC (Brodmann area 11; approximate Talairach coordinates: x = -19, y = 3, z 
= -5 mm). This ECD had the negative pole in the left lower facial electrodes and the 
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positive potential pole at parietal electrodes. ECD 2 peaked at 372 ms. ECD 3 was 
located in the right medial temporal cortex (Brodmann area 35; x = 27, y = 0, z = -8 
mm) and peaked at 388 ms. ECD 3 showed a negative maximum over the occipital 
electrodes and a positive potential component in the lower frontal region of the scalp. 
The negative potential over the occipital area of the scalp was located closer to the 
midline compared to ECD 1, which showed its negative potential component in the 
right occipital region. ECD 4 was located in the rostral ACC (Brodmann area 32; 
approximate Talairach coordinates: x = -2, y = 41, z = 8 mm). However, the CLARA 
cluster also involved the adjacent (VMPFC; Brodmann area 10), suggesting that ECD 
4 picked up activation from both these regions. ECD 4 was a radial dipole showing a 
strong positive potential pole at the vertex region of the scalp. The earliest peak 
occurred at 180 ms. ECD 5 was located in the OFC (Brodmann area 11; x = 6, y = 7, 
z = -2 mm). This source showed a double-peak pattern with peak latencies occurring 
at 227 ms and 380 ms. ECD 5 accounted for a negative potential component in the 
chin and neck region and a positive component in the posterior parietal region. 
The grand average source dipole model was used to quantify the source 
waveforms of each of five ECDs in two outcome conditions (loss, gain), and every 
participant. To test the correlations between loss aversion and feedback related 
potentials in all five sources over the interval showing the statistically significant 
correlation with loss aversion (233˗263 ms), the mean differences between loss and 
gain ECD waveforms were calculated in the time epoch of 233˗263 ms. Loss aversion 
values were correlated with five ECDs using the Pearson’s correlation method. The 
only statistically significant correlation coefficient surviving the correction for 
multiple tests was seen in ECD 5 (r(28) = 0.38, p < 0.05). The scatter plot and the 
linear regression line representing the positive association between the source activity 
in the OFC cortex and loss aversion are shown in Figure 3.4C. 
The correlations between curvature of the value function ν and five ECDs were 
computed in the interval showing the statistically significant correlation with ν in the 
scalp potential data (188˗236 ms). The only statistically significant correlation 
coefficient remaining after applying the correction for multiple tests was found in ECD 
3 (r(28) = 0.44, p < 0.05). The scatter plot and the linear regression line representing 
the positive association between the source activity in the right medial temporal cortex 
and curvature of the value function are shown in Figure 3.4F. 
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Figure 3.4. Correlations between FRN and loss aversion and curvature of the value function. A. The 
vertical green scalp-time plot shows one statistically significant regression between FRN and loss 
aversion (uncorrected p < 0.001). The T values represent the strength and direction of regression over 
the horizontal axis of the scalp in every time sample from -100 ms to 500 ms. The scalp values over the 
horizontal axis of the scalp are averages of T values occurring at each vertical point in time for a given 
horizontal point in the standardised scalp map (from -6.8 cm to +6.8 cm). One interval showed the 
presence of a statistically significant spatio-temporal cluster. In the interval 233-263 ms, one cluster 
showed a statistically significant negative correlation between loss aversion and FRN. Below the green 
panel is the standard scalp map of statistically significant negative regression between loss aversion and 
FRN. The horizontal axis of the standardised scalp-time map is aligned with the space-time map above. 
In the right part of this panel, there are two topographic maps. The upper map shows the FRN potential, 
and the lower map shows the topographic map of the statistically significant regression between loss 
aversion and FRN in T values. B. The scatter plot and linear regression line representing the correlation 
between loss aversion and the strength of FRN, r(28) = -0.91, p < 0.001. C. The scatter plot and linear 
regression line demonstrating the correlation between loss aversion scores and the strength of ECD 5 
located in the right OFC, r(28) = 0.38, p < 0.05. D. The scalp-time plot of the regression between 
curvature of the value function and scalp-time maps. In the interval 188-236 ms, one cluster showed a 
statistically significant negative correlation between curvature of the value function and FRN. The scalp 
map below the scalp-time plot is the standardised topographic map and shows the topographic location 
of the cluster showing the statistically significant correlation with curvature of the value function. The 
two topographic maps in the right part of this panel are the FRN potential map at t = 188-236 ms, and 
the regression map representing the associations between FRN and curvature of the value function at t 
= 188-236 ms. E. The scatter plot and linear regression representing the association between curvature 
of the value function and FRN, r(28) = -0.72, p < 0.001. F. The correlation between curvature of the 
value function and source dipole moments in ECD 3, r(28) = 0.44, p < 0.05. 
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Figure 3.5. Source dipole model and source waveforms underlying ERPs during the outcome period. 
A. Grand average source waveforms and the topographic scalp maps in five ECDs. Peak latencies are 
highlighted with arrows. B. Locations of five ECDs in a standard 3-D anatomical MR image and 
respective CLARA cluster (yellow-orange). Each source is represented by a bar seeded using global 
field power waveform. The ECDs are associated with numbers, which correspond to the source numbers 
in (A). L = left, R = right. 
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3.4.5 Curvature of the value function and FRN 
 
To exclude the possibility that the correlation effects of loss aversion 
overlapped with effects of the curvature of the value function, we also analysed the 
correlation between the scalp-time images and curvature of the value function. Figure 
3.4D shows the spatio-temporal clusters displaying a statistically significant (p < 
0.001) positive or negative correlation with curvature of the value function. The 
statistically significant associations between curvature of the value function and scalp 
potentials were seen in one scalp-time cluster located in the right frontal region of the 
scalp and operating in the interval 188‒236 ms. The maximum of the correlations 
between FRN and ν had a peak latency of t = 203 ms (T = 3.75, Z = 3.31, 76 scalp-
time voxels). Figure 3.4E shows the scatter plot and the linear regression line between 
individual curvature of the value function values and the spatio-temporal cluster 
manifesting a negative correlation (r(28) = -0.72, p < 0.001). Therefore, the data 
showed that correlations of curvature of the value function and scalp-time maps 
showed a different scalp topographic location and a different latency epoch to those 
of loss aversion and scalp-time maps. However, the interpretation value of this 
correlation is limited, owing to the small amplitude of FRN during the 188‒236 ms 
interval (Figure 3.3A). 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The present study analysed the associations between loss aversion and the 
spatio-temporal activation patterns during the evaluation of decision outcomes in a 
monetary gambling task using ERPs. Loss aversion was associated with the amplitude 
of the negative potential part of FRN in a cluster of electrodes covering the lower face 
(233˗263 ms). The correlation between feedback-related potentials and loss aversion 
was featured in the ECD located in the right OFC. Given that FRN acquired negative 
signal at the electrodes showing association with loss aversion, the negative 
correlation corresponds to an increased cortical response to losses in individuals with 
high levels of loss aversion. The spatio-temporal pattern associated with loss aversion 
differed from the pattern associated with curvature of the value function; curvature of 
the value function correlated with FRN in an earlier latency interval (188˗236 ms) 
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when FRN was very weak, and the ECD mediating this correlation was located in the 
right medial temporal cortex. 
 
3.5.1 FRN and cortical sources 
 
FRN potential, evaluated as the difference waveform between loss and gain 
trials, was consistent with previous studies both in the peak latency and the fronto-
central spatial maximum (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b). 
Our study extends previous research by showing further potential components in the 
lower facial, temporal, and occipital regions of the scalp, suggesting the presence of 
more than one dipole. Source localisation of ERPs during the outcome period yielded 
five cortical sources located in bilateral OFC, rACC/VMPFC, PCC, and the right 
medial temporal cortex. This finding accords previous studies reporting the generators 
of FRN in multiple brain regions (Badgaiyan and Posner, 1998; Cohen and Ranganath, 
2007; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hewig et al., 2007; Luu et al., 2003; Miltner et 
al., 1997; Müller et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c; Ruchsow et al., 2002; Walsh 
and Anderson, 2012). 
OFC and VMPFC are prominent parts of the brain valuation system, which is 
employed in outcome processing (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014), in 
evaluation of goods in the absence of risky decision making (Elliott et al., 2008; 
Lebreton et al., 2009) and whilst decisions are made (Chib et al., 2009; Plassmann et 
al., 2010). However, the three additional cortical regions identified in the source dipole 
model (PCC, rACC and medial temporal cortex) also play roles in decision making. 
PCC has been linked to automatic subjective value computation (Grueschow 
et al., 2015), comparison between alternative choices (FitzGerald et al., 2009) and 
reward magnitude (Ballard and Knutson, 2009). Additionally, the peak latency of the 
source located in PCC corresponded to the P200 component, which has been shown 
to encode the predictability of outcomes (Polezzi et al., 2008), magnitude of monetary 
outcomes (San Martín et al., 2013) and outcome history (Osinsky et al., 2012). 
Activations in rACC have been associated with emotional processing (Bush et 
al., 2000), error detection (Kiehl et al., 2000; Menon et al., 2001; Rubia et al., 2003; 
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001) and coding of reward value (Di Pellegrino et al., 
2007; Marsh et al., 2007). 
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As far as the source dipole in medial temporal cortex is concerned, previous 
studies reported activations associated with negative feedback (Coricelli et al., 2005), 
reward expectancies (Ramnani et al., 2004) and risk taking (Paulus et al., 2001). 
Overall, our results show that processing the outcomes of decisions in a 
monetary gambling task involves activations of brain regions implicated in assigning 
values to goods, emotions, reward and punishment, and monitoring outcomes and 
errors. 
 
3.5.2 Loss aversion and FRN 
 
Loss aversion modulated the amplitude of FRN in the early latency period of 
233‒263 ms on the ascending limb of FRN peak (275 ms). Due to rigorous statistical 
thresholding, which was necessary to account for multiple tests, only one small space-
time cluster of activation has survived the correction. However, this cluster was part 
of a strong negative FRN component seen at the whole left lower face (Figure 3.3A). 
The modulation of FRN in lower facial electrodes suggests that one or more deep 
cortical sources were involved (Luu et al., 2001; Sperli et al., 2006; Tucker, 1993). 
Indeed, the negative potential component seen at the face was associated with the ECD 
in the right OFC, which is where the correlation with loss aversion was found. OFC 
has been reported to be involved in computing the values of goods (Elliott et al., 2008; 
Lebreton et al., 2009), encoding reward/punishment magnitude (O'Doherty et al., 
2001; Roesch and Olson, 2004; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999) and mediating hedonic 
experience and evaluation of affective valence of stimuli (Cunningham et al., 2009; 
Kringelbach et al., 2003). Given the importance of OFC in hedonic evaluation of 
decision outcomes and the specific relation of loss aversion to outcomes of negative 
hedonic value, the present data are consistent with the role of OFC in decision making. 
 Previous studies have shown that processing of positive emotional stimuli are 
associated with activity in the left hemisphere, whereas processing of negative 
emotional stimuli are associated with activity in the right hemisphere (Ahern and 
Schwartz, 1985; Canli et al., 1998; Davidson, 1998; Lane et al., 1997; Lang et al., 
1998; Mandal et al., 1991; Tucker, 1981; Windmann et al., 2006). Although the 
outcome period was associated with activation in bilateral OFC, only the right OFC 
showed a statistically significant correlation with loss aversion. Given that loss 
aversion is a response to a negative prospect/outcome (monetary loss), this right-
72 
 
hemisphere lateralisation in the correlation between OFC and loss aversion is in line 
with the right-hemisphere prevalence in perception of hedonically negative stimuli 
(Ahern and Schwartz, 1985; Canli et al., 1998; Davidson, 1998; Lane et al., 1997; 
Lang et al., 1998; Mandal et al., 1991; Tucker, 1981; Windmann et al., 2006). 
The present study adds to previous data showing that individual levels of loss 
aversion correlated with activations in the VMPFC (Tom et al., 2007), ACC (Canessa 
et al., 2013), and ventral striatum (Canessa et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007) during the 
decision period, and in amygdala during the outcome period (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2013). Our data suggests that OFC provides an individually tuned neural signal about 
subjective value of loss or gain, and that this signal is associated with the tendency to 
avoid losses manifested in declining monetary gambles. Further studies should address 
whether the correlation between the activation in OFC and loss aversion during the 
outcome period would be also found in ERPs during the decision period. 
 Although we also found a correlation between the curvature of the value 
function and the scalp-time maps, the correlation between ERPs and the curvature of 
the value function in the interval 188-236 ms was not interpreted due to the weak FRN 
signal in this latency interval. However, the spatial location of the curvature of the 
value function correlation cluster, the time epoch, and the cortical source displaying a 
correlation with curvature of the value function differed from loss aversion data. These 
differences, together with the lack of correlation between loss aversion and curvature 
of the value function, suggest that the correlation between loss aversion and FRN seen 
in the present study was not contaminated with curvature of the value function. 
To conclude, the individual level of loss aversion is associated with the 
strength of electrocortical response to decision outcomes. Results suggest that 
increased neural signals for loss outcomes in the OFC are associated with utility 
functions that are steeper for losses than gains during decision making under risk. 
Although the present study shows an association between loss aversion and activation 
in OFC only during the evaluation of decision outcomes, it is possible that a similar 
mechanism is also implemented during the evaluation of anticipated outcomes in the 
course of the decision phase. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Study 2: Loss aversion is associated with the processing of actual but 
not counterfactual decision outcomes. 
 
 
This experiment investigated the association of individual differences in loss aversion 
with the neural processing of actual and counterfactual decision outcomes. 
 
It is currently under review. 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
Losses tend to be overvalued compared to gains of the same nominal value, a 
phenomenon known as loss aversion. Loss aversion has been shown to augment the 
neural responses to losses while learning the decision outcomes. However, decision 
outcomes are often evaluated in comparison with foregone outcomes. It is not clear if 
loss aversion also affects neural responses to counterfactual outcomes such as missed 
gains or losses. The present study analysed effects of loss aversion on neural responses 
to monetary outcomes resulting from both chosen and unchosen prospects (actual vs 
counterfactual outcomes) using electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. A 
monetary gambling task and parametric modelling of choices were used to estimate 
loss aversion. Participants were asked to accept or reject a series of gambles with 50% 
chance of winning or losing variable amounts of money. Feedback was given about 
the actual or counterfactual outcome. Event-related potentials (ERPs) time-locked to 
feedback onset for both actual and counterfactual outcomes were analysed and 
correlated with loss aversion. Feedback ERPs indicated differences in the neural 
processing of actual gains compared to actual losses, while no differences were 
observed between counterfactual gains and counterfactual losses. Critically, loss 
aversion correlated only with ERPs accompanying actual outcomes. In contrast, there 
was no association between loss aversion and counterfactual outcome processing. 
Results suggest that loss aversion is unrelated to the neural processing of unchosen 
decision outcomes and is implemented only during processing of factual outcomes. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Economic decisions are often influenced by the tendency to overestimate 
losses compared to gains of the same amount, a phenomenon known as loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A number of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies show that loss aversion is encoded by brain regions including the 
striatum (Canessa et al., 2017; Gelskov et al., 2015; Tom et al., 2007), the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Tom et al., 2007), the amygdala (Canessa et al., 2013; 
De Martino et al., 2010; Gelskov et al., 2015; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013) and the 
insula (Canessa et al., 2017; Markett et al., 2016). Individual differences in loss 
aversion have recently been linked to dopamine or norepinephrine activity (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2015; Takahashi et al., 2012; Voigt et al., 2015). Further, monetary 
losses are associated with stronger autonomic arousal responses compared to gains 
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et al., 2015). 
Recent electroencephalography (EEG) studies provide further evidence to 
support associations between individual differences in loss aversion and 
electrocortical brain activity. Duke et al. (2018) found a correlation between loss 
aversion and resting state EEG activity which was stronger in the right –compared to 
the left- hemisphere in central and posterior scalp regions. In a similar vein, Heeren et 
al. (2016) demonstrated that loss aversion modulated electrocortical potentials during 
the decision making phase when participants evaluated gamble prospects with small 
compared to large gain/loss ratios. Furthermore, Kokmotou et al. (2017) showed that 
loss aversion correlated with feedback-related negativity (FRN), an event-related 
potential (ERP) component signalling differential neural processing of positive versus 
negative decision outcomes which manifests as stronger cortical activity for losses 
compared to gains (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). This 
correlation occurred early (233-263 ms) during the evaluation of decision outcomes 
and was reflected in increased OFC activity. 
FRN is one of the most extensively studied ERPs in reward processing 
literature (Hauser et al., 2014; Walsh and Anderson, 2012). It is commonly elicited by 
experimental paradigms employing forced-choices between two gambles which are 
followed by presentation of gain or loss feedback (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung and 
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Sanfey, 2004). FRN is evaluated as the difference waveform between averaged 
potentials time-locked to the presentation of gain and loss outcomes (Gehring and 
Willoughby, 2002). The resulting potential difference has a fronto-central scalp 
distribution and its maximum amplitude occurs between 200-350 ms after feedback 
presentation (Walsh and Anderson, 2012), with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
identified as its most likely cortical source (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner 
et al., 1997; Ruchsow et al., 2002; Zhou et al., 2010). 
In addition to FRN, another ERP component playing important role in outcome 
evaluation is the P300; a positive shift in the electrocortical potential occurring 
approximately 300-500 ms after stimulus onset and acquiring its maximum amplitude 
at parietal scalp locations (Polich, 2007, 2012). P300 is associated with information 
processing and attentional mechanisms (Donchin et al., 1978; Polich, 2007). In the 
context of value-based decision making, it has been suggested to encode reward 
magnitude (Bellebaum et al., 2010b; Gu et al., 2011; Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004) and reward valence (Bellebaum et al., 2010a; Hajcak et al., 2005; Li et 
al., 2010; Wu and Zhou, 2009). 
Complete evaluation of decision outcomes often depends on counterfactual 
thinking; the comparison of the actual outcome obtained with alternative possible 
outcomes which were forgone (Roese and Epstude, 2017). Engagement in 
counterfactual thinking is emotionally charged and can alter behaviour by influencing 
subsequent decisions (Zeelenberg, 1999). For example, in the context of decisions 
involving monetary consequences, previous fMRI studies have demonstrated that 
missed gains are perceived as losses and lead to emotions of regret or disappointment 
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). These forgone gains activated the OFC, 
the ACC and the amygdala (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005), suggesting an 
overlap with regions associated with loss aversion. 
Despite the evidence provided by fMRI studies on counterfactual thinking, the 
spatio-temporal aspects of counterfactual outcome processing are less clear as EEG 
studies provide mixed results. Regarding the role of FRN in counterfactual thinking, 
forgone gains have been shown to produce more negative ERPs compared to losses, 
leading to an opposite-valence FRN (Gu et al., 2011; Yu and Zhou, 2009). In contrast, 
Osinsky et al. (2014) showed that both chosen and unchosen outcomes are processed 
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similarly, with the classic FRN component being present irrespective of whether 
outcomes have an actual economic impact for an individual. However, other studies 
found no evidence for such a differentiation between counterfactual outcomes, 
suggesting that counterfactual gains and losses lead to amplitudes of comparable 
strength (Marciano et al., 2018; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2009). 
Regarding the role of the P300 component in counterfactual outcome processing, 
results do not support strong conclusions either. Some researchers suggest that there 
are amplitude differences between counterfactual gains and losses (Marciano et al., 
2018; Osinsky et al., 2014; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2009), whereas 
others propose that both outcomes are evaluated similarly (Gu et al., 2011). 
Importantly, the process of counterfactual thinking can be sensitive to 
individual differences associated with pursuing of rewards, such as being a maximizer 
versus a satisficer (Jasper et al., 2008; Roese and Olson, 1993). However, to the best 
of our knowledge, no EEG studies have investigated the influence of such individual 
differences on counterfactual ERPs. Crucially, counterfactual thinking is enhanced 
following negative events in general (Roese and Epstude, 2017), and following losses 
compared to gains in particular (Petrocelli and Harris, 2011). Therefore, we postulated 
that individual differences in overestimating losses compared to gains –namely, loss 
aversion- might influence the neural processing of unchosen options. Specifically, we 
expected that loss averse participants would show increased cortical activations for 
unchosen gains compared to unchosen losses, as these foregone gains could be 
counterfactually evaluated as losses. Crucially, the EEG technique offers a temporal 
resolution in the range of milliseconds, which could help to further disentangle the 
temporal dynamics of the various underlying fast and automatic processes occurring 
during decision making. This would be particularly helpful when investigating a 
cognitive bias, such as loss aversion, which only appears as a small part of the decision 
making process. Loss aversion can occur during the evaluation of the alternative 
options and before the outcome of the selected option has been received. Irrespective 
of whether loss aversion will have a small or large effect on the decision made and the 
subsequent evaluation of the decision outcome, it will still only be relevant when the 
decision is being made or when individual differences in loss aversion are to be 
compared to individual differences in neural responses to outcomes. 
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The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of loss aversion on 
feedback electrocortical potentials for both chosen and unchosen outcomes. A 
gambling task was used to capture subtle individual differences in decision making 
aspects (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009; Stancak et al., 2015; Tom et al., 2007), 
during which participants freely decided whether they wanted to accept or reject a 
series of gambles. ERP responses to gains and losses were analysed separately for 
accepted and rejected gambles and correlated with loss aversion. 
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Participants 
 
Thirty healthy participants (16 females) completed the study. Three 
participants were excluded from the analysis as outliers due to extremely low values 
of loss aversion (< 3 SDs from the mean), similarly to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner 
et al., 2009). Importantly, inclusion of the outliers did not change the results and, thus, 
we hereafter report results without them. Therefore, the final sample included 27 
participants (15 females), 3 left-handed, aged 21.44 ± 4.07 years (mean ± SD). The 
study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Liverpool. 
All participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
 
4.3.2 Procedure 
 
The monetary gambling task used was adjusted from previous loss aversion 
studies (Kokmotou et al., 2017; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009; Stancak et al., 2015). 
The exact gamble amounts used, stimuli presentation and participants’ reimbursement 
were identical to those described in detail previously (Kokmotou et al., 2017). 
Participants were rewarded in the way described in Chapter 3. Specifically, they were 
endowed with an initial amount of £20 and were instructed to use it for gambling 
throughout the experiment. Similar to the experimental procedures from Chapter 3, it 
was explained to participants that 10% of the difference between their total gains and 
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losses would be added to or subtracted from this £20 endowment and they would 
receive the remaining amount as a reimbursement for their participation in the 
experiment. As such, it was further explained to participants that their final payment 
was based on their performance and gambling decisions during the experiment. In 
short, participants were required to choose between a gamble and a sure outcome. The 
gamble offered 50% chance of winning or losing variable amounts of money. The 
alternative sure outcome was either zero or an amount smaller than the potential gain 
from the corresponding gamble in a particular trial. Participants made a total of 300 
choices, split into 3 blocks of 100 trials each. Within each block, 80 trials consisted of 
choosing between a mixed-gamble (e.g., ‘You win £3, You lose £3’) and a sure zero 
outcome. The remaining 20 trials consisted of a gain-only gamble (e.g., ‘You win £3, 
You lose £0’) versus a sure non-zero outcome (e.g., £2). The inclusion of both mixed- 
and gain-only gambles allows for a dissociation of loss aversion (i.e., the steepness of 
the value function) from risk aversion (i.e., the curvature of the value function); mixed-
gambles assess loss aversion while gain-only gambles assess risk aversion (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2013; 2009). The reason is that in the gain-only trials there is no loss to 
be evaluated so if these are rejected it is because of risk aversion. However, loss 
aversion is relevant when a loss is possible, as in the mixed-gamble trials. As such, the 
gain-only trials serve as an estimation of risk aversion when loss aversion is by default 
excluded because it is not possible to lose. Instead, the potential outcomes of these 
gain-only gambles are whether the participant will receive something or nothing. 
Similarly to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009), only mixed-gamble 
trials were included in ERP analysis to avoid potential confounding effects of gain-
only trials which primarily elicited risk aversion. It needs to be noted that the task and 
stimuli differed to those described in Chapter 3. Here, both loss aversion and FRN can 
be elicited and measured through the same task because EEG was also recorded during 
the loss aversion task. In contrast, loss aversion could not be evaluated simultaneously 
with FRN in the previous experiment because, during the FRN task, participants did 
not know in advance which option could result in a win or loss. 
If participants accepted the gamble, feedback was given about whether they 
won (Actual Gain) or lost (Actual Loss) at that trial. If participants rejected the gamble, 
feedback was given about whether they would have won (Counterfactual Gain) or lost 
(Counterfactual Loss), if they had chosen to accept it. In both actual and counterfactual 
conditions, feedback constituted of the monetary amount in green colour with a ‘+’ 
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sign and red colour with a ‘-’ sign for gains and losses, respectively. Actual feedback 
was presented on white background while counterfactual feedback on grey 
background, counterbalanced across participants. Figure 4.1 shows the trial structure. 
Parametric modelling of participants’ choices based on prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) was used to quantify 
decision making style. Probabilities of gains and losses were kept equal throughout 
the experiment (p = 0.5). The value and logit functions as well as the numerical 
approximation method used have been described in detail in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.4). 
Although the same behavioural analysis as described in Chapter 3 was conducted by 
evaluating loss aversion, risk aversion and choice sensitivity (reported in section 
4.4.1), only loss aversion was the focus of this experiment. Further methodological 
reasons do not allow for a robust association of risk aversion with brain data because 
these are noisy due to the small number of trials available for risk aversion 
(approximately 80% less than the loss aversion trials) when using the task described 
in the previous paragraphs. 
 
4.3.3 EEG Recordings 
 
EEG was recorded continuously throughout the experiment using a 129-
channel Geodesics EGI System (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon, USA) 
with a sponge-based HydroCel Sensor Net. The sensor net was aligned with respect to 
three anatomical landmarks; two preauricular points and the nasion. Electrode-to-skin 
impedances were kept below 50 kΩ, as recommended for this system (Ferree et al., 
2001; Picton et al., 2000). The recording band-pass filter was 0.01−200 Hz, the 
sampling rate was 1000 Hz, and the electrode Cz was used as the reference. 
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Figure 4.1. Trial structure of the loss aversion task. Left panel: Accepted gambles. Right panel: 
Rejected gambles. Each trial began with the presentation of two prospects, which stayed on the screen 
for 3.5 s. Half of the screen presented a gamble option offering 50% chance of winning or losing the 
displayed amount of money (e.g., ‘You win £3.0, You lose £3.0’). The other half of the screen presented 
a sure outcome (e.g., £0). Subsequently, each of the prospects was replaced by a yellow rectangle. 
Participants had 1.5 s to select the rectangle corresponding to the option they preferred by pressing the 
left or right mouse button. Their chosen rectangle turned green for 1 s to highlight their choice and was 
followed by a 1.5 s black screen. Subsequently, feedback was given about the gamble outcome. This 
feedback constituted of the monetary amount in green colour with a ‘+’ sign or red colour with a ‘-’ 
sign for gains and losses, respectively, and stayed on the screen for 1 s. Actual feedback was presented 
on a white background, whereas counterfactual feedback on a grey background. A 1 s black screen 
followed the feedback and a fixation cross was presented before the start of the next trial. 
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4.3.4 ERP analysis 
 
EEG data were pre-processed using BESA v. 6.1 program (MEGIS GmbH, 
Germany). EEG signals were spatially transformed to reference-free data using the 
common average reference method (Lehmann, 1987). This spatial-transformation 
restored the signal at electrode Cz, which was included in subsequent analyses. Eye 
blinks and, when necessary, electrocardiographic artifacts were removed by principal 
component analysis (Berg and Scherg, 1994). Data were also visually inspected for 
the presence of any electrode artifacts due to muscle movement, and epochs 
contaminated with artifacts were excluded. Data were filtered from 0.5−35 Hz. 
ERPs time-locked to feedback onset were computed for each of the four 
possible outcome conditions resulting from the mixed-gamble trials: participant 
accepted the gamble and a) won (Actual Gain) or b) lost (Actual Loss) or participant 
rejected the gamble, but would have c) won (Counterfactual Gain) or d) lost 
(Counterfactual Loss). Respective epochs in the interval ranging from 300 ms before 
outcome onset to 1000 ms after outcome onset were averaged. Epochs were baseline 
corrected using a time window of -300 to 0 ms relative to the onset of feedback. FRN 
was measured as the mean amplitude pooled over three fronto-central midline 
electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz) over a time interval from 250 to 350 ms after feedback onset. 
P300 was measured as the mean amplitude pooled over three centro-parietal midline 
electrodes (CPz, Pz, POz) over a time interval from 350 to 450 ms after feedback 
onset. It needs to be noted that the EEG analysis reported here differed to the one 
described in Chapter 3. This is because for the previous experiment, which was an 
exploratory one, data were analysed using SPM, which is a whole-brain method to 
analyse EEG and for which no electrodes need to be selected a priori. However, since 
this study is focusing specifically on FRN, electrodes used previously in other studies 
can now be selected (e.g., Gu et al., 2011; Yu and Zhou, 2009; Marciano et al., 2018; 
Osinsky et al., 2014). 
The average number of artifact-free trials in each condition was: actual gains: 
50.0 ± 18.4 (mean ± SD), actual losses: 53.3 ± 20.3, counterfactual gains: 90.3 ± 16.7, 
and counterfactual losses: 86.7 ± 16.7. As participants on average rejected more 
gambles than they accepted (see 4.4.1), this resulted in a larger number of 
counterfactual compared to actual outcomes trials. However, within accept/reject 
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condition, there were no differences in the number of artifact-free trials for gains 
versus losses included in the analysis (ps > 0.05). 
The statistical significance level was set at 0.05 for all analyses and 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was implemented for ANOVAs whenever necessary. 
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Behavioural results 
 
Mean loss aversion was 1.26 ± 0.04 (mean ± SEM). The assumption of a 
Gaussian distribution was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test, which showed that loss 
aversion had normal distribution (W(27) = 0.97, p = 0.53). Following the behavioural 
analysis described in Chapter 3, risk aversion and choice sensitivity were also 
estimated. Mean risk aversion was 0.37 ± 0.03 and mean choice sensitivity was 2.19 
± 0.28. Both risk aversion and choice sensitivity had normal distributions (risk 
aversion: W(27) = 0.94, p = 0.09; choice sensitivity: W(27) = 0.94, p = 0.09). 
Furthermore, there was no correlation between loss aversion and curvature of the value 
function (p > 0.05). 
On average, participants rejected more gambles than they accepted (rejected: 
191.56 ± 7.36 vs accepted: 108.44 ± 7.36; t(26) = -5.64, p < 0.001), and were faster to 
reject than to accept gambles (rejected: 0.42 ± 0.01 s vs accepted: 0.50 ± 0.02 s; t(26) 
= 2.32, p < 0.05). 
 
4.4.2 ERP results 
 
FRN: Figure 4.2A shows the grand averaged ERP waveforms for the four possible 
feedback conditions (AG = Actual Gain, AL = Actual Loss, CG = Counterfactual 
Gain, CL = Counterfactual Loss) pooled over the FRN electrode cluster (Fz, FCz, Cz). 
The grey shaded area indicates the time window used for statistical analysis (250-350 
ms). The two topographic maps represent the amplitude difference between loss minus 
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gain trials for actual (Actual FRN) and counterfactual outcomes (Counterfactual 
FRN). The FRN component can be seen only for the actual outcomes condition 
(Actual FRN). This FRN component showed a negative maximum in central-midline 
and frontal-midline electrodes and peaked approximately 300 ms after outcome 
presentation. 
To investigate the effects of decision and outcome on FRN, mean ERP 
amplitude data during 250-350 ms after feedback onset from the FRN electrode cluster 
(Fz, FCz, Cz) were entered into a 2 (decision: accept vs reject) by 2 (outcome: gain vs 
loss) repeated measures ANOVA. The time window (i.e., 250-350 ms) selected for 
statistical analysis was based on previous FRN research (e.g., Yeung and Willoughby, 
2002; Walsh and Anderson, 2012) and particularly research exploring counterfactual 
FRN (e.g., Gu et al., 2011; Marciano et al., 2018; Osinsky et al., 2014; Yu and Zhou, 
2009). Furthermore, it was selected based on our own data with the goal of choosing 
a time window where the differences between conditions were maximum, similar to 
previous studies (Yu and Zhou, 2009). 
The interaction between decision and outcome was significant (F(1,26) = 6.59, 
p < 0.05). Paired samples t-tests showed that ERPs following actual losses had more 
negative amplitudes compared to actual gains (actual losses: 2.91 ± 0.54 μV vs actual 
gains: 3.70 ± 0.52 μV; t(26) = 2.32, p < 0.05), while there was no difference in 
amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual losses (p > 0.05). The 
main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 11.58, p < 0.05). Accepted gambles 
yielded more positive amplitudes compared to rejected gambles (accepted: 3.31 ± 0.50 
μV vs rejected: 2.26 ± 0.38 μV).  The main effect of outcome was not significant (p > 
0.05).  
Importantly, results were not dependent upon the specific time window 
selected and, for comparison purposes, we also analysed the data using different time 
intervals. Specifically, data were further analysed using the peak of the FRN averaged 
waveform (300-310 ms) and during the statistically significant time window (292-314 
ms) obtained by using a permutation analysis (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007) with 5000 
permutations in EEGLAB v.12 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). 
FRN 300-310 ms: The interaction between decision and outcome was 
significant (F(1,26) = 9.63, p < 0.05). Paired samples t-tests showed that ERPs 
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following actual losses had more negative amplitudes compared to actual gains (actual 
losses: 3.06 ± 0.56 μV vs actual gains: 4.12 ± 0.56 μV; t(26) = 2.65, p < 0.05), while 
there was no difference in amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual 
losses (t(26) = -1.65, p = 0.11). The main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 
15.77, p < 0.001). Accepted gambles yielded more positive amplitudes compared to 
rejected gambles (accepted: 3.59 ± 0.52 μV vs rejected: 2.32 ± 0.39 μV). The main 
effect of outcome was not significant (F(1,26) = 3.09, p = 0.09). 
FRN 292-314 ms: The interaction between decision and outcome was 
significant (F(1,26) = 9.61, p = 0.005). Paired samples t-tests showed that ERPs 
following actual losses had more negative amplitudes compared to actual gains (actual 
losses: 3.01 ± 0.55 μV vs actual gains: 4.05 ± 0.56 μV; t(26) = 2.64, p = 0.01), while 
there was no difference in amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual 
losses (t(26) = -1.58, p =0.13). The main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 
14.54, p = 0.001). Accepted gambles yielded more positive amplitudes compared to 
rejected gambles (accepted: 3.53 ± 0.52 μV vs rejected: 2.29 ± 0.39 μV). The main 
effect of outcome was not significant (F(1,26) = 3.11, p = 0.07). 
 
P300: Figure 4.2B shows grand averaged ERP waveforms for the four possible 
feedback conditions pooled over the P300 electrode cluster (CPz, Pz, POz). The grey 
shaded area indicates the time window used for statistical analysis (350-450 ms). The 
topographic maps represent the amplitude difference between gain minus loss trials 
for actual (Actual P300) and counterfactual (Counterfactual P300) outcomes. A P300 
component differentiating between gains and losses occurred only for actual 
outcomes. This P300 component had a positive maximum over parietal-midline 
electrodes and peaked approximately 400 ms after feedback presentation. 
To investigate the effects of decision and outcome on P300, mean ERP 
amplitude data during 350-450 ms after feedback onset from the P300 electrode cluster 
(CPz, Pz, POz) were entered into a 2 (decision: accept vs reject) by 2 (outcome: gain 
vs loss) repeated measures ANOVA. The interaction between decision and outcome 
was significant (F(1,26) = 28.30, p < 0.001). Paired samples t-tests showed that actual 
gains yielded more positive amplitudes compared to actual losses (actual gains: 6.04 
± 0.58 μV vs actual losses: 4.92 ± 0.55 μV; t(26) = 5.94, p < 0.001), while there was 
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no difference in amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual losses (p 
> 0.05). The main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 17.75, p < 0.001). ERP 
amplitudes were more positive following accepted compared to rejected gambles 
(accepted: 5.48 ± 0.56 μV vs rejected: 4.20 ± 0.50 μV). The main effect of outcome 
was also significant (F(1,26) = 14.55, p < 0.05), with gains yielding more positive 
amplitudes compared to losses (gains: 5.10 ± 0.50 μV vs losses: 4.58 ± 0.51 μV). 
Similar to the FRN analysis, different time windows were analysed in order to 
ensure that results were independent of the specific time intervals selected. Again, the 
peak (390-400 ms) of the P300 averaged waveform and the statistically significant 
time window (367-429 ms) obtained using a permutation analysis were analysed. 
P300 390-400: The interaction between decision and outcome was significant 
(F(1,26) = 42.67, p < 0.05). Paired samples t-tests showed that ERPs following actual 
losses had more negative amplitudes compared to actual gains (actual losses: 4.80 ± 
0.66 μV vs actual gains: 6.30 ± 0.62 μV; t(26) = 6.38, p < 0.05), while there was no 
difference in amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual losses (t(26) 
= -0.74, p = 0.47). The main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 15.61, p < 
0.001). Accepted gambles yielded more positive amplitudes compared to rejected 
gambles (accepted: 5.55 ± 0.58 μV vs rejected: 4.16 ± 0.49 μV). The main effect of 
outcome was significant (F(1,26) = 17.72, p = 0.001), with gains yielding more 
positive amplitudes compared to losses (gains: 5.20 ± 0.52 μV vs losses: 4.51 ± 0.50 
μV). 
P300 367-429: The interaction between decision and outcome was significant 
(F(1,26) = 34.75, p < 0.001). Paired samples t-tests showed that ERPs following actual 
losses had more negative amplitudes compared to actual gains (actual losses: 4.90 ± 
0.55 μV vs actual gains: 6.18 ± 0.60 μV; t(26) = 6.10, p < 0.001), while there was no 
difference in amplitudes between counterfactual gains and counterfactual losses (t(26) 
= -0.65, p = 0.52). The main effect of decision was significant (F(1,26) = 17.30, p = 
0.001). Accepted gambles yielded more positive amplitudes compared to rejected 
gambles (accepted: 5.52 ± 0.56 μV vs rejected: 4.17 ±  0.49 μV). The main effect of 
outcome was significant (F(1,26) = 16.50, p < 0.001), with gains yielding more 
positive amplitudes compared to losses (gains: 5.15 ± 0.51 μV vs losses: 4.55 ± 0.51 
μV). 
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Figure 4.2. A. FRN. Left: Grand averaged EEG potentials for the four possible outcome conditions 
(AG = Actual Gain, AL = Actual Loss, CG = Counterfactual Gain, CL = Counterfactual Loss) pooled 
over the FRN electrode cluster (Fz, FCz, Cz). The grey shaded area indicates the time interval included 
in statistical analysis (250-350 ms). Right: Topographic maps of Actual FRN (AL minus AG) and 
Counterfactual FRN (CL minus CG) shown at 300 ms. B. P300. Left: Grand averaged EEG potentials 
for the four possible outcome conditions pooled over the P300 electrode cluster (CPz, Pz, POz). The 
grey shaded area indicates the time interval included in statistical analysis (350-450 ms). Right: 
Topographic maps of Actual P300 (AG minus AL) and Counterfactual P300 (CG minus CL) shown at 
400 ms. C. Left: Scatterplot, linear regression line and 95% confidence interval lines representing the 
statistically significant correlation between loss aversion and Actual FRN. Right: Scatterplot, linear 
regression line and 95% confidence interval lines representing the lack of association between loss 
aversion and Counterfactual FRN. D. Left: Scatterplot, linear regression line and 95% confidence 
interval lines representing the statistically significant correlation between loss aversion and Actual 
P300. Right: Scatterplot, linear regression line and 95% confidence interval lines representing the lack 
of association between loss aversion and Counterfactual P300. 
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4.4.3 Correlations with loss aversion 
 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was carried out to investigate the relationship 
between loss aversion and feedback ERPs. The following difference waveforms were 
created: actual FRN (actual losses minus actual gains), counterfactual FRN 
(counterfactual losses minus counterfactual gains), actual P300 (actual gains minus 
actual losses), and counterfactual P300 (counterfactual gains minus counterfactual 
losses). Loss aversion correlated with FRN following actual outcomes (r(27) = 0.44, 
p < 0.05, but not with FRN following counterfactual outcomes (p > 0.05). 
Similarly, loss aversion correlated with P300 following actual outcomes (r(27) 
= 0.40, p < 0.05), but not with P300 following counterfactual outcomes (p > 0.05). 
Figures 4.2C and 4.2D show the scatterplots, regression lines and 95% confidence 
interval lines representing the associations of loss aversion with FRN and P300, 
respectively. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
The present study investigated the effects of loss aversion on feedback ERPs 
following decision outcomes resulting from accepting or rejecting a series of gambles. 
The most important finding was the presence of an association between loss aversion 
and the strength of FRN and P300 components for actual but not counterfactual 
outcomes. This suggests that individual differences in loss aversion are reflected on 
the amplitude strength of feedback ERPs during the evaluation of those outcomes 
which have actual economic impact for the decision maker. Our data also extend 
previous research on feedback processing by demonstrating the presence of FRN and 
P300 potentials in a gambling task tailored to evaluate loss aversion. 
 
4.5.1 Actual feedback 
 
For the actual feedback condition (i.e., when participants accepted the gamble), 
we were able to replicate the robust FRN potential, previously observed in studies 
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using binary forced choice paradigms (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 
2006; Holroyd et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Our 
finding is novel in that FRN was for the first time observed in a paradigm in which 
participants could freely decide whether they wanted to gamble or not. In our task, 
participants were given complete choice freedom, and feedback was contingent upon 
their own decision to engage in risk-taking. 
Regarding the P300 potential, our results are in accord with research 
highlighting its important role in outcome evaluation (Polich, 2007). Some studies 
have previously proposed that the P300 potential encodes reward magnitude rather 
than reward valence, suggesting that the brain evaluates outcomes through a double 
dissociation system: reward valence is encoded by FRN while magnitude is encoded 
by P300 (Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Even though it is a limitation of 
the current study that potential magnitude effects were not taken into account, our 
results provide support to studies reporting differential processing of positive and 
negative outcomes at the P300 range with stronger amplitudes for gains compared to 
losses during economic decision making (Hajcak et al., 2005; 2007; Holroyd et al., 
2006; Li et al., 2010; Wu and Zhou, 2009). 
 
4.5.2 Counterfactual feedback 
 
The current experiment did not find any difference in feedback ERPs to 
counterfactual (i.e., avoided) losses as compared to counterfactual (i.e., missed) gains. 
This lack of differential neural processing might seem surprising at first, especially 
considering the ample evidence available from fMRI studies that focused on how the 
brain processes missed opportunities (Camille et al., 2004; Chua et al., 2009; Coricelli 
et al., 2005). However, our results are in line with previous EEG research on 
counterfactual outcome processing by demonstrating that ERPs to foregone gains and 
losses share similar spatio-temporal patterns (Gu et al., 2011; Osinsky et al., 2014; Yu 
and Zhou, 2009). In a similar vein, Talmi et al. (2013) showed that foregone outcomes 
yielded similar FRN potentials, irrespective of whether these outcomes were positive 
(monetary reward) or negative (pain). Moreover, our results accord studies 
demonstrating that FRN represents an early binary evaluation of positive versus 
negative outcomes (Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2006; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; 
Yu and Zhou, 2006), and, as such, integrates only the obtained outcome valence 
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(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Kujawa et al., 2013; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In 
our task, counterfactual outcomes might have been appraised as self-irrelevant 
observations because they were economically neutral. This is in line with research 
suggesting that brain potentials when observing someone else losing money in a 
gambling task are weaker compared to when focusing on outcomes of one’s own 
performance (Zhou et al., 2010), and with a general reduction of FRN amplitudes 
during observational feedback learning (Bellebaum et al., 2010a; Kobza et al., 2011). 
It is, of course, not possible to rule out the possibility that the results might 
have been different if larger amounts had been used. However, by including several 
different amounts (ranging from £0 to £12), potential gains and losses were at least 
relatively large by comparing them to the smaller ones. Indeed, neuroimaging research 
shows that the brain adapts relatively to the range of potential amounts (Bunzeck et 
al., 2010; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a; Tobler et al., 2005). As such, based on the EEG 
results reported in the previous sections and although it was contrary to our initial 
hypothesis, participants did not consider the counterfactual loss as an economic loss 
relative to what they could have won. Although it cannot be ruled out that there could 
have been regret or disappointment involved during the processing of missed gains, 
this was not reflected on the EEG data. 
Similarly to FRN, we did not find supporting evidence for P300 modulation 
by counterfactual thinking. This result is in accordance with studies reporting a lack 
of P300 modulation by outcome valence following counterfactual outcomes (Goyer et 
al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011). However, it is in contrast with some previous studies 
showing differential effects of counterfactual gains and losses on P300 amplitudes 
(Marciano et al., 2018; Osinsky et al., 2014; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 
2009). A possible explanation for this discrepancy rests on the difference between the 
tasks employed. For instance, in previous studies, participants did not have the option 
to completely reject gambles and, thus, the counterfactual outcome was always 
evaluated in association with the obtained outcome. In the present study, actual and 
counterfactual outcomes resulted from different decisions and, consequently, 
comparisons between outcomes were neither meaningful nor possible. Even though 
two studies (Gu et al., 2011; Marciano et al., 2018) tried to control for this comparison 
confound by presenting the counterfactual before the actual outcome, participants 
were still expecting to be presented with actual outcomes resulting from the same 
decision. Given that P300 has been suggested to be influenced by outcome expectation 
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(Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2007; Holroyd et al., 2004), it is possible 
that presence of a direct comparison of actual and counterfactual outcomes has 
enhanced the P300 component. 
 
4.5.3 Loss aversion and FRN/P300 
 
Unlike in our previous study in which loss aversion and FRN were evaluated 
using different tasks (Kokmotou et al., 2017), in the current study we were able to 
assess individual differences in loss aversion and, at the same time, relate these 
individual differences to FRN amplitudes recorded simultaneously. Importantly, the 
current study confirms the previous correlational results that showed that loss aversion 
measured using a behavioural task was associated with feedback potentials during a 
subsequent gambling task with EEG (Kokmotou et al., 2017). Specifically, in the 
current study, loss aversion correlated with FRN strength in fronto-central midline 
electrodes during 250-350 ms after feedback onset in actual but not in counterfactual 
outcomes. 
Our results expand on two previous studies reporting associations between 
individual differences in loss aversion and EEG activity (Duke et al., 2018; Heeren et 
al., 2016). In particular, higher behavioural manifestation of loss aversion has been 
found to correlate with stronger resting state EEG activity in the right hemisphere 
(Duke et al., 2018). Additionally, loss aversion modulated a posterior slow wave 
potential during the decision making phase, when participants evaluated alternative 
prospects without expecting to learn the outcome of their decisions (Heeren et al., 
2016). Furthermore, behavioural work suggests that hedonic evaluations of prospects 
at the time of the decision differ to those after receipt of outcomes (Kahneman et al., 
1997). Neuroimaging studies further show that, during value-based decision making, 
the decision and outcome phase often employ different brain regions (Breiter et al., 
2001; Knutson et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2009). Our results, combined with the above 
findings, suggest that loss aversion is associated with distinct cortical activity patterns 
and across different stages of the decision making process. Specifically, individual 
differences in loss aversion were associated with both an early medio-frontal ERP 
component (FRN) as well as with a later one with a more posterior activation 
maximum (P300). 
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The above association of loss aversion with FRN can be elucidated by an 
influential theory in the field of decision making which has proposed that risk-taking 
might be driven by anticipatory or experienced affective reactions towards decisions 
(risk-as-feelings hypothesis; Loewenstein et al., 2001). In this context, it seems 
possible that the relationship between loss aversion and FRN could be driven by 
emotional related processes as both variables have been shown to be influenced by 
emotions (Camerer et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2006; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009). 
For example, loss aversion has been linked to emotions of fear or stress (Camerer et 
al., 2005; Hartley and Phelps, 2012). Furthermore, incidental negative emotional cues 
that are independent to the current decision, such as unpleasant odours (Stancak et al., 
2015) or fearful faces (Schulreich et al., 2016), have the potential to increase loss 
aversion. Additionally, loss aversion can be decreased using emotion regulation 
techniques by successfully reducing the emotional impact of individual decision 
outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009). Furthermore, affective ratings of 
pleasantness have been shown to be more negative following undesirable compared to 
desirable outcomes, thus, mirroring the FRN amplitude pattern (Moser and Simons, 
2009; Rigoni et al., 2010). Additionally, preceding negative outcomes have been 
shown to induce both increased risk-taking for subsequent choices and stronger FRN 
amplitudes, suggesting that FRN reflects the pattern of risk-taking behaviour observed 
following aversive outcomes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 
2004). Moreover, FRN has been shown to be associated with a range of emotion 
associated traits such as anxiety (Gu et al., 2010), reward sensitivity (De Pascalis et 
al., 2010; Lange et al., 2012) and impulsivity (Onoda et al., 2010). Such a potential 
mechanism of negative emotionality linking loss aversion and FRN is further 
supported by studies investigating arousal, which is an underlying emotion component 
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et al., 2015). For instance, monetary losses are 
associated with increased arousal levels compared to gains (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2009; Stancak et al., 2015) and individual differences in arousal between gains and 
losses correlate with loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). 
Importantly, such a potential emotional link, combined with the lack of 
difference in the electrocortical brain activity following counterfactual gains and 
losses, provides an explanatory context for the absence of loss aversion effects on 
counterfactual outcome processing. We postulate that a missed gain is not emotionally 
equated to an experienced loss. It has been suggested that loss aversion has an 
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evolutionary-based purpose, in which a monetary loss is perceived as danger or threat 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kenrick et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012), and, as such, it represents an 
emotional response to anticipated (Camerer, 2005; Tom et al., 2007) and experienced 
losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). In the case of counterfactual outcomes, the loss 
aversion mechanism has served its purpose since the feared loss has been avoided. 
This is consistent with an interpretation of loss aversion as a decision making bias 
driven by emotions (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013), which is reduced when outcomes do 
not affect the individual, as, for example, when choosing for others (Andersson et al., 
2014). 
Similarly to FRN, loss aversion was associated with P300 strength only in the 
actual outcomes condition. This relationship might have been driven by two factors 
influencing P300 amplitude. Firstly, P300 strength differs as a function of stimulus 
motivational importance with stimuli that are emotionally significant for the decision 
maker producing higher P300 amplitudes compared to neutral or irrelevant stimuli 
(Duncan‐Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Therefore, it seems 
possible that, in the current study, only actual outcomes were perceived as important 
for participants and attended to while counterfactual ones were deliberately ignored. 
This is in agreement with previous research as EEG studies on counterfactual thinking 
have provided inconclusive results (Gu et al., 2011; Yu and Zhou, 2009; Marciano et 
al., 2018; Osinsky et al., 2014). Secondly, P300 has been suggested to operate as an 
updating process in the context of decision making (Polich, 2007). Given that only 
actual outcomes have the potential to influence overall payoff, it may be that 
participants focused on these outcomes alone to guide subsequent decisions. Taken 
together, loss aversion seems to correlate with both relatively early cognitive processes 
(FRN) and later ones (P300) following learning of decision outcomes. 
Finally, investigating such a link between individual differences in loss 
aversion and outcome processing might enhance understanding of decision making 
deficits observed in various psychiatric conditions. Indeed, some psychiatric 
populations, such as pathological gamblers (Gelskov et al., 2016) or patients with 
schizophrenia (Brown et al., 2013; Currie et al., 2017; Trémeau et al., 2008) exhibit 
reduced loss aversion compared to healthy controls, while depressed people (Pammi 
et al., 2015) and people with obsessive compulsive disorder (Sip et al., 2018) show 
increased loss aversion. Additionally, some studies suggest that FRN is similar in 
schizophrenia and healthy participants, indicating normal processing of external 
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feedback and outcome evaluation (Horan et al., 2012; Llerena et al., 2016; Morris et 
al., 2011), whereas FRN is enhanced in depression (Foti and Hajcak, 2009) and 
diminished in obsessive compulsive disorder (Endrass et al., 2013; O’Toole et al., 
2012). Specifying intact and impaired reward evaluating processes could shed light on 
the diminished motivation commonly seen in these disorders (Strauss et al., 2014). 
Further, potential absence of loss aversion might be indicative of a limited integration 
between emotional and cognitive systems, whereas extreme levels of loss aversion 
might point to a dysfunctional dominance of affective over cognitive incentives, with 
both cases leading to impaired value-based decision making. 
To conclude, we show that feedback potentials, as indexed by FRN and P300, 
were correlated with individual differences in loss aversion, but only when outcomes 
signal a real monetary gain or loss. Given that loss aversion represents a sensitivity to 
losses over gains and FRN/P300 were quantified as the potential difference between 
outcome conditions, this association suggests a larger neural differentiation between 
positive and negative outcomes for the more loss averse individuals. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Study 3: Sensitivity to choice freedom mediates the relationship 
between loss aversion and feedback-related negativity. 
 
 
This experiment investigated the effects of loss aversion on the evaluation of outcomes 
resulting from free or obstructed decisions. 
 
It is currently in preparation for publication in a journal to be confirmed. 
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5.1 Abstract 
 
Losses tend to be overvalued compared to gains of the same amount, a 
phenomenon known as loss aversion. Previous studies have investigated the neural 
mechanisms related to loss aversion, linking it to feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
when participants had freedom of choice. However, real life decisions are often 
constrained by external factors that are outside of the decision maker’s control. 
Whether loss aversion influences neural responses to outcomes that are externally 
imposed upon an individual rather than freely chosen remains to be explored. The 
present study analysed the effects of loss aversion on neural responses to monetary 
outcomes resulting from free and imposed choices using electroencephalographic 
(EEG) recordings. A gambling task and parametric modelling of participants’ choices 
were employed to estimate individual differences in loss aversion. A subsequent 
gambling task served to evaluate neural responses to decision outcomes. Event-related 
potentials (ERPs) following gains and losses resulting from one’s own choices (choice 
freedom) or from an arbitrary violation of such choices (choice violation) were 
analysed and correlated with loss aversion. For participants who exhibited strong 
neural responses to choice violation, feedback ERPs were more negative for losses 
resulting from free compared to forced choices, while no such effect was observed for 
weak responders or for gain outcomes. Crucially, loss aversion correlated with FRN 
only when choices were made freely and only for strong responders. Results suggest 
that loss aversion mediates the neural processing of outcomes exclusively when 
outcomes are contingent upon one’s own choices and only for those participants 
displaying sensitivity towards having choice freedom. 
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5.2 Introduction 
 
The ability to quickly and effectively evaluate obtained outcomes is an 
important part of the decision making process. Previous electroencephalography 
(EEG) studies have highlighted the importance of feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
in outcome evaluation (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). FRN is 
an event-related potential (ERP) component which differentiates between positive and 
negative decision outcomes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2007; 
Holroyd et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), and 
represents one of the earliest components during outcome evaluation, peaking around 
200-350 ms after feedback onset (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). FRN can be elicited 
using simple gambling tasks in which participants select among options that can lead 
to monetary gains or losses (e.g., Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). 
The majority of prior research investigating FRN has focused on paradigms 
where individuals could make unobstructed choices among offered options and, 
consequently, the outcomes were contingent upon their own choices (Gehring and 
Willoughby, 2002; Goyer et al., 2008; Hajcak et al., 2006, 2007; Holroyd et al., 2004; 
Kokmotou et al., 2017; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b). Despite this, real-world decision 
making is often hindered by external unforeseen circumstances that operate outside of 
the decision maker’s control. To this end, some studies have employed paradigms that 
manipulate the amount of control participants have over outcomes by distinguishing 
between different agency levels during decision making. In particular, it has been 
shown that FRN is stronger following outcomes produced by choices that participants 
had made themselves compared to when they were passively viewing rewards that 
were randomly selected for them by a computer (Bismark et al., 2013; Martin and 
Potts, 2011; Yeung et al., 2005) or by another person deciding on their behalf (Itagaki 
and Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010). 
Despite these developments, previous studies still divulged to participants in 
advance whether they would be free to make choices or whether they would passively 
receive rewards (Bismark et al., 2013; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallarés et 
al., 2010; Martin and Potts, 2011; Yeung et al., 2005). In real world conditions, 
however, it is not always possible to predict when unforeseen circumstances will affect 
our choice, and, often, dealing with such circumstances is considered unpleasant 
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(Leotti et al., 2010). For instance, it has been shown that, if one initially available 
choice is suddenly eliminated, participants report adverse emotions (Brehm et al., 
1966) and try to re-gain access to the eliminated option (Miron and Brehm, 2006). 
Importantly, successful adaptation to new rules and circumstances as directed by the 
environment is fundamental for survival, while failing to do so often negatively 
impacts mental health (Maier and Seligman, 1976; Shapiro et al., 1996). As such, it is 
important to investigate outcome evaluation in situations where choice freedom is 
unpredictable. To the best of our knowledge, the influence of unpredictable events that 
are outside of the individual’s control but nevertheless influence receipt of rewards, 
such as being forced to choose an option other than the originally preferred one, on 
FRN remains to be explored. 
It has also been suggested that the affective experience of having choice can 
be modulated by the valence of the potential outcome. For example, Leotti et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that when participants were faced with the possibility of gain or loss 
simultaneously, they reported liking having choice for cues predicting gains but were 
indifferent for cues predicting losses. Specifically, at the start of each trial, choice trials 
were differentiated from no-choice trials by cue shape (e.g., rectangle for choice trials) 
and the orientation of the cue (pointing upward or downward) indicated whether the 
trial could potentially result in monetary gain or loss. Participants learned the 
associations between the different cues and their respective trials prior to starting the 
experiment. In the choice condition, participants could freely choose between two 
keys, and in the no-choice condition, participants had to accept a computer-selected 
key. The keys were associated with different monetary amounts but participants did 
not know which key would yield which specific monetary amount. Instead, 
participants knew that, for example, in the gain trials, one key would yield a gain of 
£50 and the other a gain of £100. Nevertheless, having choice was associated with 
activity in ventral striatum for both gains and losses, a brain region commonly 
activated during evaluation of rewards (Delgado, 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2004). 
Importantly, in the case of losses, the authors observed large individual differences in 
the preference of having choice. They proposed that this might have been due to 
individual differences in sensitivity to the threat of potential loss influencing the 
affective experience of choice in the context of losses, although this hypothesis was 
not addressed directly. 
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In the current study, we investigated individual differences in sensitivity 
towards losses by focusing on loss aversion; the tendency to overestimate losses 
compared to gains of equivalent amount (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Previous 
studies investigating the neural underpinnings of loss aversion have linked it to activity 
in brain regions which are important for reward evaluation and value computation 
during value-based decisions, including the striatum (Canessa et al., 2017; Gelskov et 
al., 2015; Tom et al., 2007), the VMPFC (Tom et al., 2007), the amygdala (Canessa et 
al., 2013; De Martino et al., 2010; Gelskov et al., 2015; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013) 
and the insula (Canessa et al., 2017; Markett et al., 2016). Importantly, loss aversion 
has previously been shown to be related to FRN (Kokmotou et al., 2017) and this 
association was modulated by situational factors (Kokmotou et al., under review). 
Specifically, the association between FRN and loss aversion was found for actual 
outcomes (i.e., outcomes resulting from gambles chosen by the individual), but not for 
counterfactual outcomes (i.e., outcomes that did not have any economic impact for the 
individual) resulting from unchosen gambles. As economically neutral outcomes were 
considered those that did not lead to any positive or negative monetary outcome. Of 
course, it cannot be ruled out that these outcomes were psychologically different. 
Although a counterfactual gain (i.e., gain that the participant missed but could have 
won if they decided differently) could potentially signify loss relative to what could 
have been won, similar to fMRI studies (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005), 
this was not the case in the above study, a finding which is further in agreement with 
other EEG studies on counterfactual outcomes (Marciano et al., 2018; Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2009). Crucially, counterfactual outcomes in the above 
study were not motivationally relevant for individuals since they were economically 
neutral. This suggests that, when participants were free to choose, loss aversion was 
not associated with the evaluation of outcomes that did not impact them. Therefore, 
the relationship between loss aversion and unchosen outcomes that do have an 
economic impact for participants remains to be explored. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of individual 
differences in loss aversion on FRN following monetary reward or penalty resulting 
either from participants’ free choice or from an arbitrary obstruction of choice. A 
gambling task and parametric fitting of choices were used to evaluate loss aversion 
(Kokmotou et al., 2017; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009; Stancak et al., 2015) while 
a second gambling task was used to measure FRN (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) 
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under two choice conditions. In the choice freedom condition, participants chose 
between two risky gambles, each offering 50% chance of winning or losing and 
received the outcome (gain or loss) from their chosen gamble. In the choice violation 
condition, participants received the outcome from the unselected gamble. FRN was 
evaluated separately for each choice condition and correlated with loss aversion 
values. Given that previous studies reported large individual differences in the 
preference of having choice (Leotti et al., 2014), it was hypothesised that individual 
differences in sensitivity to having choice freedom, as indicated by strength of neural 
activity in each choice condition, would mediate the relationship between loss 
aversion and FRN. 
 
5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Participants 
 
A total of twenty-seven healthy participants (14 females) completed the study. 
After the exclusion of three participants who displayed extremely high values of loss 
aversion (> 3 SDs from the mean), similarly to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2009), the final sample consisted of 24 participants (13 females), 4 left-handed, aged 
22.57 ± 2.31 years (mean ± SD). The study was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Liverpool. All participants gave written informed 
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
5.3.2 Procedure 
 
Participants first completed a monetary gambling task which was used to elicit 
individual loss aversion values. Risk aversion and choice sensitivity were also 
evaluated but, similar to Chapter 4, they were not associated with brain data. 
Participants were endowed with £20 to use for gambling and were informed that they 
could increase or decrease this amount depending on their choices. Figure 5.1 shows 
the trial structure. Participants were required to choose between a gamble and a certain 
outcome. The gamble offered 50% chance of winning or losing variable amounts of 
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money. The alternative certain outcome was either zero or an amount smaller than the 
potential gain from the corresponding gamble in a particular trial. If participants 
accepted the gamble, feedback was given about whether the trial was won or lost, 
whereas, if they rejected the gamble, they proceeded to the next trial. Feedback was 
not given for rejected gambles because in this case participants have selected the sure 
option (i.e., the option associated with 100% probability to receive the stated 
outcome). As such, participants could know what they have received without needing 
to be given any feedback. That was the case both when they received £0 and when 
they received other amounts, irrespective of whether these amounts were small or 
large. For instance, if a participant had to select between a gamble and a sure gain of 
£2, they knew that if they selected the gain they would receive it with 100% 
probability. Therefore, as soon as they selected it, they knew they would receive it. As 
such, the reason for which feedback was not given in this case was because it was not 
needed. Participants made a total of 200 such choices that allowed for estimation of 
individuals’ decision making style by calculating loss aversion based on prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The exact 
gamble amounts, value and logit functions and numerical approximation method used 
were reported in detail in previous studies (Kokmotou et al., 2017; Stancak et al., 
2015). Participants received the accumulated amount from a randomly selected 10% 
of the trials in addition to the initial endowment as reimbursement for participating in 
the experiment. 
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Figure 5.1. Trial structure of the loss aversion task. Each trial began with the presentation of two 
prospects, which stayed on the screen for 4 s. Half of the screen presented a gamble option offering 
50% chance of winning or losing the displayed amount of money (e.g., ‘You win £3.0, You lose £3.0’). 
The other half of the screen presented a sure outcome (e.g., £0). Subsequently, two yellow rectangles 
appeared under each prospect and participants had 2.5 s to select the rectangle corresponding to the 
option they preferred by pressing the left or right mouse button. Their chosen rectangle turned green to 
highlight their choice and was followed by a 1 s black screen. Next, if participants accepted the gamble 
(top panel), feedback was given about the gamble outcome. This feedback constituted of the monetary 
amount in green colour with a ‘+’ sign or red colour with a ‘-’ sign for gains and losses, respectively, 
and stayed on the screen for 1 s. One more 1 s black screen appeared before the start of the next trial. 
If participants chose the sure option (bottom panel), they proceeded to the next trial. If participants 
rejected the gamble, there was no reason to give feedback because they already knew what the outcome 
was since the sure option was associated with 100% probability to receive the outcome. In the example 
above, participants knew that they received £0 since they chose this option, therefore, there was no 
reason to receive feedback. This was the case with all experiments that used this task. Giving them 
feedback would not have any advantage either in terms of behavioural or EEG data. 
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5.3.3 Choice violation/FRN task 
 
Following the loss aversion task, participants were connected to the EEG 
system and completed a second gambling task during which they could win or lose 
money either as a result of their own choice or irrespective of their choice. The task 
was adapted from previous FRN studies (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). Figure 5.2 
shows the trial structure. Each trial began with the presentation of two white cards 
positioned next to each other. After 1 s, the numbers 25 and 5 appeared in each of the 
cards, indicating amount of money in pence to be potentially won or lost on that trial. 
The two cards never contained the same number simultaneously. Participants were 
required to choose, at their own pace, one of the cards but were informed that their 
choice could be arbitrarily swapped for the unchosen card. After participants had 
chosen their preferred card, a yellow frame appeared around it for 1 s. A black screen 
was then presented for 1 s serving as a resting interval. Next, participants received 
feedback (henceforth ‘choice feedback’) about whether their original choice was 
retained (‘unchanged’) or swapped for the opposite card (‘changed’). If their original 
choice was retained, participants were presented again with their originally chosen 
card surrounded by the yellow frame, whereas, if it was changed, participants saw the 
yellow frame surrounding the unchosen card. The choice feedback interval lasted for 
2.5 s. It was emphasised to the participants that they would receive the outcome (gain 
or loss) of the final chosen gamble (i.e., the one surrounded by the yellow rectangle 
after the choice feedback) irrespective of whether that was their original choice or not. 
Thus, the choice feedback was economically neutral for participants because both the 
chosen and the alternative card could lead to monetary gain or loss. Unbeknownst to 
participants, the chosen card was swapped for the opposite in half of the trials. After 
the choice feedback, another black screen was shown for 1 s. Finally, participants 
received feedback about the outcome of the gamble (henceforth ‘outcome feedback’). 
The chosen and the unchosen cards were displayed again with the sign of ‘+’ or ‘-’ in 
front of each number, indicating amount won or lost, respectively. Additionally, the 
yellow frame changed to green colour to represent gains and red to indicate losses. 
The outcome on any trial was predetermined by the computer so that gains and losses 
occurred with equal probability (i.e., 50%). The combination of choice and outcome 
feedback produced four possible outcomes: 1) the original choice was retained and 
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participant won (‘unchanged/gain’), 2) the original choice was retained and participant 
lost (‘unchanged/loss’), 3) the original choice was swapped for the unchosen card and 
participant won (‘changed/gain’), and 4) the original choice was swapped for the 
unchosen card and participant lost (‘changed/loss’). 
The task consisted of 384 trials, split into 12 blocks of 32 trials with the 
duration of each block being approximately 6 min. At the end of each block, 
participants received feedback about the amount of money earned in that block as well 
as the accumulated amount gained from the beginning of the task. Participants kept 
the total difference between their gains and losses from all trials of that task. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Trial structure of the FRN task. Each trial began with the presentation of two white 
rectangles positioned next to each other (one on the left and one on the right side of the screen) on a 
black background. After 1 s, the numbers 25 and 5 were presented in either one of the rectangles, 
indicating amount of money (in pence). Participants had to choose between these two options by 
pressing the left or right mouse button, and their chosen option was highlighted for 1 s with a yellow 
rectangle. This was followed by a 1 s black screen. Afterwards, participants received choice feedback. 
In the choice freedom condition, they saw again the choice screen with their selected rectangle being 
surrounded by a yellow rectangle (top panel). In the choice violation condition, they saw the yellow 
rectangle surrounding the opposite card (bottom panel). In both choice conditions, the choice feedback 
was followed by a 1 s black screen, and after this, outcome feedback was presented whereby the chosen 
and the unchosen cards were displayed again with the sign of ‘+’ or ‘-’ in front of each number, 
indicating amount won or lost respectively. Additionally, the yellow frame changed to green colour to 
represent gains and red to indicate losses. This outcome feedback stayed on the screen for 2.5 s and was 
followed by a 1 s black screen before the beginning of the next trial. 
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5.3.4 EEG Recordings 
 
During the choice violation/FRN task, participants were connected to a 129-
channel Geodesics EGI System (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon, USA) 
with a sponge-based HydroCel Sensor Net. The sensor net was aligned with respect to 
three anatomical landmarks; two preauricular points and the nasion. Electrode-to-skin 
impedances were kept below 50 kΩ, as recommended for this system (Ferree et al., 
2001; Picton et al., 2000). The recording band-pass filter was 0.01−200 Hz, and the 
sampling rate was 1000 Hz. The electrode Cz served as the reference. 
EEG data were pre-processed using BESA v. 6.1 program (MEGIS GmbH, 
Germany). EEG signals were spatially transformed to reference-free data using the 
common average reference method (Lehmann, 1987). Eye blinks and, when necessary, 
electrocardiographic artifacts were removed using principal component analysis (Berg 
and Scherg, 1994), while data were also visually inspected for the presence of any 
electrode artifacts due to muscle movement, and epochs contaminated with artifacts 
were excluded. Data were filtered from 0.5−35 Hz. 
 
5.3.5 Statistical analysis 
 
For statistical analysis, EEG data were exported to Matlab v. R2017a. Grand 
averaged ERPs from the two choice feedback conditions were compared statistically 
using a series of paired samples t-tests for each time sample from 300 to 600 ms 
following the presentation of choice feedback. Grand averaged ERPs from the four 
outcome feedback conditions were analysed with a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA in the epoch from 200 to 300 ms following outcome feedback onset with 
choice feedback (unchanged vs changed) and outcome feedback (gain vs loss) as 
factors. Statistical significance was evaluated using permutation analysis (Maris and 
Oostenveld, 2007) with 5000 permutations in EEGLAB v.12 (Delorme and Makeig, 
2004). Averaged data from time intervals showing statistically significant effects were 
exported to SPSS Statistics software v. 22.0 (IBM Corp, 2013) for further analysis. 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was used to investigate linear associations between loss 
aversion and ERPs. A 95% confidence interval was employed. 
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5.3.6 ERP analysis 
 
The ERP analysis included two steps. First, ERPs time-locked to the 
presentation of choice feedback (unchanged/changed) were computed by averaging 
respective epochs during the interval from 100 ms before to 1000 ms after choice 
feedback. Epochs were baseline corrected using a time window of -100 ms to 0 ms 
relative to the onset of the choice feedback. A difference waveform was computed by 
subtracting ERPs in response to changed choice from ERPs in response to unchanged 
choice feedback (unchanged-minus-changed difference waveform). The mean number 
of accepted trials was 180.66 ± 1.79 and 182.62 ± 1.57 (mean ± SEM) for changed 
and unchanged choice condition, respectively. 
Second, ERPs time-locked to outcome feedback (gain/loss) were computed for 
each of the four possible outcome conditions (unchanged/gain, unchanged/loss, 
changed/gain, changed/loss) by averaging respective epochs from 100 ms before to 
1000 ms after outcome feedback. Epochs were baseline corrected using a time window 
of -100 ms to 0 ms relative to the onset of the outcome feedback. FRN was quantified 
as the potential difference after subtracting loss from gain ERPs for each of the choice 
feedback conditions. This resulted in ‘unchanged FRN’ (unchanged/gain-minus-
unchanged/loss difference waveform) and ‘changed FRN’ (changed/gain-minus-
changed/loss difference waveform). The mean number of accepted trials per condition 
was as follows: changed/gain: 92.04 ± 1.74, changed/loss: 90.85 ± 1.35, 
unchanged/gain: 92.12 ± 1.21, unchanged/loss: 91.70 ± 1.49. 
 
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 ERPs in response to choice feedback 
 
To explore brain responses following choice feedback, ERPs for trials where 
participants’ choice was changed to the opposite option (changed) were compared 
against trials where their original choice was retained (unchanged). Figure 5.3A shows 
grand averaged ERPs in response to choice feedback, the difference waveform 
between these two conditions (unchanged-minus-changed) and the corresponding 
topographic maps. The difference potential peaked approximately 380 ms after 
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presentation of choice feedback and showed a positive maximum at vertex electrodes 
protruding towards posterior electrodes. The selection of electrodes to be used for 
statistical analysis was based on the objective of choosing a cluster of electrodes where 
differences between conditions of interest were the strongest (Yu and Zhou, 2010). 
The resulting cluster consisted of six electrodes including Cz and five adjacent to it 
extending posteriorly (EGI electrodes 31, 54, 79, 80 and 55). 
A paired samples t-test was carried out at each time point from 300 to 600 ms 
after choice feedback to investigate differences between ERPs in response to 
‘unchanged’ and ‘changed’ choice conditions. Statistically significant differences 
were seen between 340-540 ms after choice feedback (shaded area in Figure 5.3A). A 
paired samples t-test on averaged data from this time window showed that 
‘unchanged’ choices yielded significantly stronger amplitudes compared to ‘changed’ 
choices (unchanged: 1.74 ± 0.24 μV, changed: 1.12 ± 0.23 μV; t(22) = 5.62, p < 0.001). 
Further analyses showed that the difference between changed and unchanged ERPs 
was invariant to the selection of particular electrodes in the potential maximum at the 
vertex (Pz: t(23) = 4.61, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.82 ± 0.30 μV, changed: 1.17 ± 0.26 
μV; CPz: t(23) = 3.82, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.79± 0.23 μV, changed: 1.21 ± 0.23 
μV; Cz: t(23) = 6.16, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.68 ± 0.24 μV, changed: 1.06 ± 0.21 
μV). To further ensure that the findings were independent of the selected time window, 
a permutation analysis was conducted for each electrode and yielded very similar 
results (Pz 359-562 ms: t(23) = 4.89, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.68 ± 0.29, changed: 1.03 
± 0.25; CPz 351-507 ms: t(23)=3.61, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.90 ± 0.25, changed: 
1.27 ± 0.24; Cz 334-529 ms: t(23) = 6.05, p < 0.001, unchanged: 1.73 ± 0.29, changed: 
1.09 ± 0.22). 
 
5.4.2 ERPs in response to outcome feedback 
 
To evaluate effects of choice feedback on ERP amplitudes during the outcome 
receipt phase, ERPs to gain and loss outcomes resulting from both unchanged and 
changed choices were analysed. Figure 5.3B shows the grand averaged waveforms of 
the four outcome conditions, their corresponding topographic maps and the 
topographic maps of the two FRN difference waveforms (changed and unchanged 
FRN). The FRN waveforms showed a peak at approximately 230 ms and both 
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demonstrated a positive maximum over the vertex. A central midline electrode cluster 
including Cz and FCz as well as the two electrodes positioned immediately between 
them (EGI electrodes 6 and 7) was selected for statistical analysis. 
To investigate effects of choice (unchanged vs changed) and outcome feedback 
(gain vs loss) on ERPs, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was carried out at each 
time point over a latency interval of 200 to 300 ms after outcome feedback onset. The 
ANOVA yielded a statistically significant main effect of outcome (gain vs loss) during 
220-290 ms after feedback presentation (shaded area in Figure 5.3B). Paired samples 
t-tests on averaged data from this time window showed that losses yielded 
significantly more negative amplitudes compared to gains (losses: 0.69 ± 1.62 μV, 
gains: 1.17 ± 1.65 μV; t(22) = 4.74, p < 0.001), revealing a typical FRN effect. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was neither a significant main effect of choice 
feedback nor an interaction between choice and outcome feedback on ERPs (ps > 
0.05), suggesting that brain responses after learning the gamble outcome were only 
modulated by outcome valence irrespective of whether this outcome stemmed from 
participants’ own choice or not. 
 
5.4.3 Associations of loss aversion with choice and outcome ERPs 
 
To investigate associations of loss aversion with choice and outcome feedback 
ERPs, three Pearson’s correlation analyses were carried out between loss aversion and 
each of the three difference potential waveforms (unchanged-minus-changed, changed 
FRN and unchanged FRN) in the time intervals of the statistically significant 
differences between conditions (340-540 ms for choice feedback and 220-290 ms for 
FRN). There was no statistically significant correlation between loss aversion and 
either difference waveform (ps > 0.05). 
 
5.4.4 Effects of individual differences in response to choice violation on FRN 
 
To analyse individual differences in the appraisal of choice violation feedback, 
a median split of the amplitudes of the unchanged-minus-changed difference 
waveform was used to divide the sample into those participants who responded weakly 
to the change of their choice and those who responded strongly. Figure 5.3C shows 
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grand averaged waveforms of the outcome feedback conditions for weak and strong 
responders to choice change. 
To investigate differences in outcome feedback ERPs for weak and strong 
responders to the choice violation feedback, a 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed on 220-290 ms after outcome feedback with choice (unchanged vs 
changed), outcome (gain vs loss) and choice change response level (weak vs strong) 
as factors. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of outcome type (gain vs 
loss) on ERPs (F(1,22) = 29.05, p < 0.001), echoing the first analysis. A paired samples 
t-test on averaged data indicated that losses yielded significantly more negative 
amplitudes compared to gains (losses: 1.12 ± 0.42 μV, gains: 1.75 ± 0.45 μV; t(23) = 
5.51, p < 0.001). Neither the main effect of choice violation nor the main effect of 
response level reached significance (p > 0.05). 
The ANOVA yielded a statistically significant interaction between choice 
change and outcome feedback (F(1,22) = 9.001, p < 0.05). Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this interaction was driven by ERPs in response to losses, 
with ERPs to ‘changed/loss’ feedback being significantly stronger than ERPs to 
‘unchanged/loss’ feedback (changed/loss: 1.29 ± 0.43 μV, unchanged/loss: 0.95 ± 0.41 
μV; t(23) = 2.85, p < 0.05). In contrast, ERPs in response to gains were similar for 
both levels of choice feedback (ps > 0.05). Neither the interaction between response 
level and choice feedback nor the one between response level and outcome type were 
significant (ps > 0.05). 
Most importantly, the three-way interaction between choice feedback, 
outcome type and response level was statistically significant (F(1,22) = 5.29, p < 0.05). 
Figure 5.3D depicts mean ERP amplitudes of the four outcome conditions for weak 
and strong responders. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that this interaction was driven by 
ERPs in response to losses, with ‘changed/loss’ being significantly stronger than 
‘unchanged/loss’ for the strong response condition (changed/loss: 1.58 ± 0.51 μV, 
unchanged/loss: 1.06 ± 0.55 μV; t(11) = 2.78, p < 0.05). In contrast, gains were similar 
across both choice feedback and response levels. Results suggest that choice violation 
affected only those participants who responded strongly to the switching of their 
original choice for an arbitrarily imposed choice and only when choices led to losses. 
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5.4.5 Correlations with loss aversion 
 
A Pearson’s correlation analysis was carried out to investigate associations between 
loss aversion and FRN in those participants who responded strongly versus weakly to 
the choice change. A statistically significant correlation was found between loss 
aversion and ‘unchanged FRN’ for strong responders (r(12) = 0.68, p < 0.05). In 
contrast, no significant associations were found between loss aversion and either of 
the remaining FRN waveforms (strong changed FRN: r(12) = 0.19, weak unchanged 
FRN: r(12) = 0.28, weak changed FRN: r(12) = 0.25, ps > 0.05). Figure 5.3E shows 
the scatterplots and linear regression lines of the above correlations. Results suggest 
that loss aversion was associated with FRN only when participants responded strongly 
to choice change and only when outcomes originated from their own choices. 
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Figure 5.3. A. Grand averaged EEG potentials for the two choice feedback conditions and their 
difference waveform (left). The shaded area corresponds to the time interval of the statistically 
significant differences between ‘unchanged’ and ‘changed’ feedback (340-540 ms). Topographic maps 
of choice feedback and the difference potential shown at the peak (380 ms) of the difference waveform 
(right). The black circle indicates the electrode cluster entered into statistical analysis. B. Grand 
averaged EEG potentials for the four outcome feedback conditions (left). The shaded area corresponds 
to the time interval of the statistically significant main effect of outcome type (220-290 ms). 
Topographic maps of each outcome feedback condition and the difference potentials (right). The black 
circles indicate the electrode cluster entered into statistical analysis. C. Grand averaged EEG potentials 
for the four outcome feedback conditions split into weak and strong responders to choice feedback. The 
shaded areas correspond to the time interval of the statistically significant main effect of outcome type 
(220-290 ms). D. Bar graph illustrating the mean EEG amplitudes per condition. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance. E. Scatterplots and linear regression lines representing the correlations between 
loss aversion and FRN. Confidence intervals are set at 95%. 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
The present study identified two parameters as essential in order for loss 
aversion to be associated with the neural evaluation of decision outcomes: participants 
must display sensitivity to choice freedom and decision outcomes must be a product 
of the participant’s own decisions. A separation of the sample into participants who 
responded weakly versus strongly to the lack of choice freedom revealed that 
responses to losses rather than gains were more pronounced for strong responders. 
Moreover, we showed that the classic FRN effect was present in both choice freedom 
and choice violation conditions, which aligns with studies suggesting that this 
component represents a coarse binary dissociation between positive and negative 
outcomes (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). 
 
5.5.3 ERPs following choice feedback 
 
Following selection of their preferred option, participants received feedback 
regarding whether this option would actually occur. An ERP component manifesting 
approximately 300-500 ms after receipt of choice feedback was more pronounced in 
the choice freedom compared to the choice violation condition. Based on the latency 
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of its peak, approximately at 380 ms after choice feedback, as well as its centro-
parietal topography, this component is thought to represent the P300 potential 
component (Polich, 2007, 2012). 
Previous research has indicated that the P300 plays important role in decision 
making and stimulus evaluation, encoding attentional and motivational mechanisms 
(Donchin et al., 1978; Polich, 2007). Moreover, some researchers have shown that the 
P300 is sensitive to the degree of personal responsibility experienced, with P300 
amplitudes being stronger in high compared to low responsibility conditions (Li et al., 
2011; 2010; Zhou et al., 2010). In the present study, the choice freedom condition may 
have produced an element of personal responsibility for participants due to the 
contingency of the decision outcome with their own actions. Likewise, the ability to 
choose freely produces an increased sense of personal control (Rotter, 1966), while 
the mere action of having choice leads to enhanced intrinsic motivation and perceived 
competence (Leotti and Delgado, 2011; 2010). Importantly, the P300 has previously 
been shown to be stronger for stimuli that are task-relevant and motivationally 
significant (Polich, 2007). In a similar vein, the choice freedom condition is likely to 
have been more motivationally significant for participants compared to the choice 
violation condition due to perceived increased control over decision outcomes, thus, 
leading to increased P300 amplitudes. 
 
5.5.2 ERPs following outcome feedback 
 
When focusing on ERPs following outcome feedback, irrespective of 
individual differences in sensitivity towards choice freedom, the classic FRN effect 
was observed, with monetary losses yielding more negative amplitudes compared to 
gains (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). Importantly, the FRN was 
observed in both choice freedom and choice violation conditions. This finding is 
consistent with previous FRN studies in the sense that the brain segregates positive 
and negative outcomes irrespectively of the context in which the outcome was 
produced (Hajcak et al., 2006). 
 It is possible that the FRN component in the choice violation condition in the 
current study is comparable to the observational FRN previously reported in tasks 
where participants passively viewed the delivery of rewards and made no overt choices 
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(Bismark et al., 2013; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010; Martin 
and Potts, 2011; Yeung et al., 2005). However, an important difference is that 
observational FRN studies report stronger FRN amplitudes in the active compared to 
the passive choice condition (Bismark et al., 2013; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; 
Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010; Martin and Potts, 2011; Yeung et al., 2005), whereas the 
current study observed similar amplitudes in both choice conditions. Therefore, if 
FRN in the current study was simply observational in nature, a smaller FRN amplitude 
would have been observed in the choice violation condition. This discrepancy, taken 
together with the choice condition differentiation by the P300 component, is likely an 
indicator that the manipulation of choice freedom was successful. Participants did not 
appraise outcomes in the choice violation condition as passive rewards, but rather, 
outcomes appear to be evaluated in a different way, which is perhaps sensitive to 
individual differences related to the frustration associated with the disruption of choice 
(Leotti et al., 2010). 
 
5.5.3 Effects of individual differences in sensitivity to choice violation on FRN 
 
When individual differences in sensitivity to having choice freedom were 
considered, choice condition modulated the evaluation of decision outcomes, but only 
for those participants who were sensitive to retaining their choice freedom. Sensitivity 
to choice freedom was defined as the degree to which participants differentiated 
between choice freedom and choice violation conditions at the neural level, based on 
the difference in P300 amplitudes between the two conditions. The rationale for this 
comes from behavioural studies reporting individual differences in the way people 
experience having choice, with some being more sensitive to choice freedom and 
others more indifferent (Leotti and Delgado, 2014; Patall et al., 2008; Ryan and Deci, 
2006). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate such 
differences at the neural level and to analyse their influence on loss aversion and 
feedback ERPs. 
Importantly, in our study, the modulation of outcome evaluation by choice 
condition occurred only for losses, which can be seen in Figure 5.3D. In contrast, both 
chosen and unchosen gains yielded similar amplitudes, suggesting that positive 
outcomes were keenly received irrespective of their source. The differences observed 
115 
 
for losses might be indicative of feelings of unfairness or of a general tendency to 
attribute failure to external factors (Brewin and Shapiro, 1984; Gregory, 1978; Rotter, 
1966). Along those lines, Leotti et al (2014) demonstrated the importance of outcome 
valence as a moderating factor in both behavioural measures of preference for having 
a choice and neural activation at the time of choice. Specifically, when both loss and 
gain outcomes were equally likely to occur, losses were associated with decreased 
preference for having choice. However, when participants were faced only with 
potential losses and had to try to avoid them, choice preference shifted towards levels 
similar to those for gains. Additionally, striatum activity associated with preference 
for having choice was modulated by outcome valence. In particular, during choice 
cues, which cues were different geometrical shapes associated with either a free-trial 
where participants had choice or a forced-trial where participants did not have a choice 
and just received an option randomly selected by the computer, the striatum was 
activated only for potential gains in the context of both gains and losses, and was also 
activated when choices could only lead to losses but not to gains. Furthermore, 
previous fMRI studies have demonstrated that when rewards are actively chosen by 
individuals, compared to passively delivered rewards, receipt of those rewards is 
associated with stronger activation of the striatum (Bjork and Hommer, 2007; 
O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004), a region linked to emotional and reward-
related processing (Delgado, 2007). In addition, it has been shown that voluntary, 
rather than involuntary, risk taking is associated with activation in a range of brain 
regions relevant for reward-processing (Rao et al., 2008). Our finding that both agency 
and outcome valence contribute to the way in which decision outcomes are appraised 
on the cortical level aligns with the above fMRI studies. 
Regarding participants that were relatively indifferent to having choice in the 
current study, the lack of FRN modulation by choice condition suggests that they did 
not appear to be sensitive to how monetary outcomes were obtained, in the case of 
both rewards and penalties. It could be argued that, in the current task, this was rational 
behaviour given that outcomes were randomly selected by the computer in both choice 
conditions. In terms of cognitive load theory (Paas et al., 2003; Sweller, 1988, 1994, 
2011) and economic models of rational choice, the choice condition feedback could 
be ignored altogether as it has no real influence over outcomes. In this sense, it may 
be that by not emotionally engaging in feedback that was irrelevant for their goals, 
those participants behaved more rationally. 
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5.5.4 Loss aversion and FRN 
 
In the current study, loss aversion was correlated with FRN amplitude 
following outcomes resulting from unobstructed choices for participants who showed 
sensitivity to having choice freedom during 220-290 ms after feedback. This finding 
replicates our previous study, which, using a similar paradigm and experimental 
procedures, demonstrated that loss aversion was associated with FRN during 233-263 
ms after feedback onset (Kokmotou et al., 2017). In addition, it provides support to 
other studies, which, using experimental paradigms more suited to measure loss 
aversion, revealed similar associations between loss aversion and feedback ERPs 
(Kokmotou et al., under review). 
Another study investigated the influence of loss aversion on electrocortical 
potentials at the time of the decision. In particular, Heeren et al. (2016) showed that 
loss aversion mediated a posterior positive slow potential when participants were 
reflecting upon gambles with small gain/loss ratios which were indicative of high 
decision conflict. The authors report that this association was modulated by individual 
differences in trait loss aversion. Specifically, for individuals high in loss aversion, 
this posterior positive component was decreased both for high and low conflict 
decisions. The authors suggest that this indicates a relative negativity associated with 
conflict detection depending on trait loss aversion. Taken together with the fact that 
loss aversion has been theorised to represent an emotional mechanism that acts to 
avoid the negative emotionality associated with potential losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2013; 2009), we postulate that loss aversion and FRN represent behavioural and neural 
manifestations of the same phenomenon: differential sensitivity to the valence of 
reward. Loss aversion is an emotional discomfort at the possibility of an upcoming 
threat, whereas FRN is the affective evaluation of that threat after an outcome has been 
obtained. 
Importantly, the lack of association between loss aversion and FRN under 
specific conditions has implications for outcome evaluation theories and for literature 
on the neural underpinnings of loss aversion by determining exceptions in its 
manifestation. Specifically, in the current study, loss aversion lacked relevance during 
outcome evaluation under three conditions; when individual differences in choice 
sensitivity were unaccounted for, when participants were indifferent towards having 
117 
 
choice freedom, and when outcomes were not contingent upon the participant’s 
choice. Firstly, when the whole sample was included in the analysis, loss aversion was 
not associated with FRN, in contrast to our previous study (Kokmotou et al., 2017). 
However, these contradicting findings can be reconciled by studies on observational 
learning (Bellebaum et al., 2010a). Several studies have shown that FRN following 
outcomes resulting from free choices is stronger compared to mere observation of such 
outcomes in which the individual has no agency (Bellebaum et al., 2010a; Coricelli et 
al., 2005). In this sense, we postulate that by including the choice violation 
manipulation, we induced a mixture of self and observational FRN which is different 
compared to the FRN we previously obtained from one single choice condition. This 
resembles our findings for when outcomes were considered self-irrelevant because 
they were counterfactual (Kokmotou et al., under review) and when outcomes 
influenced others but not the participant (Kokmotou et al., in preparation). Secondly, 
regarding the lack of an association between loss aversion and FRN for participants 
responding weakly to the change of their choices, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that this part of the sample may not have fully engaged in the task, may not have 
believed in the rules described, or may have become frustrated due to the lack of 
control and, consequently, became inattentive (Leotti et al., 2010). Finally, regarding 
the changed FRN for strong responders, it may be that they did not perceive the 
outcomes from changed choices as their own. Support for this interpretation comes 
from one study which showed that FRN was sensitive to subjective expectations about 
gambling outcomes (Moser and Simons, 2009). Participants were asked to report 
whether they thought that their selected gamble would win or lose at two time points; 
immediately after making a choice and just before learning the outcome. Results 
showed that in the condition where participants stuck to their initial guess, subjective 
reports of outcome expectations and ERPs associated with those outcomes were both 
stronger compared to when participants changed their original guess. Therefore, this 
finding could be indicative of decreased ownership at the time of the decision (Moser 
and Simons, 2009) and decreased control over action outcomes (Leotti et al., 2010), 
as individuals may assume different levels of responsibility when they have different 
levels of control over outcomes (Coricelli et al., 2005; Walton et al., 2004). 
The above findings add to previous studies suggesting that, like most 
phenomena, loss aversion is context dependent (Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). For 
instance, studies have shown that loss aversion is absent for small amounts of money 
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(Harinck et al., 2007) and reduced when decisions are considered part of a broader 
portfolio of choices (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; 2009), or when decisions influence 
others (Andersson et al., 2014). In addition, one fMRI study showed that successful 
reduction of behavioural loss aversion was associated with decreased amygdala 
activity (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013), suggesting that behavioural (as explained by a 
reduction in loss aversion with the regulate strategy) and neural (as indicated by the 
fMRI results and the difference which was associated with loss aversion) modulation 
of loss aversion can co-occur. Our study extends understanding of loss aversion by 
showing that, under certain conditions, loss aversion might be accompanied by a 
hindrance in the corresponding neural patterns, even without changes in its 
behavioural manifestation. This means that loss aversion was associated with neural 
activity under certain conditions only. 
To conclude, we showed that loss aversion was not associated with feedback 
potentials unanimously, but rather, this association is subject to certain conditions. 
Specifically, in order for loss aversion to be associated with the evaluation of 
experienced decision outcomes, decision makers must be sensitive to having choice 
freedom and outcomes must be contingent upon their own choices. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Study 4: Loss aversion is associated with the neural processing of 
decision outcomes only when making decisions impacting the self but 
not others. 
 
 
This experiment investigated the effects of loss aversion on the neural evaluation of 
monetary rewards earned either for participants themselves or for another participant. 
 
It is currently in preparation for publication in a journal to be confirmed. 
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6.1 Abstract 
 
Behavioural studies suggest that loss aversion, the tendency to overestimate 
losses over gains, is reduced when deciding for others. Electroencephalography (EEG) 
studies have demonstrated that loss aversion is associated with feedback-related 
negativity (FRN), a component manifesting as stronger activity for negative compared 
to positive decision outcomes. Whether loss aversion is associated with FRN in a 
similar manner when decisions impact others remains to be explored. The present 
study aimed to compare the influence of loss aversion on the neural evaluation of 
monetary outcomes obtained by participants for themselves or for others using EEG 
recordings. 
Participants completed a gambling task in which they could win or lose money 
for themselves (self-condition) or on behalf of another participant (other-condition). 
Parametric modelling of choices was used to estimate loss aversion separately in the 
self- and other-condition. Event-related potentials (ERPs) to outcomes in the self- and 
other-condition were analysed and correlated with loss aversion. 
No statistically significant differences were found for loss aversion between 
the self- and the other-condition. The classic FRN was observed in the self-condition, 
with losses producing more negative amplitudes compared to gains. In contrast, FRN 
in the other-condition demonstrated the opposite pattern. Furthermore, loss aversion 
correlated with FRN in the self-condition only. 
Results suggest that, despite participants deciding similarly for themselves and 
others at the behavioural level, decision outcomes obtained for themselves versus 
others were processed differently at the neural level. This may be reflective of a 
subconscious comparison between self- and other-outcomes, leading to the evaluation 
of others’ gain as a relative loss for themselves. 
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6.2 Introduction 
 
Making decisions on behalf of others might differ to the decisions made for 
oneself. Previous studies have highlighted self-other discrepancies in the context of 
risky decision making, with some studies suggesting that people make riskier 
decisions when deciding for others compared to when deciding for themselves 
(Chakravarty et al., 2011; Hsee and Weber, 1997; Pollai and Kirchler, 2012), although 
these findings are not conclusive (Fernandez-Duque and Wifall, 2007; Stone et al., 
2002). 
When decisions involve the prospect of a loss, people tend to overestimate 
losses compared to gains of the same nominal values, a phenomenon known as loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Previous behavioural studies suggest that 
loss aversion is reduced when deciding for others compared to deciding for the self 
(Andersson et al., 2014). Furthermore, Fullbrunn et al. (2017) demonstrated that, when 
decision outcomes have joint implications for the self and for another person, loss 
aversion is of similar magnitude to when decisions impact only the self. Combined, 
the above findings support a general reduction in loss aversion when making decisions 
for others without consequences for the self. 
Further support for the discrepancies in decision making for the self versus 
others is provided by neuroimaging studies. A meta-analysis of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies demonstrated that reward-related brain regions 
were activated for both personal and vicarious reward, while areas relevant for 
mentalising responded specifically to vicarious reward (Morelli et al., 2015). For 
instance, activation of the striatum has been shown to be dependent on whether the 
decision outcome leads to a reward for the self or to a reward for another participant 
(Braams et al., 2014). In particular, rewards won for the self or for a friend were 
associated with increased striatum activity compared to penalties, whereas the 
opposite pattern was found when outcomes concerned a disliked other. Likewise, 
reward-related brain regions have shown increased activation for decisions regarding 
the self, compared to decisions concerning others, both at the decision phase and 
during reward receipt (Jung et al., 2013). 
Electroencephalography (EEG) studies have highlighted the importance of 
feedback-related negativity (FRN) in the neural processing of reward. FRN is an 
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event-related potential (ERP) component manifesting as a negative deflection in the 
electrocortical potential and differentiating between positive and negative outcomes 
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). FRN occurs between 200 to 
350 ms after feedback onset and displays a negativity over fronto-central scalp 
locations (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). Literature on observational feedback has 
demonstrated that watching rewards and penalties being delivered to others produces 
FRN that is of similar polarity to self-relevant rewards, albeit of smaller amplitude 
(Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Kang et al., 2010; Leng and Zhou, 2014; Ma et al., 
2011; Yu and Zhou, 2006). In contrast, antagonistic situations where monetary 
rewards obtained for others translate into losses for the self lead to an opposite-polarity 
FRN (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallarés et 
al., 2010). However, in the above studies, participants passively observed outcomes 
being delivered to others and those outcomes were not dependent upon their own 
actions. 
The effects of making active decisions for others on FRN have recently been 
investigated by Liu et al. (2018). Participants played a gambling game in three 
conditions; for themselves, for an underprivileged student (high-empathy condition) 
and for a student for whom no information was given (low-empathy condition). The 
classic FRN was observed in the self-condition, no differences between gain and loss 
amplitudes were found in the high-empathy condition, while an opposite-valence FRN 
was present in the low-empathy condition. These results suggest that evaluation of 
vicarious rewards is modulated by empathy levels. Crucially, in the above study, gains 
for others were associated with losses for the participant as the amount won for others 
was subtracted from participants’ accumulated rewards. In another study, participants 
gambled for a friend or for a stranger and rewards won for the friend were associated 
with a stronger FRN compared to rewards won for a stranger, suggesting that FRN 
strength is modulated by social distance (Leng and Zhou, 2014).  
FRN has previously been shown to be correlated with loss aversion when 
participants decided for themselves. Specifically, individual differences in loss 
aversion correlated with FRN strength in fronto-central electrode sites during 233-263 
ms after learning the decision outcome (Kokmotou et al., 2017). Furthermore, this 
association between loss aversion and FRN has been shown to be specific only for 
decisions that had real but not hypothetical impact for participants (Kokmotou et al., 
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under review). However, whether loss aversion modulates FRN in a similar manner 
when decisions impact others remains unknown. 
The present study investigated the relationship between loss aversion and 
ERPs following monetary gains and losses resulting from decisions made by 
participants for themselves (self-condition) versus for another participant (other-
condition). A gambling task was employed to evaluate loss aversion while EEG was 
recorded simultaneously. ERPs time-locked to outcome onset were computed 
separately for gain and loss outcomes for the self- and other-condition, and individual 
loss aversion values were correlated with FRN for each condition. 
 
6.3 Methods 
 
6.3.1 Participants 
 
Twenty eight healthy participants (14 females) completed the study. One 
participant was excluded from the analysis due to a technical fault during the 
recording. Because the gambling task allowed participants to reject as many gambles 
as they wanted, nine more participants had to be excluded due to having less than 30 
trials per condition, which is the recommended minimum number of trials necessary 
for FRN averaging (Huffmeijer et al., 2014; Marco‐Pallarés et al., 2011). Therefore, 
the final sample included 18 participants (10 females), 2 left-handed, aged 24.39 ± 
4.02 years (mean ± SD). The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Liverpool, and all participants gave their written informed consent 
prior to the start of the experiment. 
 
6.3.2 Procedure 
 
In order to estimate individual loss aversion values and to record EEG activity 
following decision outcomes, participants were asked to play a gambling task while 
connected to the EEG system. Specifically, participants received an initial endowment 
ranging between £9 to £11 to use for gambling during the task and were told that they 
could increase or decrease this amount depending on how well they performed 
throughout the experimental session. Participants were told that they would play this 
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gambling task once for themselves and once for the next participant lined up for the 
study. In the condition where participants gambled for themselves (self-condition), the 
outcomes of a randomly selected 10% from all trials would be given to them on top of 
their initial endowment as compensation for participating in the experiment. In the 
condition where participants gambled for the next participant (other-condition), they 
would keep nothing for themselves. Instead, the outcomes of a randomly selected 10% 
from all trials would become the next participant’s endowment amount. Similarly, it 
was explained to participants that the endowment they received was won for them by 
the previous participant. However, unbeknownst to participants, the specific 
endowment amount was pre-selected before the start of the experiment. Specifically, 
this amount was a random number between £9-11 so that all participants received 
similar endowment amounts. 
The gambling task was adjusted from previous studies (Kokmotou et al., 2017; 
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Stancak et al., 2015) and the exact gamble amounts used 
and stimuli timing were identical to those described in detail previously (Kokmotou et 
al., 2017; Stancak et al., 2015). Figure 6.1 shows the trial structure. Participants were 
required to choose between a gamble and a sure outcome. The gamble offered 50% 
chance of winning or losing variable amounts of money (e.g., ‘You win £3, You lose 
£3’). The alternative sure outcome was either zero or an amount smaller than the 
potential gain from the corresponding gamble in a particular trial. If participants 
accepted the gamble, feedback was given about whether they won or lost at that trial. 
Feedback constituted of the monetary amount in green colour with a ‘+’ sign and red 
colour with a ‘-’ sign for gains and losses, respectively. If participants rejected the 
gamble, they proceeded to the next trial. 
Participants made a total of 200 choices for themselves and 200 choices for the 
next participant in separate blocks. The task was split into 4 blocks of 100 trials each 
with intervening breaks. The order of block type was counterbalanced across 
participants. Within each block, 80 trials consisted of choosing between a mixed-
gamble (e.g., ‘You win £3, You lose £3’) and a sure zero outcome. The remaining 20 
trials consisted of a gain-only gamble (e.g., ‘You win £3, You lose £0’) versus a sure 
non-zero outcome (e.g., £2). The inclusion of both mixed- and gain-only gambles 
enabled a dissociation of loss aversion from risk aversion as mixed-gambles assess 
loss aversion whereas gain-only gambles assess risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2013). Similarly to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013), only mixed-gamble 
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trials were included in the ERP analysis in order to distinguish activity which was 
specifically relevant for loss aversion. It is not possible to assume that there is not a 
component of risk aversion in the decision to avoid a gamble, however, what this task 
does is to measure both loss and risk aversion and, by including the probability of a 
loss outcome in only one subset of the trials, then disentangle the two decision making 
parameters. The analysis conducted was similar to previous studies (Sokol-Hessner et 
al., 2009; 2013). As such, the advantage of this task is not that it assesses only loss 
aversion but rather that it separates it from risk aversion, as in the risk aversion trials 
there is no potential for loss. 
Loss aversion was evaluated separately for the self- and other-condition, using 
parametric modelling of participants’ choices based on prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). The exact gamble amounts used, value and logit functions, and 
numerical approximation method used have been reported in detail previously 
(Kokmotou et al., 2017; Stancak et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Trial structure of the loss aversion task. Each trial began with the presentation of two 
prospects, which stayed on the screen for 3.5 s. Half of the screen presented a gamble option offering 
50% chance of winning or losing the displayed amount of money (e.g., ‘You win £3.0, You lose £3.0’). 
The other half of the screen presented a sure outcome (e.g., £0). Next, two yellow rectangles appeared 
under each prospect and participants had 2.5 s to select the rectangle corresponding to the option they 
preferred by pressing the left or right mouse button. Their chosen rectangle turned green to highlight 
their choice and was followed by a 1.5 s black screen. Subsequently, if participants accepted the gamble 
(top panel), feedback was given about the gamble outcome. This feedback constituted of the monetary 
amount in green colour with a ‘+’ sign or red colour with a ‘-’ sign for gains and losses, respectively, 
and stayed on the screen for 1 s. One more 1 s black screen appeared before the start of the next trial. 
If participants chose the sure option (bottom panel), they proceeded to the next trial. The trial structure 
was identical for both self- and other-condition. 
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6.3.3 Recordings 
 
EEG was recorded continuously throughout the experiment using a 129-
channel Geodesics EGI System (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, Oregon, USA) 
with a sponge-based HydroCel Sensor Net. The sensor net was aligned with respect to 
three anatomical landmarks; two preauricular points and the nasion. Electrode-to-skin 
impedances were kept below 50 kΩ, as recommended for this system (Ferree et al., 
2001; Picton et al., 2000). The sampling rate was 1000 Hz and data were filtered online 
with a 0.01−200 Hz band-pass filter. The Cz electrode was used as the reference. 
 
6.3.4 ERP analysis 
 
EEG data were pre-processed using BESA v. 6.1 program (MEGIS GmbH, 
Germany). EEG signals were spatially transformed to reference-free data using the 
common average reference method (Lehmann, 1987). Eye blinks and 
electrocardiographic artifacts were removed by principal component analysis (Berg 
and Scherg, 1994). Data were also visually inspected for the presence of electrode 
artifacts due to muscle movement, and epochs contaminated with artifacts were 
excluded. Data were filtered from 0.5−35 Hz. 
ERPs time-locked to feedback onset were computed separately for each of the 
four possible outcome conditions (self-gain, self-loss, other-gain, other-loss) resulting 
from the accepted mixed-gamble trials. Epochs from 200 ms before to 1000 ms after 
outcome onset were averaged for each condition and baseline-corrected using a time 
window of -200 to 0 ms relative to outcome feedback onset. 
 
6.3.5 Statistical analysis 
 
For statistical analysis, EEG data were exported to Matlab v. R2017a. Grand 
averaged ERPs from the four outcome feedback conditions were analysed with a two-
way repeated measures ANOVA from 250 to 350 ms with decision type (self vs other) 
and outcome type (gain vs loss) as factors. The statistical significance was evaluated 
using permutation analysis (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007) with 5000 permutations in 
EEGLAB v.12 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Averaged data from time intervals 
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showing statistically significant effects were exported to SPSS Statistics software v. 
22.0 (IBM Corp, 2013) for further analysis. Pearson’s correlation analysis was used in 
order to investigate associations between loss aversion and ERPs. 
 
 
6.4 Results 
 
6.4.1 Loss aversion 
 
Mean loss aversion for decisions regarding the self was 1.81 ± 0.20 (mean ± 
SEM) and loss aversion for decisions regarding others was 1.31 ± 0.16. A paired 
samples t-test showed that there were no statistically significant differences in loss 
aversion for decisions regarding the self versus others (t(17) = 1.81, p = 0.088), 
suggesting that participants decided in similar ways for themselves and others. 
 
6.4.2 FRN 
 
Figure 6.2A shows grand averaged ERP waveforms for the four possible 
feedback conditions (self-gain, self-loss, other-gain, other-loss) of the FRN electrode 
cluster (comprising electrodes FCz and Fz) on the left and their corresponding 
topographic maps on the right. To investigate the effects of decision and outcome type 
on FRN, a 2 (decision: self vs other) by 2 (outcome: gain vs loss) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on data pooled over the FRN electrode cluster from 250-350 
ms after feedback onset. 
The ANOVA revealed a statistically significant interaction between decision 
and outcome type during 315 to 345 ms after feedback (F(1,17) = 15.01, p < 0.05). 
This time window is indicated by the light grey shaded area in Figure 6.2A. A paired 
samples t-test on mean data from this time window showed that, when participants 
were deciding for themselves, losses yielded more negative amplitudes compared to 
gains (losses: 3.55 ± 0.81 μV vs gains: 4.26 ± 0.77 μV; t(17) = 3.29, p < 0.05), 
revealing the classic FRN effect. When deciding for others, results showed the 
opposite pattern with losses being more positive compared to gains (losses: 2.48 ± 
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0.59 μV vs gains: 1.79 ± 0.45 μV; t(17) = -2.20, p < 0.05), suggesting that decisions 
regarding others yielded an opposite-direction FRN. 
The main effect of decision was significant during 286 to 346 ms after 
feedback (F(1,17) = 17.17, p < 0.05). This time window is indicated by the dark grey 
shaded area in Figure 6.2A. A paired samples t-test on mean data from this time 
window showed that feedback following decisions for the self yielded stronger 
amplitudes compared to decisions for others (self-decision: 3.36 ± 0.70 μV vs other- 
decision: 1.73 ± 0.48 μV; t(17) = 2.97, p < 0.05). The main effect of outcome was not 
significant (p > 0.05). 
 
6.4.3 Correlations with loss aversion 
 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was carried out to investigate the relationship 
between loss aversion and FRN following outcomes resulting from decisions for the 
self or for others during the time interval of the statistically significant interaction 
(315-345 ms). For decisions regarding the self, a difference waveform was created by 
subtracting ERPs to self-gains from ERPs to self-losses (self-FRN). For decisions 
regarding the self, a difference waveform was created by subtracting ERPs to other-
gains from ERPs to other-losses (other-FRN). 
Loss aversion for decisions regarding the self correlated with self-FRN (r(18) 
= 0.57, p < 0.05). Loss aversion for decisions regarding others did not correlate with 
other-FRN (r(18) = 0.04, p > 0.05). Figure 6.2B shows the scatter plots, regression 
lines and 95% confidence interval lines representing the associations of loss aversion 
with self-FRN (left) and other-FRN (right). The topographic maps of the two 
difference waveforms are also depicted in Figure 6.2B and 6.2C, where it is evident 
that self-FRN yielded a negativity over fronto-central scalp locations whereas other-
FRN had the opposite pattern. 
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Figure 6.2. A. Grand averaged EEG potentials for the four feedback conditions (self-gain, self-loss, 
other-gain, other-loss) pooled over the FRN electrode cluster (FCz, Fz). The light grey shaded area 
corresponds to the time interval of the statistically significant interaction between decision and outcome 
type (315-345 ms). The dark grey shaded area corresponds to the time interval of the main effect of 
decision type (286-346 ms). Topographic maps of each feedback type are shown at the peak of the 
conditional waveforms (approximately at 320 ms). B. Scatterplot, linear regression line and 95% 
confidence interval lines representing the correlation between loss aversion and FRN in the self-
condition with the corresponding topographic map shown at 320 ms. C. Scatterplot, linear regression 
line and 95% confidence interval lines representing the correlation between loss aversion and FRN in 
the other-condition with the corresponding topographic map shown at 320 ms. 
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Figure 6.3. A. Mean EEG amplitudes for the four feedback conditions (self-gain, self-loss, other-gain, 
other-loss) pooled over the FRN electrode cluster (FCz, Fz) averaged over the time window of the 
statistically significant interaction (315-345 ms). B. FRN averaged potentials in the self-condition (solid 
black line) and other-condition (dashed black line). The light grey shaded area corresponds to the time 
interval of the statistically significant interaction between decision and outcome type (315-345 ms). 
The dark grey shaded area corresponds to the time interval of the main effect of decision type (286-346 
ms). 
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6.5 Discussion 
 
The present study investigated loss aversion and its influence on neural 
evaluation of outcomes during decisions impacting participants themselves versus 
others. Behavioural data showed that loss aversion did not differ between conditions, 
suggesting that participants were equally sensitive to prospective losses irrespective 
of whether those losses concerned themselves or others. However, decision outcomes 
for oneself or for another person appeared to be processed differently at the neural 
level. In the self-condition, the classic FRN component was observed with losses 
yielding more negative amplitudes compared to gains. In the other-condition, the 
inverse pattern was observed, leading to an opposite-polarity FRN effect, suggesting 
that gains (losses) for others were evaluated as losses (gains) for the self. Importantly, 
loss aversion was associated with FRN only in the self-condition. 
The lack of loss aversion differences between conditions was somewhat 
surprising considering previous studies which found reduced loss aversion for 
decisions regarding others (Andersson et al., 2014; Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2017; 
Mengarelli et al., 2014; Polman, 2012b). One possible explanation for this discrepancy 
might be that the participants in the current study perceived similarities between 
themselves and the other person (e.g., student status). Psychological distance, and 
specifically the social aspect of it, that is, how different one considers another person 
to the self (Liberman et al., 2007), has been highlighted as an important factor during 
decision making (Polman and Emich, 2011; Trope and Liberman, 2010). For instance, 
the negative impact of losses is considered smaller for larger compared to shorter 
psychological distances (Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006). Importantly, Polman (2012b) 
showed that, in conditions of low psychological distance, decisions for others were 
similar to decisions regarding the self. Furthermore, smaller perceived psychological 
distance leads to a prevention focus, whereas larger is associated with a promotion 
focus (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Likewise, Polman (2012a) demonstrated an 
association between loss aversion and regulatory focus (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; 
Pennington and Roese, 2003) such that those with a promotion focus showed higher 
loss aversion for themselves versus others, whereas those with a prevention focus 
showed no differences. Therefore, if participants in the current study perceived small 
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psychological distance between themselves and the other participant, losses might 
have been equally aversive in both conditions. 
 
6.5.1 FRN 
 
In the self-condition, we observed the classic FRN component, with losses 
yielding more negative amplitudes compared to gains, thus, replicating many previous 
studies (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c; Yeung and 
Sanfey, 2004). In the other-condition, we observed the opposite effect, suggesting that 
participants evaluated the gains (losses) of others as losses (gains) for the self. The 
finding of an opposite-FRN effect for decisions regarding others aligns with the low-
empathy condition in the study by Liu et al. (2018) whereby the other person was a 
student similar to the participant. The authors observed an FRN of opposite polarity 
when participants did not feel empathy for the other person. Similarly, it is consistent 
with previous studies which demonstrated an opposite-polarity FRN in antagonistic 
situations during observational learning (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006; Itagaki and 
Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010). However, when personal and vicarious 
rewards were independent, observational FRN has been shown to be of the same 
polarity (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Kang et al., 2010; Leng and Zhou, 2014; Ma et 
al., 2011; Yu and Zhou, 2006). Nevertheless, in the above observational learning 
studies, participants did not make active decisions for others, rather, they just observed 
the random delivery of rewards. In the current study, the rewards won for others were 
contingent upon participants’ own actions, perhaps making the other person’s 
outcomes more relevant and, thus, enhancing comparison effects between personal 
and vicarious rewards. 
FRN has been shown to encode outcomes not in absolute but in relative ways 
(Holroyd et al., 2004) based on their motivational significance for participants 
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). For instance, it has been shown that when two gains 
of different size are possible but the smaller one is received, participants consider this 
as a relative loss (Holroyd et al., 2004). Similarly, a gain for others might have 
constituted a loss for the self since it signified a missed opportunity. Along those lines, 
Boksem et al. (2011) showed that FRN is dependent on social comparison. 
Specifically, FRN was modulated by another player’s outcome during a gambling task 
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such that it was the most negative when the other player received positive feedback 
while other’s negative feedback did not make any difference. This suggests that FRN 
was the most pronounced during the participant’s comparison with a better 
performance than their own. Likewise, it has been shown that ventral striatum was 
activated similarly during both absolute and comparative rewards, such as when losing 
a specific amount or when winning an amount smaller than another participant (Dvash 
et al., 2010). Moreover, another study showed that people reported being envious 
when others’ outcomes were better than their own, with more envy being associated 
with increased anterior cingulate cortex activity (Takahashi et al., 2009), a brain region 
which is considered a possible FRN source (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). In 
general, upward comparisons lead to negative emotions (Dvash et al., 2010; Roese and 
Epstude, 2017; Wu et al., 2011; Zeelenberg et al., 1998) and it is these emotions that 
might have been reflected in the FRN response during learning the outcomes obtained 
for others. 
 
6.5.2 FRN associations with loss aversion 
 
The association between loss aversion and FRN strength in the self-condition 
replicates previous findings (Kokmotou et al., 2017). In particular, loss aversion 
measured during a separate task was associated with FRN amplitude recorded using a 
different forced-choice gambling task at fronto-central electrode sites during 233 to 
263 ms after learning the choice outcome (Kokmotou et al., 2017). We postulate that, 
the more prospective negative outcomes were feared during the decision making 
process, as indicated by increased loss aversion, the more the brain differentiated 
between outcomes during the outcome receipt phase in the self-condition. 
Previous studies have investigated the influence of loss aversion on ERPs. For 
instance, loss aversion has previously been associated with stronger resting state EEG 
activity in the right, compared to the left, hemisphere at central and posterior sites 
(Duke et al., 2018). Furthermore, loss aversion has been shown to modulate a posterior 
positive slow wave during difficult decisions, as indicated by small gain/loss ratios 
(Heeren et al., 2016). Additionally, fMRI studies provide evidence for a link between 
loss aversion and a range of brain regions which play an important role in value 
computation and evaluation of rewards, including the VMPFC, the amygdala and the 
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insula (Canessa et al., 2017; 2013; De Martino et al., 2010; Gelskov et al., 2015; 
Markett et al., 2016; Tom et al., 2007). 
In our previous study (Kokmotou et al., under review), loss aversion was 
selectively associated with actual but not with counterfactual outcomes (i.e., outcomes 
resulting from accepted gambles versus hypothetical outcomes resulting from rejected 
gambles that could have been obtained, if the individual had decided differently). This 
suggests that outcomes should have motivational significance for participants in order 
for loss aversion to take effect. Similarly, in the current study, outcomes for others 
were less important for participants since they did not influence their own earnings. 
Therefore, although participants had a similar level of motivation to win for 
themselves and others, as indicated by the lack of differences in the behavioural 
results, loss aversion was not associated with others’ outcome evaluation, namely FRN 
in the other-condition. 
Taken together, the behavioural and EEG results suggest that there might have 
been a two-stage process taking place. Firstly, losses have been evaluated equally 
aversive during the decision time for participants themselves and others alike, leading 
to similar loss aversion values in both conditions. Secondly, an automatic involuntary 
evaluation of decision outcomes after they were received led to social comparisons 
between the rewards achieved for the self versus those for others. The lack of 
association between behavioural and neural data in the other-condition might indicate 
that the emotional responses associated with loss aversion at the time of the decision 
were diminished by the time participants learned the decision outcome. This is in line 
with literature proposing that decision making for the self compared to others recruits 
different neural evaluation mechanisms. For instance, one study showed that making 
decisions with negative consequences for the self was associated with regret, while 
making wrong decisions for others was associated with guilt and, importantly, regret 
led to stronger emotional reactions compared to guilt (Wagner et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the emotional reactions experienced following risky decisions are not 
always of the intensity that they were hypothesised to be during deliberate thinking 
about those decisions (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Thus, the asymmetry in the neural 
evaluation of self-other outcomes might have been due to a mistaken initial hypothesis 
that participants would be gratified by another individual winning a reward in the same 
way that they would be gratified if they received the reward themselves. 
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To conclude, we showed that loss aversion during a monetary gambling task 
was similar for decisions made both for participants themselves and for others. 
However, the similarities in the amount of loss aversion revealed at decision time were 
not reproduced during the outcome evaluation period. In particular, the classic FRN 
component was observed for self-decisions, whereas an opposite-direction FRN was 
observed for other-decisions, suggesting differential processing of self- and other-
outcomes. Finally, loss aversion was associated with FRN only when making 
decisions for the self but not when making decisions impacting others, further 
emphasising the observed discrepancies between behavioural and EEG data for 
participants themselves versus others. 
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Chapter 7 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the effects of loss aversion on the 
evaluation of decision outcomes, and to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying 
such effects using EEG. It was hypothesised that individual differences in loss 
aversion would correlate with the neural evaluation of monetary decision outcomes, 
and that such modulation would be observed in feedback ERPs. Specific conditions 
influencing the loss aversion effects were identified by studying decision making in 
different contexts. 
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
 
The first study of this thesis investigated whether individual differences in loss 
aversion evaluated using a monetary gambling task were associated with FRN strength 
measured during a second forced-choice gambling task. It was hypothesised that 
people high in loss aversion would also show increased FRN. An exploratory SPM 
analysis showed that loss aversion was associated with FRN strength at fronto-central 
electrode locations during 233 to 263 ms after feedback onset. ERP analysis of the 
scalp data revealed the classic FRN with monetary losses yielding more negative 
amplitudes compared to gains. Correlation of behavioural loss aversion data with 
mean amplitude data from the 233-263 ms time window revealed statistical 
significance, suggesting that higher loss aversion values were associated with stronger 
FRN. Source analysis estimated that OFC was the generator of the FRN, and OFC 
activity strength during the 233-263 ms window was further associated with individual 
differences in loss aversion. Finally, a comparison analysis between loss and risk 
aversion showed that these findings were specific to loss aversion as risk aversion was 
associated both with different scalp topographic pattern and timing while it was not 
associated with FRN amplitudes. 
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 The second study utilised a single gambling task with EEG recordings in order 
to simultaneously measure loss aversion and neural processing of both actual and 
counterfactual choice outcomes. The aim of this investigation was to replicate the 
correlational results from the first study and, furthermore, to explore the neural 
processing of counterfactual outcomes. It was hypothesised that individual differences 
in loss aversion would correlate with FRN strength following both actual and 
counterfactual outcomes. The findings from the first study were replicated such that 
loss aversion was associated with FRN following obtained gains and losses during 
250-350 ms after feedback onset at fronto-central midline electrodes. In addition to 
FRN, scalp data suggested the presence of a P300 potential, so this component was 
also analysed. Results for P300 mirrored those of FRN, and loss aversion was 
associated with P300 strength during 350-450 ms at centro-parietal electrodes. 
However, contrary to our hypotheses, differences between ERPs following gains and 
losses were not statistically significant in the counterfactual outcome condition, while 
loss aversion was not associated with FRN or P300 to counterfactual outcomes. This 
result suggests that outcomes must have real economic consequences for individuals 
in order for loss aversion to influence the evaluation phase of the decision making 
process. After the exploratory analysis of the first study, this second experiment 
further supported associations of loss aversion with feedback ERPs and set a first 
condition for the loss aversion effects: outcomes must be of significance to the 
participants. 
 The third study aimed to investigate an important factor in decision making 
that has scarcely been investigated in EEG literature, namely, decisions when there 
are obstacles interfering with the choice process and outcome receipt. A modified FRN 
gambling task was used in tandem of real world limitations during decisions. It was 
shown that, following obstructed decisions, participants showed a decreased P300 
component compared to when they were able to choose freely between alternative 
options. Following the receipt of outcomes, the classic FRN was observed for both 
choice conditions. A median split of the sample between participants showing strong 
and weak P300 amplitudes was used to investigate effects of individual differences in 
sensitivity to having choice freedom on outcome processing. Results showed that 
outcomes from choices made by participants themselves and outcomes resulting from 
arbitrary inflicting decisions upon participants were processed differently on the 
neural level. This effect was specific for losses such that losses resulting from 
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unchosen outcomes produced stronger amplitudes compared to those from decisions 
chosen by participants. This effect was not significant for gains. Furthermore, this 
result was only found for strong but not weak responders, suggesting that the latter did 
not focus on how outcomes were obtained but rather focused only on their valence. 
Crucially, loss aversion was associated with FRN only in the condition of outcomes 
freely chosen by participants and only for strong responders. Thus, this third study 
established further conditions for loss aversion to influence the neural processing of 
decision outcomes: participants must be sensitive to having choice freedom and 
outcomes must result from their own choices. 
 The fourth study investigated loss aversion within a social context. 
Specifically, this study aimed to investigate both behavioural differences in loss 
aversion for decisions regarding the self and decisions regarding others as well as the 
neural underpinnings of such decisions. Participants were led to think that they would 
be gambling to win money for themselves or for another participant. Results revealed 
that participants decided similarly for themselves and others on the behavioural level, 
as indicated by a lack of statistically significant differences between loss aversion in 
the self and the other condition. For decisions regarding the self, the classic FRN was 
found. Surprisingly, for decisions regarding others, the FRN was of opposite direction, 
suggesting that rewards gained for others were probably experienced as relative losses 
for the self on the neural level. This finding might have been due to a social 
comparison taking place between gains for the self versus gains for others leading to 
emotions of envy or disappointment. Furthermore, loss aversion correlated only with 
FRN following decisions about the self but not decisions about others, suggesting that 
loss aversion was a reliable predictor of outcome processing only when outcomes 
concerned the individual. These discrepancies between behavioural and neural data 
might suggest that, even though participants appeared to have been equally eager to 
win for themselves and others, rewards for others were not experienced similarly to 
rewards for themselves after learning the decision outcome. This final study further 
clarified that outcomes must be important for the self but not for others in order for 
loss aversion to influence their neural processing. 
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7.2 Themes 
 
Several common themes emerged from the experimental findings in the 
present thesis. The overarching finding was that loss aversion is consistently 
associated with feedback ERPs when it comes to outcomes that are motivationally 
significant for individuals. Such effects were represented in a range of experimental 
conditions, using different types of decisions. 
 
7.2.1 Loss aversion is associated with the processing of important outcomes 
 
A common theme emerging from all four experiments is that loss aversion is 
associated with the neural processing of decision outcomes that are of motivational 
significance for the decision maker. Individual differences in loss aversion were 
associated with individual differences in FRN amplitude strength across all studies 
when decisions had monetary consequences for participants. In contrast, loss aversion 
was not associated with FRN when decisions did not have any monetary consequences 
for participants. Furthermore, loss aversion was not associated with FRN when 
participants were forced to receive a reward or penalty that was randomly selected for 
them by the computer. 
These findings correspond to behavioural studies suggesting that the presence 
and magnitude of loss aversion depend on whether a future reward is deemed as 
worthy (Harinck et al., 2007) and whether the decision maker has the intention to 
pursue a specific outcome (Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). The findings are also in 
line with literature showing that the motivational significance of a reward influences 
a range of decision making aspects, including the amount of mental (Boksem and 
Tops, 2008; Botvinick et al., 2009; Westbrook et al., 2013) and physical (Hartmann et 
al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2012) effort dedicated towards achieving the reward, initial 
goal setting (Venables and Fairclough, 2009), attention paid to the task (Engelmann et 
al., 2009; Hübner and Schlösser, 2010; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011), and time spent 
looking at the reward (Krajbich et al., 2010; Libera and Chelazzi, 2006). 
The finding that loss aversion consistently correlated with the processing of 
economically important outcomes extends these results and provides further evidence 
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that important and unimportant outcomes have differential effects on feedback-related 
cortical activity patterns. Likewise, a range of neuroimaging studies have manipulated 
the motivational significance of rewards by differentiating between monetary versus 
non-monetary incentives. For instance, larger FRN amplitudes were observed during 
incentive trials (e.g., where the participant received money for selecting the correct 
option) compared to non-incentive trials (e.g., where the participant received nothing 
or just points that did not translate into monetary rewards), and this effect appeared 
irrespective of whether incentives were defined in terms of earning rewards or 
avoiding penalties (Potts, 2011). Another study directly compared real and 
hypothetical rewards and found that real rewards led to stronger FRN and P300 
amplitudes (Xu et al., 2018). Similarly, feedback about monetary rewards was 
associated with stronger FRN amplitudes compared to non-monetary feedback that 
merely signalled correctness (Van den Berg et al., 2012). Along those lines, an fMRI 
study found stronger OFC and VS activation when participants made real compared 
to hypothetical purchases (Kang et al., 2011). 
The differences in the associations of loss aversion with feedback 
electrocortical potentials regarding important and unimportant outcomes can be 
understood within research frameworks suggesting that the neural representation of 
reward does not reflect a single aspect, but rather, the brain encodes information about 
(at least) two distinct aspects of outcomes, namely, their motivational and affective 
relevance (Carter et al., 2009). The motivational aspect refers to the value of the 
outcome (e.g., important versus unimportant), whereas the affective aspect refers to 
its valence (e.g., gains versus losses). For instance, one study manipulated both the 
motivational relevance of the reward (self- versus charity-directed rewards) and its 
affective relevance (gain versus loss), and found that activation strength within 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) could be described as a 
function of reward magnitude during self-directed trials only, suggesting that 
activation in these brain regions primarily reflected the motivational relevance of the 
reward (Carter et al., 2009). The results from the current thesis extend this research by 
showing that loss aversion correlated with feedback ERPs exclusively in conditions of 
reward significance, while lack of self-relevance masked both loss aversion and 
valence associations, resulting in an attenuation of FRN amplitudes. Therefore, the 
distinction between important versus unimportant outcomes emerges as the most 
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significant factor for the association of loss aversion with feedback ERPs. This finding 
has important theoretical implications for loss aversion research, (i.e., that it is only 
associated with brain activity when the outcomes are important) while the present 
thesis further provides a step towards understanding when loss aversion plays a role 
during outcome processing by highlighting that not all outcomes are processed 
similarly, and, importantly, by identifying an initial set of specific conditions that need 
to hold in order for loss aversion to influence outcome evaluation. 
 
7.2.2 Effects of individual differences on feedback ERPs 
 
The results of the current thesis contribute to a more general literature on the 
role of individual differences in reward processing. Across all four experiments, 
individual differences in loss aversion were reflected in FRN amplitudes. A similar 
pattern of results was also found for the P300 potential in the second experiment. 
Given that both ERP components were computed as difference waveforms between 
gain and loss outcomes, these results appear to suggest that the more participants 
disliked the prospect of losing, the more the brain differentiated between positive and 
negative outcomes after those have been received. Furthermore, findings from the 
third experiment showed that individual differences measured on the neural level were 
associated with different electrocortical patterns during outcome evaluation. 
Specifically, participants who showed enhanced P300 amplitudes in response to 
having choice freedom, evaluated outcomes depending on how these outcomes were 
obtained, and this was seen as amplitude differences in loss ERPs between the two 
choice conditions. 
Investigating the potential influence of individual differences during decision 
making is crucial for a better understanding of the cognitive processes associated with 
and leading to specific choice behaviours (Cohen, 2007). Given that loss aversion 
refers to the tendency to avoid negative consequences at the cost of obtaining positive 
ones, literature investigating individual differences in negativity bias can provide an 
explanatory context. For instance, increased subjective experience of negative affect 
and concern over the outcome of an event have been associated with stronger FRN 
(Santesso et al., 2008; Tucker et al., 2003). This finding is even more pronounced in 
research showing that depressed participants, compared to controls, exhibit enhanced 
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FRN amplitudes following negative feedback in the context of both incorrect 
performance (Tucker et al., 2003) and monetary loss (Santesso et al., 2008). Along 
those lines, it has been argued that the enhanced FRN amplitudes prevalent in 
individuals reporting high worry and anxiety relate specifically to an underlying 
negative emotionality (Hajcak et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, negative affect is thought to be associated with individual 
differences in punishment sensitivity (Watson et al., 1999), which suggests that the 
FRN represents an enhanced neural response to penalties (Boksem et al., 2006). 
Previous studies have shown that individual differences in self‐reported punishment 
and reward sensitivity are associated with FRN strength. Specifically, individuals high 
in punishment sensitivity produced enhanced FRN (Boksem et al., 2006), whereas 
those high in reward sensitivity produced attenuated FRN (Santesso et al., 2011). 
Punishment sensitivity was further associated with greater VMPFC activation during 
the FRN response (Amodio et al., 2008; Santesso et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
increased FRN effect for individuals scoring high in punishment sensitivity was 
greater when negative feedback was associated with losing money compared to 
incorrect performance (Boksem et al., 2008). On the contrary, individuals high in 
sensation-seeking and reward sensitivity produced lower FRN following incorrect 
performance feedback (Cooper et al., 2014). Similarly, individuals who self-reported 
decreased motivation following negative feedback showed increased FRN amplitudes 
in a range of tasks (Santesso et al., 2008; Tucker et al., 2003), whereas individuals 
who self-reported stronger motivation after losing showed smaller FRN amplitudes 
(Segalowitz et al., 2011). Likewise, extraversion tendency (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Cohen et al., 2005) has been found to modulate FRN amplitudes such that highly 
extraverted individuals exhibited stronger FRN following unexpected rewards and 
smaller FRN following unexpected non-reward outcomes (Smillie et al., 2010). 
 It is evident from the above studies that negative emotionality plays an 
important role in the manifestation of FRN. The results of this thesis extend those 
findings by showing that the more sensitive an individual is to the prospect of negative 
consequences, the more distinctly the brain discriminates between positive and 
negative outcomes. Thus, understanding the role of individual differences in decision 
making and how these are mirrored on scalp data is an important factor that needs to 
be taken into account by decision making models and reward processing research more 
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generally. Towards this direction, the experiments described here focused on loss 
aversion as one decision making variable and its differences among participants and 
feedback ERPs differences in amplitude strength among participants as a reward 
processing variable. By demonstrating a robust association between loss aversion and 
FRN across the studies, we extend the previous literature described above 
investigating whether individual differences are associated with the amplitudes of 
individual ERP components. 
 
7.2.3 Associations of decision utility with experienced utility 
 
The effects of loss aversion measured during the decision making phase (i.e., 
when participants were contemplating among alternative outcomes) on the subsequent 
hedonic evaluation of those outcomes after the decision has been made can be 
understood in relation to research investigating how decision utility is related to 
experienced utility. Decision utility refers to the subjective expected value of an option 
at the time of choice, whereas experienced utility refers to the actual experienced 
hedonic value produced by the outcome at the time of consumption (Kahneman et al., 
1997). Thus, decision utility at the time of choice would ideally lead to experienced 
utility at the time the decision is materialised. That is, when deciding, the goal is to 
receive a reward the hypothesised value of which is reflected on the decision utility. 
As such, by selecting the option that at the time of choice is valued as the most 
probable to lead to the highest reward, we expect this reward to be received and indeed 
be associated with an experienced utility as high as expected. Of course, this is not 
necessarily always the case as a mismatch between the two can lead to disappointment 
and regret and, potentially, a change in the decision strategy. Nevertheless, the reason 
for choosing a specific option is because the decision maker assumes or hopes that the 
chosen option will lead to the highest experienced utility. 
The neural representations of decision utility have been investigated by 
reinforcement learning models, which associate predictive cues with their subsequent 
outcomes, under the assumption that cues indicating higher rewards will be preferred 
in subsequent choices after learning has occurred (O’Doherty, 2004; Schultz, 1997; 
Seymour et al., 2004; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Likewise, experienced utility and the 
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way the brain encodes signals associated with received rewards has been investigated 
by decision making studies under the general assumption that higher experienced 
utility will be associated with stronger activation in reward-related brain regions 
(Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Delgado, 2007; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Kringelbach, 
2005; Montague and Berns, 2002). 
Although it is important to investigate the specific properties of decision and 
experienced utility separately, it is equally essential to investigate whether and how 
those two different types of utility are associated. Along those lines, individual 
differences in striatal activity during deciding whether to punish a player for an unfair 
offer during an economic game was associated with the amount of money that 
participants actually paid in order to punish that individual (De Quervain et al., 2004). 
Likewise, striatal activity during forced charity donations was associated with the 
amount of money participants donated to charities during voluntary donations 
(Harbaugh et al., 2007). Furthermore, it has been shown that stimulus cues that predict 
outcomes evoke an FRN even before the actual feedback is received, with a 
topographic pattern very similar to the one produced by feedback itself. In particular, 
cues that predicted future losses compared to gains produced stronger FRN and this 
effect was found both when cues signalled sure future losses (Dunning and Hajcak, 
2007; Hajcak et al., 2007) and probable future losses (Holroyd et al., 2011; Liao et al., 
2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2011). Importantly, individual differences in the 
endowment effect, which has been proposed to be a consequence of loss aversion 
(Kahneman et al., 1991), were correlated with the difference in striatal activity strength 
between buying and selling trials (De Martino et al., 2009). 
These studies provide support for the notion that the value assigned to a future 
prospect at the time of the decision depends on a subjective estimation about the 
quality of the experience of that prospect (Kahneman and Snell, 1990). Along those 
lines, loss aversion has been interpreted as a predictive cognitive mechanism 
associated with the psychophysics of hedonic experience (Camerer, 2005). Findings 
from the current thesis appear to provide support for this hypothesis by suggesting that 
loss aversion regarding future prospects was associated with FRN strength following 
the receipt of these prospects. Nevertheless, this postulation needs to be interpreted 
with caution as loss aversion in the current thesis was only measured behaviourally in 
two out of the four studies, while in the remaining two, a single-trial analysis that 
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would allow direct associations between decision and expected utility was not possible 
because of the nature of the experimental design and the ERP components under 
consideration. Nonetheless, our results extend previous fMRI research utilising a 
similar experimental paradigm and associating loss aversion with amygdala activity 
strength for experienced outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). 
 
7.3 Limitations 
 
 The primary limitation of the current thesis is that the methodology used was 
constrained to EEG. The use of fMRI, or combined EEG-fMRI, would have been 
useful to further investigate this topic and relate the timing of loss aversion with 
activation in specific brain regions. However, due to the fact that loss aversion appears 
to constitute only a small part of the decision making process, EEG was deemed as the 
most appropriate method to capture this phenomenon due to its excellent temporal 
resolution. Furthermore, at the start of the experiments discussed here, the gap in the 
literature was specifically the spatiotemporal aspects of loss aversion, while fMRI 
studies, albeit limited, already existed on loss aversion, pointing to structures such as 
the amygdala or the VS (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007). The key finding 
regarding the spatiotemporal correlates of loss aversion that emerged from the 
experiments described in the current thesis was that individual differences in loss 
aversion are associated with two distinct ERP components which differentiate between 
monetary gains and losses and which occur after the outcome of a decision has been 
received. Specifically, individual differences in loss aversion were associated with 
early (around 300 ms) medio-frontal (i.e., FRN) and later (around 400 ms) posterior 
(i.e., P300) brain potential components. 
Another obvious limitation, yet one that is often disregarded in research of this 
type, is that experimental participants were predominantly undergraduate and 
postgraduate students. Thus, findings might not be possible to generalise in different 
samples (Peterson, 2001). Including different samples would be helpful to investigate 
the presence of loss aversion in participants that often need to make risky decisions 
and encounter high stake losses, such as police officers. Similarly, cultural variability 
between participants in the current studies was small, therefore, results should be 
interpreted with caution until they have been replicated cross-culturally. Nevertheless, 
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given practical limitations associated mostly with time constraints, we focused on 
students as the most common method for data collection. 
Finally, another limitation is that for loss aversion estimation we only used a 
gambling task. This particular task was deliberately chosen because it has been widely 
validated for loss aversion research (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007), and 
allowed us to disentangle loss and risk aversion, which are often confounded, so that 
we could ensure that our results were specific to loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2013). This behavioural analysis disentangling loss aversion from risk aversion was 
followed in all four studies presented in the current thesis, irrespective of whether one 
or two experimental tasks have been used. However, only the first study focused on 
the differences between brain activity corresponding to loss aversion versus brain 
activity corresponding to risk aversion. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first 
experiment was an exploratory one for which a whole brain approach using SPM was 
utilised. The brain activity corresponding to individual differences in risk aversion was 
investigated in order to ensure that it was different to the brain activity associated with 
individual differences in loss aversion. The reason for which this analysis was not 
followed for the other studies was both methodological and theoretical. The 
methodological constraint was that the number of trials for risk aversion 
(approximately 80% less than the loss aversion trials) would not allow a robust 
averaging of ERPs. The theoretical motivation was that the main focus of the studies 
was primarily loss, rather than risk, aversion. It was loss aversion specifically for 
which the neuroimaging literature was limited, whereas risk aversion has been 
investigated more often using a variety of tasks (e.g., Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Wu 
et al., 2012). Further advantage of this task is that rewards had real monetary 
consequences for participants and, presumably, highlighted the impact of decisions 
more compared to a task of hypothetical nature. Nevertheless, it would have been 
interesting to ask participants to make other kinds of decisions, perhaps with different 
(non-monetary) stakes. 
 
7.4 Future research 
 
 One interesting possibility for future research would be to investigate loss 
aversion and/or FRN in clinical samples. Two general variables of the present thesis, 
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namely, decision making and reward processing, are also components whose 
dysfunction has been highlighted in several disorders. For instance, loss aversion is 
generally a negative/prevention mind-set that prevails in disorders such as depression 
or obsessive compulsive disorder (Pammi et al., 2015; Sip et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
feedback processing in the range of FRN in disorders such as schizophrenia is not yet 
fully understood. Therefore, investigating the status of these variables in clinical 
samples might further our understanding of the impaired cognitive and emotional 
information processing associated with particular decision making deficits, which 
could subsequently be targeted by specific interventions (e.g., cognitive behavioural 
therapy focusing on avoidance behaviours occurring due to an asymmetric evaluation 
of positive and negative/feared consequences). 
 Future studies could endeavour to use more realistic experimental paradigms. 
For instance, the use of EEG in combination with simultaneous eye tracking 
recordings during a real card game with two participants would be a possible scenario 
in order to extend the current findings in a more naturalistic setting. During the 
paradigms presented here, and as is common with most research of this nature, 
participants viewed stimuli on a computer screen, the order and timing of stimuli were 
strictly controlled and set in advance, and the entire task was generally very 
constrained. Even though these experimental settings were deliberately chosen in 
order to facilitate the collection of clean data and to ensure that ERP responses were 
time-locked to specific events, it would be interesting to see whether these findings 
hold when the experimental paradigm moves away from the experimenter’s control. 
 Furthermore, the use of single-trial analysis techniques might be an interesting 
way to investigate specific neural activity alterations during reward processing. 
Ultimately, every day decision making is often a one-shot single decision process and 
not repetitive as is the case with the large number of trials necessary for creating grand 
averaged ERPs. Although it is generally considered a difficult challenge to use single-
trial analysis with EEG data, it would be definitely useful for seeing how different 
monetary amounts influence loss aversion and FRN. For instance, we did not include 
reward magnitude as a factor in the current experiments because of the above 
described difficulties and also because previous research has suggested that reward 
magnitude is not encoded by FRN (Hajcak et al., 2006). Nevertheless, reward 
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magnitude changes from trial to trial might influence later components and future 
studies should try to incorporate this variable into a single-trial study design. 
Another possibility would be to further investigate risk aversion and how it 
compares to loss aversion. Even though we made an initial step with the first study 
towards that direction, risk aversion was not the primary focus of the present thesis. 
Particularly, given the limited number of risk aversion trials in the current 
experiments, we were not able to investigate associations with brain data in detail. 
However, given that risk and loss aversion can co-occur and are often confounded in 
decision making research (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013), it would be useful if future 
studies could disentangle their brain dynamics. 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
 To conclude, this thesis employed risky decision making tasks and EEG 
recordings to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying loss aversion during the 
processing of decision outcomes. The results point towards an association between 
individual differences in loss aversion and FRN amplitude strength. This pattern was 
replicated across four studies, while at the same time a number of exceptions were 
highlighted. It appears that an important condition for loss aversion to influence the 
evaluation of decision outcomes is that these outcomes must be of motivational 
significance for the decision maker. Motivational significance in the present thesis was 
investigated in terms of counterfactual thinking (hypothetical outcomes that could 
have been obtained if the individual had decided differently), choice freedom 
(outcomes resulting from free choices compared to outcomes arbitrarily inflicted upon 
the individual), and, finally, social context (outcomes affecting others but not the 
decision maker). We showed that loss aversion is associated with FRN (study 1), but 
only when decisions have real economic consequences for individuals (study 2), when 
those consequences stem from individuals’ free choices (study 3), and when the 
receiver of the reward are the individuals themselves (study 4). Results from the 
current thesis add to the growing literature on the neural underpinnings of loss aversion 
and decision making in general. Additionally, they expand previous findings on FRN 
literature and neural processing of rewards by suggesting that individual differences 
in decision making influence such processing. It is hoped that the findings will be 
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useful in future neuroimaging research addressing the effects of individual differences 
in decision making on cortical activity patterns, and the corresponding representation 
of reward processing in the brain. 
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